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JAMES A. STUCKEY
I. INTRODUCTION

Louisiana was the last ofthe fifty states to adopt Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code,' which took effect in Louisiana on
January 1, 1990, long after the other states and the District of
Columbia. Ironically, in that same year, a comprehensive revision

and restatement ofUniform Commercial Code Article 9 commenced.
After a decade long process, Revised Article 9 was promulgated by

the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws

and The American Law Institute in 1999.2
Louisiana's former Chapter 9 was adopted with multiple changes
from the uniform model version of former U.C.C. Article 9.
Recognizing that non-uniformity, and due to the complexity and
length ofthe proposed legislation, when revised U.C.C. Article 9 was

first introduced in the Louisiana Legislature it was referred to the

Louisiana State Law Institute for study, redrafting and the addition of
comments.3 After a two year process of committee meetings and
Institute Council sessions, a modified version of U.C.C. Article 9
containing Louisiana non-uniform variations was recommended by
the Louisiana State Law Institute to the Legislature for the 2001
regular session." With one substantive amendment made in the
Senate Committee on Judiciary A,5 this legislation was enacted,

effective July 1,2001.6 This legislation is known officially as the
Uniform Commercial Code--Secured Transactions, and is referred

to in this article as "Chapter 9."7

1. 1988 La. Acts No. 528; 1989 La. Acts No. 135.
2. The original official promulgation date for Revised Article 9 is 1999.
However, the official uniform version of Revised Article 9 has been subject to
multiple technical amendments throughout 1999 and 2000 (indeed after some states
already had enacted their legislation). As this article goes to press, the American
Law Institute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code have
approved further Modifications to the Official Text and Comments (December
2001) of Revised Article 9. In this article, when citing to the uniform version of
Revised Article 9 (as opposed to a version that has been enacted in any particular
"which includes the amendments
state), the reference is to "U.C.C. Section 9and errata corrections through the end of 200. The Louisiana enactment is
referred to herein as "Chapter 9."
3. H.R. Con. Res. 241, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1999).
4. H.R.B. 679, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2001).
5. See text accompanying infra notes 302-03.
6. 2001 La. Acts No. 128.
7. A comparison of Chapter 9 with U.C.C. Article 9 prepared by the
Louisiana State Law Institute is available on the website ofthe Louisiana Secretary
of State, at http://www.sec.state.la.us/comm/ucc/ucc-v-la-comparite.htm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2002). In spite of the omissions and changes in Chapter 9 from
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This article reviews the material variations in Chapter 9 from

U.C.C. Article 9. The four areas oflargest variation are (1)the scope

ofcollateral, which in Chapter 9 is expanded as to certain types8 and

restricted as to fixtures, 9(2)the inventive filing system under Chapter
9,10 (3) the inclusion in Chapter 9 of an express priority rule

governing the competition between security interests and statutory

privileges," and (4) the remedies and damages available under
Chapter 9. " But, there are other significant non-uniform provisions
in Chapter 9 as well. This article assumes a familiarity with the
provisions and workings of U.C.C. Article 9, and focuses on the
Louisiana additions and omissions contained in Chapter 9. As will
be discussed in detail below, in many cases the omissions made in

Chapter 9 are as significant as, ifnot more significant, than the added
text. 3
II. DEFINITIONS
A. LouisianaDefinitions
The definitions in U.C.C. Article 9 are fundamental to an
understanding and application of its provisions. Many of the

definitions in U.C.C. Article 9 are new. U.C.C. Article 9 also adopts

a new drafting approach different from former U.C.C. Article 9,
Consolidating all defined terms in Section 9-102, with some
exceptions.'I
U.C.C. Section 9-102 contains three subsections.
U.C.C. Article 9, the sequence of sections in Chapter 9 uses the same order as in
the national official text.
8. See discussion infraPart III.A-D.
9. See discussion infraPart V.C.
10. See discussion infra Part V, especially Subpart A.
11. See discussion infra Part VII.B.
12. See discussion infra Part IX.
13. For example, the expansion of Chapter 9's scope to include consumer
deposit accounts, consumer tort claims and judgments, and Chapter 9's addition of
a filing requirement for perfection of a security interest in an interest in a
decedent's estate, each accomplished by the mere omission in Chapter 9 of a
provision contained in U.C.C. Article 9. See text accompanying infra notes 62,
90, 101, and 248. Indeed, legislation by omission is well established in U.C.C.
Article 9. The much celebrated change in U.C.C. Article 9 (and Chapter 9)
dropping the requirement that a financing statement bear the debtor's signature is
achieved by mere omission, not by any explicit statutory statement. La. R.S. 10:9502 (2002). CompareLa. R.S. 10:9-502 with former La. R.S. 10:9-402(1) (1993),
as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1. The statutory text of Chapter 9
similarly does not state that taxpayer identification numbers are no longer required
to be set forth in filings; that change is by omission from former Chapter 9.
CompareLa. R.S. 10:9-502 with former La. R.S. 10:9-402(1) (1993).
14. A few definitions which are used only in one section are set forth in the
applicable section. See, e.g., La. R.S. 10:9-103(a) (Supp. 2002) (purchase-money
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Subsection (a) sets forth 80 definitions. Subsection (b) adopts thirtyfive definitions by cross-reference to other Articles of the U.C.C.
Subsection (c) adopts by general cross-reference the definitions and
principles ofU.C.C. Article ."5

Section 9-102 in Chapter 9 is by necessity non-uniform for
several reasons. First, Louisiana has not enacted Articles 2 and 2A6
of the U.C.C., nor is their adoption likely in the foreseeable future.

As a result, Chapter 9 excludes eleven definitions relating to U.C.C.
Articles 2 and 2A, and instead includes Louisiana definitions for most

of those terms in a new non-uniform Subsection 9-102(d).' 7

security interest); La. R.S. 10:9-210(a) (Supp. 2002) (request for an accounting);
La. R.S. 10:9-336(a) (Supp. 2002) (commingled goods); La. R.S. 10:9-616 (Supp.
2002) (explanation of deficiency). Chapter 9 also retains the placement of the
definition of"pre-effective-date financing statement" in the transition Part 7, which
is used in more than one section, but moves it to a non-uniform Section 9-710
rather than U.C.C. Section 9-707(a).
15. Several terms ofgreat importance in U.C.C. Article 9 are defined in U.C.C.
Article 1, such as the definitions "security interest," "purchase"and "purchaser,"
"organization," and "buyer in ordinary course ofbusiness." See La. R.S. 10:1-201
(1993 & Supp. 2002).
16. H.R. Con. Res. 44,1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1999) directed the Louisiana
State Law Institute to conduct a feasibility study of adopting Articles 2 and 2A of
the Uniform Commercial Code and repealing the Louisiana Civil Code articles on
sales and leases. The resulting Report to the Council of the Louisiana State Law
Institute strongly recommended to the Louisiana Legislature that Articles 2 and 2A
should not be adopted in Louisiana. Report by the U.C.C. 2, 2A Committee of the
Louisiana State Law Institute (Sept. 22-23, 2000).
17. The omitted eleven definitions are the terms "contract for sale," "lease,".
"lease agreement," "lease contract," "leasehold interest," "lessee," "lessee in
ordinary course ofbusiness," "lessor," "lessor's residual interest," "merchant," and
"sale." Subsection 9-102(d) adds non-uniform Louisiana definitions for seven of
these terms. The Louisiana definitions of "lease" and "sale",are derived from the
La. Civ. Code arts. 2669, 2674 and 2677, and 2439, respectively. The Louisiana
definitions of"leasehold interest," "lessee" and "lessor" are straightforward. The
Louisiana definitions of "lessee in ordinary course of business," and "merchant,"
are taken from U.C.C. Articles 2A and 2, respectively. Four of the omitted
definitions are not replaced in Chapter 9: "contract for sale," "lease agreement,"
"lease contract," and "lessor's residual interest." "Contract for sale" is used in only
two places in U.C.C. Article 9. In Chapter 9 the reference to contract for sale in the
definition of goods is superseded by the Louisiana non-uniform definition
"recorded timber conveyance," and the reference to that term in U.C.C. Subsection
9-610(d) is unnecessary in Louisiana. Consistent with other Louisiana law,
Chapter 9 has no need for definitions of "lease agreement" and "lease contract"
separate from the term "lease." U.C.C. §§ 9-323(f)(2), 9-407(a), 9-407 (c). See
La. R.S. 10:1-201 cmt. (e) (1974) (U.C.C. definitions of "agreement" and
"contract" are omitted as "incomplete, inaccurate and unnecessary"). In Chapter
9 the term "lessor's residual interest" is used (without definition) only in Section
9-407. Furthermore, the non-uniform language in former Chapter 9's definition of
chattel paper by which the reversionary right of the lessor in the leased goods was
embodied in the chattel paper has been intentionally suppressed in Chapter 9. See
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Subsection 9-102(d) of Chapter 9 contains nineteen additional
non-uniform definitions. As noted above, seven of these definitions
are added in lieu of terms defined in U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2A.18
Four other definitions are added to translate the common law
terminology used in U.C.C. Article 9 to fit within the language of
Louisiana's civil law property concepts and principles. Thus,
"intangible" is defined to mean "incorporeal," "personal property" to
mean "movable property," "real property" to mean "immovable
property and
real rights therein," and "tangible" to mean
"corporeal."' 9 This drafting approach avoids having to change those
terms innumerable times in the text of Chapter 9 to these parallel but
not identical Louisiana counterparts which-unlike these four
common law terms-have meaning in Louisiana. For a similar
reason, definitions of"bailee," "bailor," 2° "lien," and "lienholder" 2'
are included in Subsection 9-102 (d) because such terms do not have
established and recognized meanings in Louisiana's civil law. For
similar reasons, Chapter 9 replaces the phrase "rule of law" used in
U.C.C. Article 9 with the terms "statute or regulation."2
former La. R.S. 10:9-105(1)(b) (1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 128, §
1.
18. See supra note 17.
19. La. R.S. 10:9-102(d)(3), 10:9-102(d)(14), 10:9-102(d)(15), and 10:9102(d)( 18) (Supp. 2002). However, the definition of"real property," and its subset
definition of"mineral rights," are defined broader perhaps for purposes ofChapter
9 than may be the case for other purposes of Louisiana law, by inclusion of leases
and net profits interests, respectively. See text accompanying infra note 28. The
civil law majority view is that a lease creates personal rights, not real rights. A. N.
Yiannopoulos, Property §226 at 422, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1996).
Compare with La. R.S. 31:16 (1989) (mineral leases and other unenumerated
mineral rights are real rights).
20. La. R.S. 10:9-102(d)(1) (Supp. 2002). The definition of "bailee" in
Chapter 9 is a simplified version suitable for its limited use and purpose in Chapter
9, but does not include all of the concepts found in the definition of bailee and
bailment under common law. See La. R.S. 10:9-31 0(b)(4), 10:9-312, and 10:9-505
(Supp. 2002).
21. La. R.S. 10:9-102(d)(9), 10:9-102(d)(10) (Supp. 2002). U.C.C. Article 9
refers throughout to "security interests and other liens" (emphasis added), but in
Louisiana a privilege is not a security interest. Thus Chapter 9 makes a nonuniform change throughout to delete the reference to "other" liens in places where
reference is made to "security interests and liens." See also infra Part VII.B
(dealing with non-uniform Chapter 9 provisions regarding the relative priority of
liens versus security interests).
22. La. R.S. 10:9-201, 10:9-333 (Supp. 2002). Compare La. R.S. 10:9109(d)(2) (Supp. 2002) with U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(2) (2001). But see La. R.S. 10:9406(0, 10:9-408(c), and 10:9-409(a) (Supp. 2002). The sources of law in
Louisiana are legislation and custom. La. Civ. Code art. 1. The phrase "rule of
law" is rejected in Chapter 9 to avoid its intended inclusion ofjurisprudence as an
authoritative source oflaw in Louisiana. Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119,
128 (La. 2000). See infra notes 280 and 376; A. N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil
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Five other non-uniform definitions are added to Chapter 9 in
Subsection 9-102(d). A definition of "collateral mortgage note" is
used to permit the inclusion of special non-uniform provisions
pertaining only to collateral mortgage notes in Chapter 9, and to
restrict their application to collateral mortgages encumbering
Louisiana immovable property.2" At the request ofthe Law Institute
Council a non-uniform definition of "local law" was added. "Local
law" is a term used in U.C.C. Article 9 without definition to mean the
substantive law of a particular jurisdiction and not its choice-of-law
rules.24 Definitions of "mineral rights, 25 "recorded timber
conveyance," 26 and "titled motor vehicle"" are included in Chapter
9 for convenience in drafting.
The application of the definitions in Chapter 9 is intended to be
restrictive in two respects. First, consistent with U.C.C. Article 9, the
introductory language in Section 9-102 regarding definitions has been
changed from prior law in former Chapter 9 and former U.C.C.
Article 9. In former Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:9-105(1), the
introductory clause specified that the context in which a defined word
was used might require a different meaning to be given to the word.
That language gave the courts some latitude in determining whether
the precise definition provided in the U.C.C. should be applied in a
particular case. In Chapter 9, each definition is only used in the
context in which it was intended. Thus, the prior statement of
flexibility is deleted as no longer appropriate. Second, the definitions
in Chapter 9 take precedence over the general definitions in Article 1.
Furthermore, it is the express intent of the language "in this Chapter"
that these definitions be used by the courts only in the interpretation
of Chapter 9, and they not otherwise be imported or used in
interpreting other matters of Louisiana law.2"

Law: A Lost Cause?, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 830, 835 n.25 (1980). Similar changes are
the omission of references to "equitable principles" of tracing proceeds in
Subsection 9-315(b)(2), the replacement of "ownership interest" for "legal or
equitable interest" in Section 9-318, and the omission of "equitable" proceedings

in Subsection 9-334(e)(3).
23. La. R.S. 10:9-102(d)(2) (Supp. 2002). See discussion infra Part III.E.
Comparewith La. R.S. 9:5550 (1991).
24. La. R.S. 10:9-102(d)(1 1)(Supp. 2002). See U.C.C. §9-301 cmt. 3 (2001),
La. Civ. Code art. 3517 (source ofphraseology).
25. La. R.S. 10:9-102(d)(13) (Supp. 2002). See former La. R.S. 10:9102(4)(c) (1993), as amendedby 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1. See alsosupranote
19 and infra Part III.G.
26. La. R.S. 10:9-102(d)(16) (Supp. 2002). See text accompanying infra note
37.
27. La. R.S. 10:9-102(d)(19) (Supp. 2002). See infraPart V.E.
28. See supra note 19 and discussion infra Part II.C.2.
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B. AgriculturalMatters
Chapter 9 contains four definitions particularly pertinent to the
provisions bearing upon agricultural matters. 29 The definition of
"farming operations" in Chapter 9 is uniform. It is added in U.C.C.
Article 9 for clarification only.30 However, the definition of "farm
products" in Chapter 9 reproduces additional non-uniform language
of former Chapter 9 by listing specific examples of crops, livestock
and products. 3'
This enumeration of specific examples of farm products is less
important in revised Chapter 9 due to the breadth of the expanded
definition in U.C.C. Article 9, but is carried forward to avoid creating
any negative implication by their removal. Goods are "farm
products" if the debtor is engaged in farming operations with respect
to the goods. Crops, livestock, and their products cease to be "farm
products" when the debtor ceases to be engaged in fanning operations
with respect to them. Products of crops or livestock, even though
they remain in the possession of a person engaged in farming
operations, lose their status as farm products if they are subjected to
a manufacturing process.32 The terms "crops," "livestock," and
"manufacturing process" are not defined.
The definition of "farm products" in Chapter 9, as in U.C.C.
Article 9 and former Chapter 9,33 excludes standing timber.
However, this definition continues to differ from the definition of
farm products in Louisiana Revised Statutes 3:3652(10) pertaining to
the Louisiana agricultural central registry established pursuant to the
Federal Food Security Act of 1985, which includes standing timber
in the definition of farm products.34 Under Section 9-311, the filing
requirements set forth in Title 3 pertaining to security interests and
liens affecting farm products or standing timber prevail over the rules
in Chapter 9 which are inconsistent.35
29. See discussion infra Part VII.A.
30. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 4(a) (2001).

31. CompareLa. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(34) (Supp. 2002) with former La. R.S. 10:9109(3) (1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1. The enumerated aquatic

goods in Chapter 9 include crawfish, which inexplicably was not listed in former
Chapter 9 despite being Louisiana's official state crustacean. La. R.S. 49:168
(1987).
32. See U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 4(a) (2001).
33. See supra note 31.
34. Other differences exist in the two definitions. For instance, Chapter 9 no

longer requires by definition that such goods be in the debtor's possession to be
farm products. See also La. R.S. 10:9-31 1(a)(2) (Supp. 2002) and former La. R.S.
10:9-302(3)(b)(ii) (1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1.
35. At the time that the article is written, the requirements for filings in the
Louisiana agricultural central registry still include the debtor's signature and
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However, standing timber owned separately from the land is in
many instances within the scope of revised Chapter 9, even though
not a farm product under Chapter 9. This result arises from multiple
provisions in Chapter 9. The definition of "goods," in combination
with the new definition of"recorded timber conveyance," reproduces
the substance of former Chapter 9 pertaining to timber. Standing
timber is immovable, but trees cut down, whether carried off or not,
are movables.36 Nonetheless, the precise intersection between
immovable and movable property can be difficult to elucidate, and
timber is no exception. Under Chapter 9, the interest of a debtor
other than a landowner in standing timber that is to be cut and
removed under a recorded timber conveyance is classified as goods,
and may be encumbered under Chapter 9. The definition of
"recorded timber conveyance" is new in Chapter 9, although it
reproduces the substanceof former Chapter 9.37 This term is used in
revised Chapter 9 in the definition of "goods," pertaining to the
circumstances in which standing timber is made movable by
anticipation. This aspect ofthe treatment of timber in Chapter 9 did
not change Louisiana law. Additional non-uniform language in
former Chapter 9 was omitted as unnecessary and implicit, but with
no intent to change Louisiana law.
If standing timber is not cut and removed within the time period
provided for in the recorded timber conveyance, the standing timber
ceases to be "goods" and any security interest granted in the standing
timber will automatically terminate.3 s Chapter 9 is more explicit than
former Chapter 9 in providing that standing timber which is made
movable by anticipation is within the scope ofChapter 9. Section 9109(a)(1) provides that standing timber that constitutes goods (that is,
the interest of a non-landowner in standing timber that is subject to
a recorded timber conveyance) is subject to Chapter 9. A similar
non-uniform clarification is added to Section 9-109(d)(1 1)(F).
The fourth definition pertinent to agricultural matters is
"agricultural lien."39 As discussed below, Chapter 9 includes
agricultural liens within its scope. ° This definition varies from
taxpayer identification number. La. R.S. 3:3654(E) (1993 & Supp. 2002).

36. La. Civ. Code arts. 463-464. Cf Revision Comments - 1978 to La. Civ.
Code art. 469 and La. Civ. Code art. 474 (growing crops made movables by
anticipation).
37. See former La. R.S. 10:9-105(1)(h) (1993), as amendedby 2001 La. Acts
No. 128, § 1.
38. Id.
39. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(5) (Supp. 2002).
40. The creation or attachment of an agricultural lien is not governed by
Chapter 9 (or U.C.C. Article 9), but the perfection and priority rules of Chapter 9
do apply to agricultural liens. See, e.g., La. R.S. 10:9-302, 10:9-308(b), 10:9-310,
10:9-31 1(a)(2), 10:9-322(a), 10:9-322(f)(5), 10:9-324(d), and 10:9-334(i) (Supp.
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U.C.C. Article 9 by substituting the term "lien," which is a nonuniform defined term in Chapter 9.4 This definition also changes
U.C.C. Article 9 with respect to the lessor's privilege, in order to
bring all Louisiana lessor's privileges on farm products within the
scope of the definition. Louisiana does not restrict the lessor's
privilege only to the movable effects of the tenant. The Louisiana
lessor's privilege also includes the movables of a subtenant or third
party on the leased premises.42 Thus the definition in Chapter 9 is
modified so as to not require that the debtor be the direct tenant. In
addition, the definition does not restrict the lien in favor of the
furnisher of goods or services only to furnishers in the ordinary
course of business. That requirement in U.C.C. Article 9 is not
contained in all of Louisiana's statutes creating such privileges.43
C. OtherModifications to U C.C.Article 9 Definitions
1. Debtor
The definition of"debtor" in Chapter 9 is substantively uniform."
However, the result from this uniform definition may be different in
Louisiana from many other states. Louisiana is a community
property state.45 The term "debtor" is defined in relation to property,
rather than the secured obligation. 46 The definition specifies that the
debtor is a person having an interest in the collateral. Thus, as under
former Chapter 9, each spouse is a debtor as to community property
collateral, even if only one spouse acts alone to encumber the
collateral with the security interest. 47 Each debtor is entitled to the
protections afforded under Chapter 9. The secured party is protected
from responsibility to unknown debtors by Sections 9-605 and 9-628.
In circumstances where one spouse alone has the exclusive right to
encumber, notice under Chapter 9 to only the debtor-spouse who by
2002). See infra Part VII.A.
41. See supranote 21.
42. La. Civ. Code arts. 2706-2708.
43. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 3217(1), La. R.S. 9:4522 (1991 & Supp.
2002), and La. R.S. 9:4661 (1991). See further discussion in text accompanying
infra notes 269-270.
44. The variation is the deletion of the word "other" in front of lien, done
throughout Chapter 9. See supra note 21.
45. La. Civ. Code art. 2334.
46. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(28) (Supp. 2002).
47. The creation of a security interest in certain community property requires
the concurrence of both spouses. La. Civ. Code arts. 2347, 2348 and 2353. With
respect to certain other community property, one spouse alone has the exclusive
right to encumber (although each spouse is a debtor as to such collateral). La. Civ.
Code arts. 2350-2352.
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law has the exclusive management of that community property
collateral may be sufficient.48 Even as to ordinary community
property, where spouses reside together at the time, notice to one
spouse alone may be sufficient for purposes of Chapter 9.49 Either
spouse is a proper defendant, during the existence of the marital
community, in a judicial action to enforce an obligation against
community property.5°
2. GoodFaith
The definition of"good faith" in Chapter 9 follows the definition
inU.C.C. Article 9." The definition goes beyond honesty in fact, and
requires the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing. The same definition is found in other parts of the U.C.C.
enacted in Louisiana.52 However, this definition varies from the nonuniform definition of good faith in U.C.C. Article 1 previously
enacted in Louisiana, which was made non-uniform to be consistent
with the Louisiana Civil Code. 3 The Chapter 9 definition is
applicable only to the interpretation of the term in the specific
provisions in which it is used in the express language in Chapter 9.54
This definition is not applicable generally to matters governed by
Chapter 9 where the term "good faith" is not expressly stated in the
statute's text. Nor is it to be used in other areas of Louisiana law
outside Chapter 9.55 In particular, the Chapter 9 definition is not
used, and is not intended to apply to, the rights and duties of a
secured party in its relationship with a debtor or obligor. The term is
intentionally not used in Part 6 ofChapter 9 in that context. Instead,
the obligation of good faith imposed on a secured party's56
enforcement actions under Chapter 9 uses the other, prior definition.

48. Cf Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Nata, 469 So. 2d 11 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985)
(sufficient in executory process foreclosure to sue only the one spouse in whose
name automobile is registered). See La. Civ. Code arts. 2350-2352.
49. Cf Shel-Boze, Inc. v. Melton, 509 So. 2d 106 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999)
(where spouses reside together at the time, service of notice on one spouse alone
does not offend the due process rights of the other spouse with respect to the

enforcement of an obligation against community property).
50. La. Code Civ. P. art. 735.
51. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(43) (Supp. 2002).
52.

La. R.S. 10:8-102(a)(10) (1993 & Supp. 2002).

53. La. R.S. 10:1-203 (1993).
54. SeeLa.R.S. 10:9-102(d)(7), 10:9-315(a)(3), 10:9-321(a), 10:9-330, 10:9405(a), 10:9-615(g), and 10:9-617(b) (Supp. 2002). See text accompanying supra
note 28.
55. See text accompanying supra note 28.
56. La. R.S. 10:1-203 (1993). See U.C.C. § 9-620 cmt. 11 (2000). See also
infra note 324.
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3. Registered Organization
For clarification, Chapter 9 adds a non-uniform second sentence
to the definition of"registered organization." 5 This definition is new
in U.C.C. Article 9, and reflects the changes in the choice oflaw rules
governing perfection and priority ofsecurity interests and agricultural
liens. Official Comment 11 to U.C.C. Section 9-102 states: "[n]ot
every organization that may provide information about itself in the
public records is a "registered organization." For example, a general
partnership is not a "registered organization," even if it files a
statement of partnership authority under section 303 of the Uniform
Partnership Act or an assumed name ("dba") certificate. This is
because the State where the partnership is organized is not required
to maintain a public record showing that the partnership has been
organized. In contrast, corporations, limited liability companies, and
limited partnerships are "registered organizations."
Chapter 9 clarifies this definition for use with respect to Louisiana
entities. Even though a Louisiana general partnership must file its
contract of partnership for registry with the Louisiana Secretary of
State in order for the partnership to be deemed an owner of
immovable property as to third parties,5" this filing is not necessary
for the general partnership to exist as that type of legal entity. In
contrast, a Louisiana partnership in commendam must be filed for
registry in order for such partnership to exist as that type of entity,59
even though the partnership still may exist as a legal entity without
registry of its partnership contract. The rule is that if public
registration is necessary for an entity to exist as that type of entity,
then such entity is a "registered organization."
III. SCOPE
In the first ofseveral significant variations, Chapter 9 brings into
its scope several kinds of property that reside outside of U.C.C.
Article 9. This expansion in scope is carried forward from former
Chapter 9.60 The additional types of collateral included within the
scope of Chapter 9 are consumer deposit accounts, consumer tort
claims,judgments, and life insurance policies. Additionally, Chapter
9 contains special provisions pertaining to collateral mortgage notes
and to public finance transactions. As discussed later, Chapter 9 also
varies in the creation, perfection, priority, and remedies rules
applicable to fixtures. This expansion in scope will create problems
57. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(70) (Supp. 2002).

58. La. Civ. Code art. 2806 and La. R.S. 9:3401-3408 (1997 & Supp. 2001).
59. La. Civ. Code art. 2841.
60. La. R.S. 10:9-104 (1993), as amendedby 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1.
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as to the choice of law governing perfection of security interests in
collateral not covered by U.C.C. Article 9. For reasons discussed
below, only some of these potential problems could be effectively
addressed by Chapter 9.61
A. DepositAccounts
Chapter 9 carries forward from former Chapter 9 the inclusion of
all deposit accounts as eligible original collateral. U.C.C. Section 9109(d)(1 3) excludes deposit accounts in a consumer transaction from
the scope of U.C.C. Article 9. In one of several inclusions by
omission, Chapter 9 makes consumer deposit accounts eligible as
collateral within the scope ofChapter 9 by omitting and reserving that
exclusion in the scope provision.62 Louisiana was one of the few
states to include deposit accounts within the scope of former U.C.C.
Article 9.63 However, Louisiana included no other special statutory
provisions to accommodate properly the inclusion ofcommercial and
consumer deposit accounts within its scope, other than a perfection
Chapter 9, plus
method' and a choice of law provision65 in former
66 Louisiana was
modifications to the Louisiana banking statutes.
lucky to avoid litigation arising from the large gaps in former Chapter
9 as to the intersection of deposit accounts as original collateral and
deposit accounts as proceeds ofother collateral. Chapter 9 is uniform
with U.C.C. Article 9 in most respects regarding deposit accounts,
including the choice of law governing perfection and priority of
security interests in deposit accounts under Section 9-304.67 However,
61. See infra notes 67, 98, 101, 106, 110 and accompanying text. Compare
text accompanying infra note 251.
62. La. R.S. 10:9-109(d)(13) (reserved) (Supp. 2002). See supra note 13.
Other states such as Idaho, Illinois, Mississippi and North Dakota (and Florida and
Oregon in part) have made similar non-uniform changes.
63. See La. R.S. 10:9-103(7) (1993) (choice oflaw); La. R.S. 10:9-104 (1993)
(exclusion (1)reserved in Louisiana); La. R.S. 10:9-305(4) (1993) (perfection), as
amendedby 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1. The other states were California, Hawaii,
Idaho and Illinois.
64. La. R.S. 10:9-305(4) (1993).
65. La. R.S. 10:103(7) (1993).
66. La. R.S. 6:312(E), La. R.S. 6:316 (1986 & Supp. 2002). Cf Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, 824 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. La. 1993) (statutory
security interest in deposit account priority dispute under pre-former Chapter 9
law).
67. See text accompanying supranote 61. Otherwise Louisiana law will send
the issue of perfection and priority to be governed by another state's law which
does not include consumer deposit accounts within U.C.C. Article 9 and thus
provides no perfection mechanism under its U.C.C. Of course, this problem is
minor compared to the similar problem that existed under former Chapter 9 choice
of law rule whenever the depositary bank of a commercial or consumer account
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because Chapter 9 includes consumer deposit accounts within its
scope, Section 9-304 has a broader application than U.C.C. Section
9-304. Thus, the choice of law rule of Louisiana governing
perfection and priority of a security interest in a consumer deposit
account makes it clear that this inclusion of consumer deposit
accounts within the ambit of Chapter 9 applies only when Louisiana
is the depositary bank's jurisdiction.
Section 9-104 is uniform in Chapter 9. This section explains the
concept of "control" ofa deposit account. Control under this section
may serve two functions. First, "control... pursuant to the debtor's
security agreement" may substitute for an authenticated security
agreement as an element of attachment.68 Second, when a deposit
account is taken as original collateral, the only method ofperfection
is to obtain control under Section 9-104.69
This provision changes existing Louisiana law. Former Chapter
9 provided that a security interest in a deposit account maintained or
established with a third party bank is_perfected only by giving notice
of the security interest to that bank.7" Chapter 9 changes the law to
require more than mere notice to the bank. Either the bank must
agree in an authenticated record that the bank will comply with the
71
instructions ofthe secured party, or the secured party must become

the bank's customer with respect to the deposit account.7"
Under the transition rules of Chapter 9, a secured party which on
July 1, 2001 is perfected solely by notice will have one year to
comply with the new requirements.73 Nonetheless, the practical effect
of this change will be limited. First, it is rare that a secured party
would have relied solely on notice, without having obtained a written
acknowledgment from a third party bank. Written acknowledgment
is especially important because of the need to obtain a waiver or
subordination of the depositary bank's right of set-off and statutory
security interest. Such waiver or subordination is necessary in order
was located outside Louisiana. See La. R.S. 10:9-103(7) (1993).

68. La. R.S. 10:9-203(b)(3)(D) (Supp. 2002).

69. La. R.S. 10:9-312(b)(1), 10:9-314 (Supp. 2002).
70. La. R.S. 10:9-305(4) (1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts 128, § 1.
Grocery Supply Co. v. Winterton Food Stores, Inc., 655 So. 2d 555 (La. App. 2d
1995).
71. La. R.S. 10:9-104(a)(2) (Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S. 10:9-312(b)(1),
10:9-314 (Supp. 2002).
72. La. R.S. 10:9-104(a)(3) (Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S. 10:9-312(b)(1),
10:9-314 (Supp. 2002). But ifthe secured party is the depositary bank, the security
interest is automatically perfected (albeit now by "control"), as was true under
former Chapter 9. La. R.S. 10:9-104(a)(1) (Supp. 2002) and former La. R.S. 10:9305(4) (1993).
73. See La. R.S. 10:9-703(b) (Supp. 2002). See alsotext accompanying infra
note 387.
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74
for the creditor's security interest to have commercial value. Also,
Chapter 9 continues the substance of former Chapter 9 where, as is
usually the case, the creditor is the bank at which a deposit account
is maintained. In that circumstance the security interest of the
depositary bank is automatically perfected at the time the security
interest attaches.75
Chapter 9 has suppressed the statements in former Chapter 9 that
a security interest in a deposit account is not prejudiced by the
debtor's right to withdraw funds from or write checks on the account
at will, and that granting a security interest in such an account is not
deemed to be a withdrawal of such funds.76 These provisions are
unnecessary.77 This omission does not change the law.
Chapter 9 does change the definition of "deposit account" from
former Chapter 9 to correspond to the interplay of deposit accounts
and instruments in U.C.C. Article 9. Former Chapter 9 excluded "an
account evidenced by a certificate of deposit" from the definition of
deposit account. 78 The revised definition of "deposit account" in
Chapter 9 goes further and specifically excludes all accounts
evidenced by an instrument.7 9
The definition of the term "instrument" in Chapter 980 and in
U.C.C. Article 9 is broader than the definition of that term in U.C.C.
Article 3,81 which includes only negotiable instruments. Under
U.C.C. Article 9 and Chapter 9, an "instrument" is defined as "a
negotiable instrument or any other writing that evidences a right to
the payment of a monetary obligation.., and is of a type that in the
ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any
necessary endorsement or assignment."" Thus, under the new
definition an uncertificated certificate of deposit is a deposit account
if,and because, there is no writing evidencing the bank's obligation
to pay. On the other hand, a non-negotiable certificate of deposit is
a deposit account only if it is not an "instrument," i.e., a question that
turns on whether the non-negotiable certificate ofdeposit is "ofa type

74. See La. R.S. 10:9-340 (Supp. 2002). See text accompanying infra notes
89 and 305.
75. See supra note 72.

76. See former La. R.S. 10:9-305(4) (1993).
77. See La. R.S. 10:9-205 (1993 & Supp. 2002).
78. La. R.S. 10:9-105(e) (1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1.
79. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(29) (Supp. 2002).
80. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(47) (Supp. 2002). Chapter 9 includes the nonuniform statement that a negotiable certificate of deposit is an instrument.
81. See La. R.S. 10:3-104 (1993) ("instrument" means a "negotiable
instrument" as defined therein); U.C.C. § 9-102 cmts. 5(c) and 12 (2001). See
Baker v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 111 F. Supp. 2d 799 (W.D. La. 2000)
("nontransferable" certificate of deposit not a negotiable instrument).

82. U.C.C. § 9-102(47) (2001); La. R.S. 10:9-102(47) (Supp. 2002).
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that in ordinary course ofbusiness is transferred by delivery with any
necessary indorsement or assignment. 8 s3
This revised definition is only a partial step towards clarifying the
proper treatment of non-negotiable or uncertificated certificates of
deposit, which have become the norm in the banking industry. The
clarity is that deposit accounts and instruments are mutually exclusive
by definition; the lack ofclarity arises from the uncertainty as to nonnegotiable CDs. A deposit account evidenced by an instrument is
subject to the rules applicable to instruments generally. As a
consequence, a security interest in such an instrument cannot be
perfected by "control" and the special priority rules applicable to
deposit accounts do not apply. Chapter 9 varies from U.C.C. Article
9 in the definition of "instrument" to expressly state in the statute,
and not just in the official comments, that a negotiable certificate of
deposit is an instrument. 4
In both U.C.C. Article 9 and Chapter 9, deposit accounts are
explicitly excluded from the definitions of"accounts" 5 and "general
intangible[s]."s6 Thus, banks are not "account debtors" ' with respect
to deposit accounts, and are not subject to the duties imposed in
Sections 9-404 through 9-406. Chapter 9 does add a non-uniform
Section 9-343, to specify that the joinder by a depositary bank in a
control agreement does not itselfconstitute a waiver or subordination
of the bank's security interest in the deposit account, unless that
control agreement specifically so provides.8 8 Of course, a depositary
bank in Louisiana not only has the right of compensation or set-off,
but also a statutory security interest.89 As a practical matter, a secured
party holding a security interest in a deposit account maintained at
another depositary institution must obtain an agreement with that
other depositary institution that not only provides the benefit of
perfection by control to the secured party but further waives or
subordinates the depositary institution's security interest and rights
of compensation.
83. See U.C.C. §9-102 cmts. 5(c) and 12 (2001). See also In re Omega Envtl.,
Inc. v. Valley Bank, 219 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2000).
84. See supranote 80.

85. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(2) (Supp. 2002).
86. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(42) (Supp. 2002). Thus a deposit account is not a
payment intangible, which must be a general intangible. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(61)
(Supp.2002).
87. An account debtor is obligated on an account, chattel paper or general
intangible, which does not include deposit accounts. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(3)
(Supp. 2002).
88. See discussion infra Part VIII.D. A bank is not required to agree to enter
into a control agreement even if the debtor customer requests. La. R.S. 10:9-342
(Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S. 6:312(E), 6:664(E) (1986 & Supp. 2002).
89. La. R.S. 6:316 (Supp. 2002). See text accompanying supranote 74.
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B. Tort Claims

Chapter 9 follows former Chapter 9 in including all tort claims as

eligible original collateral. Once again, this addition in scope is

U.C.C. Article 9,which
accomplished in Chapter 9 by deletion from
90 Indeed, Chapter 9 omits
claims.
tort
limits its scope to commercial
and reserves the definition "commercial tort claim"' because Chapter
9 applies to all tort claims and there is no need to refer in the

Louisiana statute to commercial tort claims specifically. Chapter 9
goes beyond former Chapter 9 in including specific provisions
pertaining to security interests in tort claims, both by following
U.C.C. Article 9 and.by adding non-uniform provisions.
Tort claims are excluded from the definition of "general
intangible." Therefore, because the tortfeasor is not "obligated on a[]
... general intangible," tortfeasors are not account debtors under
U.C.C. Article 9 or Chapter 9.92 As a result, the rules in Section 993
406 with respect to account debtors are inapplicable to tortfeasors.
Instead, the rights and obligations9 4of a tortfeasor are dealt with in

non-uniform Subsection 9-41 1(c).

Once a tort claim is reduced to judgment, non-uniform Section 9412 governs.95 If a tort claim is settled under circumstances giving
rise to a contractual obligation to pay, the right to payment becomes
90. See La. RS. 10:9-109(d)(1 2) (reserved) (Supp. 2002), La. R.S. 10:9-104(k)
(1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1, and supra note 13 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Chapter 9's restriction in the creation of
security interests in tort claims to existing tort claims described with some
specificity, see infra notes 155-159 and accompanying text, and for a discussion
of the transition issue caused thereby, see infra notes 156 and 386 and
accompanying text.
91. See La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(13) (reserved) (Supp. 2002). An understandable
but erroneous first impression by readers ofChapter 9 is that this deletion of the
definition ofcommercial tort claims is a prelude to an exclusion ofall tort claims,
including commercial tort claims, from Chapter 9, rather than an inclusion of all
tort claims including consumer.
92. See La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(42), 10:9-102(a)(3) (Supp. 2002).
93. A tortfeasor is not an "account debtor." Because Sections 9-406, 9-407,
9-408 and 9-409 have no application to tort claims, the general rule under Section
9-401 applies. Whether a debtor's rights in a tort claim may be transferred (by a
security interest or otherwise) is governed by law other than Chapter 9 (and U.C.C.
Article 9 in other states). U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(g) (2000). Assignments of tort
claims are permitted in Louisiana. Dupuis v. Faulk, 609 So. 2d 1190 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1992); see La. Civ. Code art. 2652 and discussion in the text accompanying
infra at note 317. U.C.C. Article 9 does not determine whom the tortfeasor must
pay to discharge its obligation. U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 15 (2000). ContraLa. R.S.
10:9-412 (Supp. 2002).
94. See discussion infra Part VIII.G.
95. See discussion infra Part Il.C and VIII.F.
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a payment intangible (or an instrument) and ceases to be a claim
arising in tort.96
Perfection as to tort claims is by filing. 7 Under the general rule
established in Section 9-310, a security interest in rights under a tort
claim is perfected by filing a financing statement. Because Chapter
9 does not contain a special choice of law rule governing the
perfection and priority rules applicable to tort claims, the general rule
applies.9" As a result, filing a notice in the court records or
intervening in any judicial proceedings in which the tort claim is
pending is unnecessary. These rules pertaining to tort claims in
Chapter 9 do not change Louisiana law.
Under Section 9-412, a tortfeasor may discharge his obligation
until he receives notification from the secured party that payment
must be made to the secured party. However, the notification
required by Section 9-412 is not related to perfection of a security
interest in a tort claim. Perfection ofa security interest in a tort claim
is relevant only as to other creditors (obligees) of the debtor, and not
to the tortfeasor as an obligor of the debtor. Filing of a financing
statement does not constitute notice to the tortfeasor under Section 9412. 99

96. U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 15 (2000).
97. This conclusion results from the general rule that filing is the catch-all
method of perfection unless a stated exception applies to a type ofcollateral. La.
R.S. 10:9-310(a). There is no stated special rule for tort claim perfection. Cf
Dupuis v. Faulk, 609 So. 2d 1190 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (no filing needed for
true assignment ofpersonal injury lawsuit claim).
98. Because none of the exceptions in U.C.C. Sections 9-303 through 9-306
apply, nor do any of the exceptions in the other subsections of U.C.C. Section 9301, the perfection and priority ofsecurity interests in tort claims are governed by
the substantive law of the debtor's location. La. R.S. 10:9-301(1) (Supp. 2002).
As with other types of collateral where Chapter 9's scope is expanded, the
application of this rule to consumer tort claims leaves a gap in instances where the
debtor is not located in Louisiana. See text accompanying supranote 61. Of
course, the same problem existed under former Chapter 9, but then included even
commercial tort claims in this conundrum. If the debtor granting a security interest
in a consumer tort claim is not a Louisiana resident, under Louisiana law another
state's law will govern perfection and priority but that other state will not supply
any applicable rules under U.C.C. Article 9. La. R.S. 10:9-307(b)(1) (Supp. 2002)
and U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(12) (2000). Indeed, perhaps in the rare case where the
perfection of a security interest in a consumer tort claim granted by a nonLouisiana resident is judged in a Louisiana judicial forum, the court may look to
the law of the District of Columbia (with the same result, that it will not recognize
U.C.C. filing as a method of perfection)! La. R.S. 10:9-307(c) (Supp. 2002). This
interpretation depends upon whether the phrase "the collateral" in that subsection
refers to collateral generally or only to the type of collateral at issue. U.C.C.
subsection 9-307(c) appears to apply only if there is not a filing system for most
collateral ("generally"), in which case Subsection 9-307(c) would not apply here.
99. See discussion infra Part VIII.G.
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C. Judgments

Chapter 9 includes a right represented by a judgment as eligible

original collateral, and not merely as proceeds, carrying forward the

same inclusion in former Chapter 9.1° Once again, this addition is by
omission of an exclusion contained in U.C.C. Article 9.101
Judgments are probably general intangibles and payment intangibles

in which a security interest is perfected by filing.
°3

02

But due to a non-

Section 9-411 and the
uniform exclusion in Section 9-406,
Louisiana Revised Statutes govern the rights and duties of the

judgment obligor, rather than Section 9-406.'° Again, similar to tort
claims, notice by the secured party to the judgment obligor is required
to trigger any obligation upon the judgment obligor, but that matter

is separate from perfection. Filing of a financing statement is not
notice to the judgment obligor. A security interest in rights under a
judgment is perfected by filing a financing statement without the

additional necessity of filing a notice in the court records or
intervening in any judicial proceedings in which the judgment was

rendered. Nor does perfection of a security interest in rights under a

judgment require the filing of a notice in the mortgage records even

if the judgment is recorded.'
Mere perfection of a security interest in the judgment does not
bind third parties dealing with immovable property affected by a
100. La. R.S. 10:9-104(h) (reserved) (1993), asamended by 2001 La. Acts No.
128, § 1.
101. La. R.S. 10:9-109(d)(9) (reserved) (Supp. 2002). However, the usefulness
of this expansion ofscope to include judgments may be limited to instances where
the debtor is "located" in Louisiana so that the choice of law rules ofChapter 9 and
U.C.C. Article 9 in other states both elect Louisiana law to govern perfection. See
supra note 61 and infra note 106 and accompanying text. The same problem
existed under former Chapter 9, if the debtor's chief executive office or residence
(as applicable) was located outside Louisiana.
102. Although unlikely (and unintended), perhaps a judgment may fall within
the expanded definition of account. La. R.S. 10-9-102(a)(2) (Supp. 2002). If not,
a right represented by a judgment is a general intangible, which is the residual
category. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(42) (Supp. 2002). Either way, the perfection and
account debtor rules discussed in the text apply. La. R.S. 10:9-310(a) (Supp. 2002)
(perfection) and La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(3) (Supp. 2002) ("account debtor"). Note
that both sales of accounts and payment intangibles are covered by Chapter 9, as
well as security interests therein. La. R.S. 10:9-109(a)(3), 10:9-309(2), and 10:9309(3) (Supp. 2002) (automatic perfection).
103. La. R.S. 10:9-406(a) (Supp. 2002). See discussion infraPart VIII.F.
104. In this context use of the typical term "judgment debtor" is potentially
confusing, as the debtor granting a security interest in a judgment is the judgment
creditor. See text accompanying infranote 106.
105. See La. R.S. 10:9-411(a) (Supp. 2002). See also discussion infra Part
VIII.F; Sanson Four Rentals, L.L.C. v. Faulk, 803 So. 2d 1048 (La. App. 2d Cir.
2001).
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judicial mortgage. A separate filing in the immovable property
records is needed to affect third parties in that respect. Accordingly,
as a matter ofgood practice a secured party taking a security interest
in ajudgment should not only file a financing statement, but also-if
the judgment is recorded-file an assignment in the applicable
mortgage records.
Chapter 9 does not contain a special choice of law provision
pertaining to judgments. Accordingly, the correct choice of law
governing perfection and priority of a security interest in ajudgment
is only clear in Chapter 9 when the debtor (the judgment creditor) is
located in Louisiana.1 °6 Under Section 9-301, in instances where the
-debtor (the judgment creditor) is a registered organization formed
under the laws of another state or is otherwise not located in
Louisiana under Section 9-307, the substantive law of that other
jurisdiction will govern perfection and priority of a security interest
in the judgment, even if the judgment is rendered by a Louisiana
court. But in those cases U.C.C. Article 9 will not supply any such
rules.
D. Life InsurancePolicies
Chapter 9 reproduces the substance of former Chapter 9 by
including within its scope a transfer ofan interest in or an assignment
of a claim under a policy of life insurance." 7 This inclusion is
created by removing life insurance policies from U.C.C. Article 9's
general exclusion of all insurance policies. 10 The treatment of life
insurance policies in former Chapter 9 was derived from Louisiana
Civil Code Article 3158, which had formerly governed pledges oflife
insurance policies. In contrast, most, ifnot all, other states deal with
the pledge of life insurance policies outside of U.C.C. Article 9.109
Chapter 9 does not include a special choice oflaw provision with
respect to the perfection and priority of a security interest in a life
106. See La. R.S. 10:9-301(1) (Supp. 2002). See text accompanying supra
notes 61 and 101.

107. La. R.S. 10:9-104(g) (1993), as amendedby 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1.
108. La. R.S 10:9-109(d)(8) (Supp. 2002). See also infra note 114, and text
accompanying infra notes 156 and 159, regarding Chapter 9's requirements to
create a security interest in a life insurance policy. Serious consideration was given
to including life insurance policies within the scope of U.C.C. Article 9 during its
drafting process. Steven L. Harris &Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful was
the Revision of U.C.C.Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 1357, 1374-75 (1999).
109. The general pattern in other states is to allow security assignments if the

policy does not prohibit them. Comparewith infranote 122 and accompanying

text. Under most state laws, the assignment is perfected by notifying the insurer.
Barkley Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial
Code §1.08 [7][a] (Rev. ed. 2001).
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insurance policy."' To do so would be of little avail, because the
other states' rules under U.C.C. Article 9, Part 3 would be
inconsistent. If the debtor is located in Louisiana under Section 9307, then Louisiana's choice oflaw rule in Section 9-301 will allow
the secured party to rely on these non-uniform Chapter 9 provisions.
Chapter 9 therefore provides a clear application of these rules
governing the perfection and priority of a security interest in a life
insurance policy only when the debtor is located in Louisiana under
Section 9-307. However, even in instances where the debtor is
located in Louisiana, if the life insurance company is not located in
Louisiana, a secured party will want to comply with the laws of the
state where the life insurance company is domiciled. Generally, this
is done by obtaining a written acknowledgment of the pledge and
security interest from the life insurance company.
Chapter 9 changes the law from former Chapter 9 as to the
method of perfection applicable to a security interest in a life
insurance policy."' Under former Chapter 9, a secured party was
required either to take possession of the life insurance policy to file
a financing statement covering the policy." 2 In addition, the secured
party also was required to deliver to the .insurance company the
written security agreement. Chapter 9 provides that the only method
of perfecting a security interest in a life insurance policy is to obtain
control under Section 9-107.1. Filing is neither necessary nor
effective."' Under the transition rules of Chapter 9, secured parties
with security interests in life insurance policies perfected under
former 9. pter
4 9 have one year to comply with the requirement in

Chapter

Chapter 9 continues the requirement in former Chapter 9 of
written consent of the beneficiary of the insurance policy in certain
cases if the beneficiary is not the insured or his estate." 5
The concept ofpossession ofthe life insurance policy as a method
ofperfection has been suppressed." 6 Modem commercial practice is
110. See text accompanying supra note 61. The same problem existing under
former Chapter 9.
111. La. R.S. 10:9-107.1 (Supp. 2002).

112. La. R.S. 10:9-305(2) (1993), as amendedby 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1.
113. SeeLa. R.S. 10:9-310(b)(8), 10:9-312(b)(5), 10:9-314, 10:9-329.1 (Supp.
2002).
114. See La. R.S. 10:9-703(b) (Supp. 2002). See discussion infraPart XI. For
a discussion of Chapter 9's restriction in the creation of security interests in life
insurance policies to existing policies described with some specificity, see infra

notes 157-159 and accompanying text, and for a discussion ofthe transition issue
caused thereby, see infra notes 156 and 386 and accompanying text.
115. La. R.S. 10:9-107.1(b) (Supp. 2002) and former La. R.S. 10:9-203(5),
10:9-305(2)(c) (1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1.
116. See former La. R.S. 10:9-305(2)(a) (1993) and La. Civ. Code art. 3158.
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that life insurance companies do not attribute legal consequences to
possession of a sole "original" life insurance policy. Moreover, the
requirement ofpossession is not practical as applied to an interest in a
group life insurance policy.
The definition of "general intangible" in Chapter 9 explicitly
excludes life insurance policies." 7 This exclusion prevents the general
rules of creation, perfection, and priority applicable to general
intangibles from applying to life insurance policies. Instead, specific
rules under Chapter 9 apply to the creation,18 perfection, n 9 and
priority' of a security interest in a life insurance policy.
The exclusion of life insurance policies from the definition of
"general intangible" also prevents life insurance companies from being
"account debtors" under Chapter 9.12' This exclusion prevents the
application of Sections 9-406 and 9-408 to life insurance companies.
Instead, Section 9-401 applies, so whether a debtor's rights to a life
insurance policy may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred is
governed by law other than Chapter 9, such as the Louisiana Insurance
Code and the terms ofthe life insurance policy itself Chapter 9 also
adds Section
pertaining
rights of life insurance companies.
This
Section9-344,
is similar
to theto the
provisions
to banks and
securities intermediaries in U.C.C. Articles 8applicable
and 9.3
Chapter 9 adds a non-uniform Section 9-329.1 governing priority
of security interests in a life insurance policy, modeled upon the
priority rules for deposit accounts in Section 9-327. Chapter 9 also
adds a non-uniform provision in Section 9-208(b)(6) imposing a duty
upon a secured party who has control of a life insurance policy to
terminate under appropriate circumstances.
E. CollateralMortgageNotes
For purposes of Chapter 9, a collateral mortgage note is an
instrument. " However, the definition ofinvestment property excludes
117. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(42) (Supp. 2002).
118. La. R.S. 10:9-108(e)(3), 10:9-109(d)(8), 10:9-203(b)(3), and 10:9204(b)(4) (Supp. 2002).
119. La. R.S. 10:9-107.1, 10:9-208(b)(6), 10:9-310(b)(8), 10:9-312(b)(5), and
10:9-314 (Supp. 2002).
120. La. R.S. 10:9-329.1 (Supp. 2002).
121. See La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(3) (Supp. 2002).
122. Subject to the terms of the policy relating to its assignment, life insurance
policies (other than group life insurance policies) under the terms of which the
beneficiary may be changed upon the sole request of the insured, may be assigned
either by pledge or transfer of title, by an assignment executed and delivered to the
insurer. See La. R.S. 22:642 (1995) and supra note 109 and accompanying text.
See also La. R.S. 22:170(A)(7), 22:634, 22:636(A)(2), 22:643, 22:647 (1995).
123. See discussion infra Part VIII.E.
124. See La. R.S. 10:9-102(d)(2), 10:9-102(a)(47) (Supp. 2002). Forthe special
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collateral mortgage notes in order to prevent the rules applicable to the
creation, perfection, and priority of security interests in investment

property from applying to collateral mortgage notes." 5 Similarly, in
multiple places in Chapter 9, collateral mortgage notes are expressly
and
excluded from many rules pertaining to creation, perfection, 26
priority which are otherwise applicable to instruments generally.

Most importantly, Chapter 9 reproduces longstanding Louisiana
law requiring possession of a collateral mortgage note for

perfection. 27 While Chapter 9 follows U.C.C. Article 9 in changing
the law to permit perfection by filing with respect to instruments
generally, Chapter 9 varies to exclude collateral mortgage notes in
that respect."I Without this variation, a financing statement covering
instruments might have the unintended effect of giving the secured
party a mortgage upon the debtor's immovable property.
Chapter 9 provides a special choice of law rule with respect to
collateral mortgage notes.I29 By definition, a collateral mortgage note
for purposes of Chapter 9 is limited to an instrument secured by a
collateral mortgage on immovable property located in Louisiana. 3 '
A security interest in a collateral mortgage note may be perfected

only by possession under the non-uniform provisions of Section
9-313. Because a collateral mortgage note is by definition secured by
a mortgage on Louisiana immovable property and because filing is
not an appropriate method of perfection as to collateral mortgage

notes,'

Chapter 9 includes this special choice of law provision to

prevent another state's laws from governing perfection and priority
nature of a collateral mortgage note in Louisiana, see Max Nathan, Jr., & H. Gayle
Marshall, The CollateralMortgage,33 La. L. Rev. 497 (1973); David S. Willenzik,
FutureAdvance PriorityRights ofLouisiana CollateralMortgages: Legislative
Revisions, New Rules, and a Modern Alternative, 55 La. L. Rev. 1 (1995). A
collateral mortgage note is not just like any other promissory note, and itself is not
a separate debt instrument. Diamond Servs. Corp. v. Benoit, 780 So. 2d 367, 371
(La. 2001). See also La. R.S. 9:5551-5554 (Supp. 2002).
125. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(49) (Supp. 2002).
126. See, e.g., La. R.S. 10:9-108(e)(7), 10:9-204(b)(7), 10:9-301(5), 10:9310(b)(5), 10:9-312(a), 10:9-312(b)(4), 10:9-312(e), 10:9-312(g), 10:9-322(f)(6)
(Supp.2002).
127. La. R.S. 10:9-312(b)(4) (Supp. 2002). However, former Chapter 9 dealt
with collateral mortgage notes as instruments with no specific reference thereto.
See La. R.S. 10:9-304(1) (1993), as amendedby 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1. See
also La. Civ. Code art. 3158 and La. R.S. 9:5551 (1991).
128. La. R.S. 10:9-310(b)(5), 10:9-310(b)(6), 10:9-312(b)(4), and 10:9-313(a)
(Supp. 2002). Thus Subsection 9-330(d) has no application to collateral mortgage
notes because a security interest in a collateral mortgage note, although an
instrument, cannot be "perfected by a method other than possession."
129. La. R.S. 10:9-301(5) (Supp. 2002).
130. La. R.S. 10:9-102(d)(2) (Supp. 2002). Comparewith La. R.S. 9:5550(1)
(1991).
131. See supranotes 127-128 and accompanying text.
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of a security interest in a collateral mortgage note. Chapter 9 is the
sole source of law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or
non-perfection, and the priority of a security interest in a collateral
mortgage note.
A security interest in a collateral mortgage note requires a specific
description ofthe collateral mortgage note for attachment.132 Chapter
9 does not change traditional Louisiana law with respect to the
priority of collateral mortgages derived from the pledge and
possession ofa collateral mortgage note. Under Section 9-322(f)(6),
the general priority rules under Section 9-322 are subject to Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:5551 with respect to collateral mortgages. This
statute preserves the longstanding Louisiana rule governing the
ranking of a collateral mortgage in instances in which the debt owed
to a pledgee ofa collateral mortgage note is reduced to zero, but debt
secured by the pledge is incurred later, with no interruption in the
possession ofthe collateral mortgage note. 33
F. PublicFinance Transactions
Chapter 9 contains a uniform definition of "public-finance
transaction."' 34 However, this term is used only in Section 9-515(b)
to increase the time period during which an initial financing statement
filed in connection with a public-finance transaction is effective from
five years to thirty years after the date offiling. The term is also used
in Section 9-525(a)(12) to increase the filing fee for such a financing
statement to one hundred dollars.
The real operative provision pertaining to security interests
granted by governmental entities is the definition of "governmental
unit. "', Chapter 9 adds non-uniform language to this definition to
specify that a public trust such as the Louisiana Public Facilities
Authority 36 is a governmental unit. The definition also expressly
includes the public entities covered by the statutes on public
finance.' I The definition of "governmental unit" is used in the

132. La. R.S. 10:9-108(e)(7) (Supp. 2002). Although certainly the normal
practice, the collateral mortgage note must also already be in existence. See La.
R.S. 10:9-204(b)(7) (Supp. 2002). For a discussion of the presumably rare
transition problem caused thereby, see infra notes 157 and 386 and accompanying
text.
133. La. Civ. Code art. 3158(1) (pledges before Jan. 1, 1990).
134. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(67) (Supp. 2002).
135. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(45) (Supp. 2002).
136. See La. R.S. 9:2341 (1991) and 40:1487 (2001). See also Louisiana Pub.
Facilities Auth. v. Foster, 795 So. 2d 288 (La. 2001).
137. La. R.S. 10:9-102(2)(45) (Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S. 39:1421(2)
(1989) and text accompanying infra note 145.
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definitions of "account," '38 "public-finance transaction,"139 in the

scope provision," ° and in the non-uniform provisions in Section 9-

406141 and 9-408.142

Chapter 9 applies to security interests created by a governmental

unit, except to the extent that another statute governs the issue in

question. 431 This scope provision changes the law. Security interests

created by public entities in connection with the issuance ofsecurities
were excluded under former Chapter 9.I A special statute was
enacted in connection with the adoption of Chapter 9 to displace the
application ofChapter 9 as to the creation, perfection, and priority of

security interests in taxes, income, revenues, monies or receipts
granted by public entities. 45 That statute, however, makes no
reference to enforcement.
G. As-Extracted Collateral

The term "as-extracted collateral" is a definition new to U.C.C.
Article 9, but does not reflect a change in the law. 46 The term refers
to minerals and related accounts resulting from the sale ofminerals
at the wellhead or minehead to which special rules for perfecting
security interests apply. Chapter 9 carries forward Louisiana's nonvariations, made to mesh Chapter 9 with Louisiana' smineral
uniform
47
law.1

The definition of "as-extracted collateral" is modified in Chapter
9 to substitute Louisiana terminology from Louisiana's mineral law
for common law language, and reproduces the language used in
former Chapter 9. The definition uses the term "mineral rights,"
which is a non-uniform definition added in Chapter 9.148 This
definition carries forward the substance of the same defined term

138. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(2) (Supp. 2002) (account includes winnings from
governmental unit's lottery).
139. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(67)(C) (Supp. 2002).
140. La. R.S. 10:9-109(c)(2) (Supp. 2002).
141. La. R.S. 10:9-406(i) (Supp. 2002).
142. La. R.S. 10:9-408(f) (Supp. 2002).
143. La. R.S. 10:9-109(c)(2) (Supp. 2002). Chapter 9 clarifies the Louisiana
scope provision by adding a reference-to the Louisiana Constitution too: Chapter
9 does not apply to the extent that another statute or the constitution of Louisiana
expressly governs the creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement of a security
interest created by the state or a Louisiana governmental unit.
144. La. R.S. 10:9-104(e) (1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1.
145. 2001 La. Acts No. 128, §14 (enacting La. R.S. 39:1430.1).
146. See La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(6) (Supp. 2002); U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 4(c)
(2000).
147. La. R.S. 10:9-103(5) (1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1.
148. La. R.S. 10:9-102(d)(13) (Supp. 2002).
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under former Chapter 9.149 It also is another illustration of the
purpose underlying the intent that the definitions in Chapter 9 are
intended solely for use in Chapter 9 and not in interpreting other
matters ofLouisiana law. 5 Mineral rights are defined under Chapter
9 to be immovable property, but also specifically include net profit
interests, which in fact may or may not be immovable property
interests under the Louisiana Mineral Code.
The definition of"accounts" in Chapter 9 contains a non-uniform
addition, including within "accounts" rights to payment arising under
mineral rights, even if such rights to payment are characterized as
rentals under Louisiana law. 5 ' The exception to this inclusion is
rentals payable to a landowner or mineral servitude owner. A
corresponding change is made in the scope provision in Section 9109, to include these rights to payment under mineral rights within
the scope of Chapter 9 and the definition of accounts.' 52
Louisiana's non-uniform filing rules apply to as-extracted
collateral. Under Chapter 9, filings pertaining to as-extracted
collateral are made in the regular Uniform Commercial Code records,
not the mortgage records for immovable property, even though
immovable property descriptions are attached.' 53 Also, Chapter 9
continues the Louisiana system in permitting financing statements
covering as-extracted collateral to be filed in any parish selected by
the filer, rather than only in the parish where the pertinent immovable
property is located.' 54
Pertaining to minerals upon severance, Chapter 9 omits and
reserves Subsection 9-320(d). Subsection 9-320 (d) is included in
U.C.C. Article 9 to provide a rule in those states in which a mortgage
encumbers minerals both before extraction and after extraction.
Neither part of that rule is law in Louisiana.
IV. CREATION
A. Description
U.C.C. Section 9-108(e) lists several types of collateral which
require greater specificity when described in a security agreement.
149. See former La. R.S. 10:9-102(4)(c) (1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts
No. 128, § 1.

150. See supranote 19 accompanying text. See also text accompanying supra
note 28.
151. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(2) (Supp. 2002). See former La. R.S. 10:9-106
(1993),
152.
153.
154.

as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1.
See La. R.S. 10:9-109(d)(1 1)(E) (Supp. 2002).
See La. R.S. 10:9-501, 10:9-502(b) (Supp. 2002).
La. R.S. 10:9-501, 10:9-502(b) (Supp. 2002). See discussion infra Part
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For these types of collateral, description only by type of collateral
using the statutory U.C.C. definitions is an insufficient description in
a security agreement for purposes ofcreating a security interest. The
purpose of requiring greater specificity of description is to prevent
debtors from inadvertently encumbering certain property. Under
U.C.C. Article 9 the types of collateral subject to this specificity
requirement are commercial tort claims, or, in a consumer transaction,
a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity account.
Chapter 9 adds more collateral types to its Subsection (e).
Because Chapter 9 includes all tort claims and not just commercial
tort claims, this requirement necessarily applies to all tort claims. In
addition, this section's requirement of more specific description is
applied in Chapter 9 to life insurance policies, judgments, beneficial
interests in a trust, interests in an estate, and collateral mortgage
It was considered appropriate policy to require such
notes.'
collateral to be described with greater specificity than, for instance,
picking up a judgment or an interest in a trust or estate merely by
reference to "all general intangibles." Subsection 9-108(e) changes
may
Louisiana law from former Chapter 9. This change in the 5law
require action by secured parties under the transition rules." 6
It should be noted that clauses (1) and (4) of Subsection 9-108(e)
also provide an exception to this description requirement. Each
clause provides that a description only by definition type is an
insufficient description ofa tort claim or a judgment, other than as a
form ofproceeds under Section 9-315.'s7 In instances where a tort
claim or a judgment is proceeds of a perfected security interest in
other collateral, the general rule of continued automatic perfection
under Section 9-315 will usually apply. That basic rule provides that
a security interest in proceeds remains perfected beyond the period of
automatic perfection if a filed financing statement covers the original
collateral and the proceeds (tort claim or judgment) are collateral in
which a security interest may be perfected by filing. In such
situations, the secured party is not relying on the generally applicable
perfection (and attachment) rules under Subsection 9-315(d)(3), but
instead under Subsection 9-315(d)(1). Even without the non-uniform
155. See also text accompanying infranote 159.

156. A security interest created by general description that is enforceable
(validly created) under former Chapter 9 but does not satisfy the rules under
Chapter 9 for attachment due to an insufficient description under Section 9-108(e)
will become unenforceable on July 1,2002. La. R.S. 9-703(b) (Supp. 2002). See
discussion infra Part XI, especially text accompanying infra note 386. See also
U.C.C. § 9-703 cmt. 2 (2002).
157. The scope provisions of U.C.C. Article 9 include judgments taken on a
right to payment that was collateral, and tort claims constituting proceeds of

collateral. U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(9); § 9-109(12); § 9-102 cmt. 5(g); § 9-109 cmt. 15
(2002).
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additions in Subsection 9-108(e)(1) and (4), which add the phrase
"other than as a form ofproceeds," the result should be that
either a
tort claim or a judgment which constitute proceeds of collateral is
exempt from the requirement for specific description for attachment.
B. After-Acquired Collateral
Chapter 9 has non-uniform additions to Section 9-204, which
must be read and applied in conjunction with Section 9-108. U.C.C.
Article 9 makes after-acquired property clauses in a security
agreement ineffective as to two types of collateral: certain consumer
goods and commercial tort claims. Chapter 9 is uniform with respect
to the after-acquired consumer goods provision. However, Chapter
9 applies the after-acquired property clause restriction to all tort
claims, and also to security interests in a judgment, a life insurance
policy, a beneficial interest in a trust, an interest in an estate, or a
collateral mortgage note. 5 The consequence is that under Chapter
9, in order for a security interest to attach to a tort claim, a judgment,
a life insurance policy, a beneficial interest in a trust, an interest in an
estate, or a collateral mortgage note, such collateral must be in
existence when the security agreement is authenticated. In addition,
the security agreement must describe such collateral with greater
specificity than simply "all tort claims," or "all judgments," or the
like. 5 9
The combined effect of Sections 9-108 and 9-204 is that an afteracquired collateral clause in a security agreement will not reach future
tort claims, judgments, life insurance policies, beneficial interests in
a trust, interests in an estate or collateral mortgage notes. In contrast,
and uniform with U.C.C. Article 9, a security entitlement, a securities
account or a commodity account, each in a consumer transaction, is
subject to Section 9-108, but not Section 9-204.
C. SupportingObligatiQn
The new term "supporting obligation" covers the most common
types of credit enhancements: suretyship obligations and letter-ofcredit rights that support one ofthe types ofcollateral specified in the
definition. 6 ° U.C.C. Article 9 now contains rules explicitly
governing attachment, perfection, and priority ofsecurity interests in
supporting obligations. These provisions reflect the principle that a
supporting obligation is an incident of the collateral it supports.
158. La. R.S. 10:9-204(b) (Supp. 2002). See alsotext accompanying supranote
156. But see text accompanying supra note 158.

159. See U.C.C. §9-108 cmt. 5 (2002).

160. See La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(77) (Supp. 2002).
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Chapter 9 varies the language of these U.C.C. Article 9 rules
pertaining to supporting obligations. These modifications in Chapter
9 do not change the meaning or intent of these rules, but instead
substitute language consistent with Louisiana principles pertaining to
accessory obligations. A security interest in a supporting obligation
automatically follows from a security interest in the underlying
supported collateral. 6 '
D. Repledge by SecuredParty
U.C.C. Section 9-207 deals with the rights and duties ofa secured
party having possession or control of collateral. One ofthose rights
is the right of a secured party to repledge such collateral. Subsection
9-207(c)(3) in U.C.C. Article 9 eliminates the qualification in former
U.C.C. Article 9 and former Chapter 9 to the effect that the terms of
a "repledge" ofcollateral may not "impair" a debtor's right to redeem
collateral.'62 Under U.C.C. Article 9, if the secured party repledges
collateral, the debtor's right to redeem is unimpaired as against the
debtor's original secured party, but nevertheless may not be
enforceable as against the new secured party. Indeed, in the vast
majority of cases where repledge rights are significant, the security
interest of the second secured party will be senior to the debtor's
interest under U.C.C. Article 9. The new language in U.C.C. Article
9 is intended to eliminate any limitation on the secured party's
statutory right to repledge collateral to those repledge transactions in
which the collateral does not secure a greater obligation than that of
the original debtor. 6 3 U.C.C. Article 9 leaves the burden on the
debtor to restrict this right in its agreement with the secured party.
These rules follow common law precedents which apply unless the
right ofrepledge
parties otherwise agree. The merits ofthe expanded
r64
afforded by U.C.C. Article 9 are debatable.
Chapter 9 rejects this approach. Non-uniform Subsection 9207(c) in Chapter 9 provides that a secured party's repledge is subject
to and on terms that do not impair the debtor's right to redeem the
161.

Under Chapter 9 a security interest in collateral "also includes the rights

to" a supporting obligation under Chapter 9, and perfection does the same. See La.
R.S. 10:9-203(f) and La. R.S. 10:9-308(d) (Supp. 2002). Chapter 9 is similarly
modified with respect to other accessory obligations transferred with collateral

constituting the principal obligation, avoiding the questionable concept ofgranting

a security interest in another security interest. See La. R.S. 10:9-203(g) and La.
R.S. 10:9-308(e) (Supp. 2002).

162. See former La. R.S. 10:9-207(2)(e) (1993), as amendedby 2001 La. Acts
No. 128, § 1.
163. See U.C.C. § 9-207 cmt. 5; § 9-314 cmt. 3 (2002).
164. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Repledge and Pre-DefaultSale of Securities
CollateralUnder Revised Article 9, 74 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 1109, 1119 (1999).
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collateral, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Thus, under
Chapter 9 the burden is on the secured party, rather than the debtor,
to provide different treatment in the security agreement. This change
is consistent with Louisiana civil law principles. 65
E. Proceeds
U.C.C. Article 9 continues the former rule that a security interest
automatically attaches to proceeds ofthe collateral. 66 U.C.C. Article
9 has expanded the former definition ofproceeds to encompass rights
arising out of the license of property and distribution on stock. 67
Former Chapter 9 already contained an expanded definition of
proceeds to include whatever is collected on, or distributed on
account of, collateral, such as stock dividends. 6 Because U.C.C.
Article 9 has adopted this expanded approach, Chapter 9 reproduces
the substance of the expanded language from former Chapter 9, but
uses the uniform language ofU.C.C. Article 9. This expansion ofthe
definition of "proceeds" does not change Louisiana law.
However, former Chapter 9 also contained a non-uniform
provision expressly excluding from "proceeds" receipts that are
derived from the disposition of collateral by a secured party by way
ofpublic or private sale orby judicial sale. 6 This provision has been
suppressed. Under Chapter 9 "proceeds" do include such receipts. 71
This provision changes Louisiana law.
The definition of"proceeds" is also narrower in scope. Under the
definition in former U.C.C. Section 9-306, proceeds included not
only whatever was received from the sale, exchange, or other
disposition ofcollateral but also whatever was received from the sale,
exchange or other disposition of proceeds. Thus, there could be
165. Except in limited circumstances, Louisiana rejects the doctrine of la
possession vaut titre. See also La. Civ. Code arts. 3165, 3166, and 3179.
Louisiana Civil Code Articles 3145 and 3146 provide that one person may pledge
the property of another, provided it be with the express or tacit consent of the
owner. But this tacit consent must be inferred from the circumstances, so strong
as to leave no doubt of the owner's intention.
166. La. R.S. 10:9-315 (Supp. 2002). See former La. R.S. 10:9-306 (1993), as
amendedby 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1; Henry Gabriel, Louisiana Security Rights
in Personal Property, ch. 8(B) (3d ed. 1994).
167. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(64) (Supp. 2002).
168. La. R.S. 10:9-306(1)(a)(ii) (1993).
169. La. R.S. 10:9-306(1)(a)(i) (1993).
170. See La. R.S. 10:9-615 (Supp. 2002). But if after a disposition the junior
secured party remits surplus proceeds to the debtor, it is questionable whether a
senior secured party can claim such proceeds. See Timothy R. Zinnecker, The
Default Provisions of Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 92
(1999). The junior secured party is protected by Section 9-615(g). See U.C.C. §
9-610 cmt. 5 (2002).
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proceeds of proceeds, and so on. This chain of collateral consisting
of proceeds and proceeds of proceeds could technically go on until
the secured party could no longer show that the proceeds were
received upon disposition of the collateral or proceeds. Under the
new definition, proceeds are limited to the first generation, being
what is acquired from, collected on, distributed on account of, or
arising from the collateral. Proceeds of proceeds are covered as
"collateral" directly. No change in meaning is intended, and the
essential test remains the identification requirement.
The new definition resolves an issue under former law concerning
whether lease rentals constitute proceeds of the secured party's
collateral when the debtor has granted a security interest in goods and
then later leases those goods and receives rent payments under the
lease. This definition makes it clear that the lease rentals from a later
lease are proceeds ofthe collateral. 7 ' Other revenue derived from the
use of collateral may present a more difficult question. It is not clear
how to characterize income from fares to ride a bus or income from
game or slot machines installed in a restaurant, bar or other facility,
when the bus or machine is collateral. Perhaps this income is
"proceeds," as what is acquired upon the license of collateral.
Beyond a certain point, the secured party should not be able to claim
income as proceeds without a more explicit provision in the security
agreement.
This definition continues existing law that casualty insurance
proceeds from collateral may be considered as proceeds to the extent
of the value of the insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to
the collateral, except to the extent the insurance is payable to aperson
other than the debtor or the secured party. This result includes
insurance proceeds for property damage paid by a third party
tortfeasor's liability insurer, and not just by the debtor's property
insurer. 172 This result, however, does not mean that a secured party
can hold a tortfeasor's insurance company liable for payment to the
If the insurance contract specifies the person to whom
debtor.'
insurance proceeds are payable, then the insurance proceeds should
be paid according to the loss payable clause in the insurance contract
171. See former U.C.C. § 9-306 cmt. 6 (1972); Permanent Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code, Commentary No. 9 (June 25, 1992). But see In re
Clearly Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 9 B.R. 40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980). The answer is
not clear if instead the lease of the goods already exists at the time the security
interest in the goods (only, without express inclusion of the lease as collateral) is

created. It is debatable whether or not rental proceeds under a prior lease would
be proceeds subject to the security interest.
172. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Wausau Ins. Co., 669 So. 2d 619 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1996).
173. Scholfield Bros. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 752 P.2d 661 (Kan.
1988); Fidelity Fin. Servs. v. Blaser, 889 P.2d 268 (Okla. 1994).
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and not according to the security agreement. Thus, if a secured party
desires to have insurance proceeds from collateral paid directly to it,
its name should be set out in the loss payable clause of the insurance
contract, as well as in the security agreement.
F. True Sale
U.C.C. Article 9 makes it clear that a seller ofaccounts retains no
interest in the property sold. 74 This provision rejects the much
criticized holding in Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer.'"
Chapter 9 goes further and carries forward in Section 9-109 a nonuniform provision from former Chapter 9. Subsection 9-109(e)
provides that the application of Chapter 9 to the sale of accounts
should not result in the sale transaction being recharacterized as a
transaction to secure debt. The predecessor language to Subsection
9-109(e) was added to former Chapter 9 in 1997 as a rebuttal to the
Octagon decision. 176
V. PERFECTION BY FILING

A perfected security interest is an attached security interest that
will prevail over a competing creditor, including a trustee in
bankruptcy having the status ofa lien creditor on the commencement
ofthe debtor's bankruptcy. '77 There are three primary ways in which
an attached security interest may be perfected. A security interest
may be perfected by filing, the secured party's taking possession of
the collateral 7 1 or, in certain cases, control.' In a few instances,
U.C.C. Article 9 provides that a security interest may be perfected
automatically upon attachment.'8 °
The primary method of perfection is for the secured party to file
a proper financing statement in the appropriate Uniform Commercial
Code filing office. For most security interests, perfection either is

174. See La. R.S. 10:9-318 (Supp. 2002).
175. 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993). See Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code, Commentary No. 14 (June 14, 1994).

176. See former La. R.S. 10:9-102(1) (1993), as amendedby 2001 La. Acts No.
128, § 1.
177. 11 U.S.C. § 544(c)(1) (1994). See La. R.S. 10:9-317(a) (Supp. 2002).
"Lien creditor" is a defined term in U.C.C. Article 9, and should not be confused
with "lienholder." Compare La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(52) (Supp. 2002) with U.C.C.
§ 9-102(d)(0) (2000).
178. See La. R.S. 10:9-313 (Supp. 2002).
179. See La. R.S. 10:9-314 (Supp. 2002).
180. See La. R.S. 10:9-309 (Supp. 2002). See alsoLa. R.S. 10:9-308, 10:9-312

(Supp. 2002).
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permitted or is mandatory by filing.'' Chapter 9 has multiple nonuniform changes regarding perfection by filing, resulting in a
significant variation from U.C.C. Article 9.
A. FilingSystem
Section 9-501 of Chapter 9, governing filing of financing
statements in Louisiana, is entirely non-uniform. Chapter 9 continues
the unique filing system adopted by former Chapter 9. In Louisiana,
a financing statement may be filed in the Uniform Commercial Code
records of the Clerk of Court in any parish, or if in Orleans Parish
with the Recorder of Mortgages, without regard to the location ofthe
debtor or the collateral within the state. 2 Each parish is linked by
computer to the office of the Louisiana Secretary of State, which
maintains a master, state-wide computer index of all Uniform
Commercial Code filings."8 3 This system is not an alternative
suggested in U.C.C. Article 9,'8 but is fully consistent with the policy
of central filing strongly promoted by U.C.C. Article 9. This
Louisiana system combines the principal advantage of state-wide
filing, which is ease of searches and access to information, with the
convenience of local filing offices.
The Louisiana Secretary of State is not a "filing office."', 5 It
accepts no filings of Uniform Commercial Code records, nor does
that office perform searches. Instead, search requests are processed
by the Clerks of Court and in Orleans Parish by the Recorder of
Mortgages. This system has worked exceedingly well in Louisiana
since its adoption in 1990. Louisiana has avoided the serious time
delays encountered by states which have adopted pure Central filing,
with a solitary office handling all Uniform Commercial Code filings
and searches in a state.
Chapter 9 also carries over other derogations of Louisiana's
filing system from former Chapter 9. One such difference from
181. See La. R.S. 10:9-310(a), 10:9-312(a) (Supp. 2002).
182. La. R.S. 10:9-501(a)(2) (Supp. 2002). In Orleans Parish, financing
statements are filed with the Recorder ofMortgages. Id. There is one exception
for titled motor vehicles not held as inventory for sale or lease, for which filings are
made with the Office of Motor Vehicles. See La. R.S. 10:9-501(a)(1) (Supp.
2002). See former La. R.S. 10:9-406 (1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts No.
128, § 1. This system also had the political benefit of preserving a share of the
filing fees revenue for the local Clerks of Court. Under U.C.C. Article 9, Georgia
has adopted a similar system designating filing with the clerk ofthe superior court
of any county, but (unlike Louisiana) excepting as-extracted collateral, timber to
be cut, and (non-uniform) crops (presumably intending growing crops).
183. La. R.S. 10:9-519(a)(4) and (c) (Supp. 2002).

184. Nor was it in former U.C.C. Article 9.
185. See La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(37) (Supp. 2002) and supra note 182.
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U.C.C. Article 9 pertains to real property related filings covering
fixtures, as-extracted collateral (minerals), or timber to be cut.
Chapter 9's filing system follows former Chapter 9 in placing fixture
filings and filings of financing statements covering as-extracted
collateral or timber to be cut in the regular Uniform Commercial
Code records. 6 Unlike U.C.C. Article 9,such filings are not made
in the mortgage records for immovable property, even though
immovable property descriptions are attached.' Also, unlike U.C.C.
Article 9, Chapter 9 follows former Chapter 9 in permitting these
initial filings to be made in any parish selected by the filer, regardless
ofthe location ofthe pertinent immovable property within the state. 88
Accordingly, in Louisiana a "fixture filing" does not require the filing
of a separate financing statement. One financing statement may be
effective to perfect a security interest in both ordinary collateral and
fixtures. 89 The same is true with respect to as-extracted collateral or
timber to be cut.
Because Chapter 9 does not require local real estate filings for
fixture filings, the special rule for transmitting utilities in Subsection
9-501(b) of U.C.C. Article 9 is unnecessary in Louisiana and is
omitted and reserved.' 90 This omission follows existing Louisiana
law. 191
Chapter 9 also carries forward the rule from former Chapter 9
requiring all subsequent filings to be filed in the same parish in which
the pertinent original financing statement was filed.
B. Rejection

Chapter 9 varies significantly from U.C.C. Article 9 on the
authority of the filing officer to reject a tendered filing. U.C.C.
Subsection 9-520(a) makes it mandatory for the filing officer to reject
the filing for the reasons set forth in U.C.C. Section 9-516(b).
However, under Chapter 9 the authority of the filing officer to reject
186. See La. R.S. 10:9-501(a)(1) (non-uniform); 10:9-502(b)(2) (reserved) and
10:9-502(c) (reserved); 10:9-514(c) (reserved); 10:9-515(g) (reserved) (Supp.
2002). Likewise there is no special place offiling rule in Louisiana for transmitting
utilities. See La. R.S. 10:9-501 (b)(reserved) (Supp. 2002). Seetext accompanying
infra notes 214-216.
187. La. R.S. 10:9-502(b)(3) (Supp. 2002) (but using Louisiana non-uniform
terminology) and La R.S. 10:9-516(b)(3)(D) (reserved) (Supp. 2002).
188. See supra note 182. Subsequent filings pertaining to an initial filing must
be made in the same parish as that initial filing. See La. R.S. 10:9-512(a), 10:9513(b), 10:9-514(b), 10:9-514.1, and 10:9-515(d) (Supp. 2002).
189. See discussion infra Part V.C.
190. See supra note 186.
191. Compareformer La. R.S. 10:9-401 (1993), as amendedby 2001 La. Acts
No. 128, § 1, with former U.C.C. § 9-401(5) (1972).
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a Uniform Commercial Code filing is discretionary, rather than
mandatory. Nonetheless, like U.C.C. Article 9, Chapter 9 provides

an exclusive list of grounds upon which the filing office, in its
discretion, may reject a filing.'92 The Louisiana approach of
discretionary authority is consistent with former Chapter 9.193 The
critical point of emphasis is that Chapter 9 limits this discretionary
authority to the exclusive list of reasons set forth in Subsection 9516(b).
Chapter 9 varies from other filing provisions ofU.C.C. Article 9.
U.C.C. Subsection 9-516 (d) deals with a filing office's unjustified
refusal to accept a record. Under U.C.C. Article 9, an improperly
rejected filing is considered filed. However, a financing statemeAt
that is communicated to the filing office but which the filing office
refuses to accept provides no public notice. Louisiana's public
94
records doctrine necessitates that Chapter 9 reject this approach.
Therefore, Subsection 9-516(d) is omitted and reserved in Chapter 9.
Such an approach will not prejudice creditors because under
Louisiana's filing system a filer has a choice of sixty-four filing
offices for Uniform Commercial Code filings, one in each parish. In
the rare event that a filing officer in Louisiana improperly rejects a
filing, the Louisiana filer has the easy option of filing in another
parish.
U.C.C. Subsection 9-516(d) also contains an exception to protect
a third-party purchaser ofcollateral who gives value in reliance upon
the apparent absence of the record from the files. In that instance, an
improperly rejected filing will be deemed ineffective as to the third
party purchaser. Chapter 9, however, has no need for this provision
and it is omitted. This is because under Chapter 9 an improperly
rejected filing is considered as never having been filed and is
ineffective. As a result, a third party purchaser of collateral will
never run the risk of being prejudiced by a rejected, yet effective,
filing.
1. OrganizationalIdentificationNumber

In U.C.C. Article 9, there are several debtor-related informational
items required to be set forth in a properly completed financing
statement. Most of these requirements are clearly explained in the
192. See La. R.S. 10:9-516(b), 10:9-520(a) (Supp. 2002) ("may refuse," not
shall). See also La. R.S. 10:9-516(b)(3)(D) (reserved), 10:9-520(c) (Supp. 2002)
("permitted," not required, to refuse) and text accompanying infra note 194.

193. See former La. R.S. 10:9-402 (1993).
194. See La. R*S. 10:9-516(a) (non-uniform), 10:9-516(d) (reserved) (Supp.
2002). Thus La. R.S. 10:9-520(b) (Supp. 2002) omits the requirement that the date
and time of rejection be noted.
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statute but the requirement that the debtor's organizational
identification number be listed on the financing statement is cryptic.
While U.C.C. Article 9 does not require for legal sufficiency that a
financing statement list the organizational identification number of a
debtor,' 9 it does require a filing officer to reject a financing statement
that does not contain either the number or a statement that the
organization has no such number. 9 6 As noted above, Chapter 9
permits such rejection, but does not mandate it.
The term "organizational identification number" is not defined in
U.C.C. Article 9 or Chapter 9. The reference is to the number
-assigned to that organization by the agency where an organization's
charter or similar organizational document was filed, if any. 9 7 As
suggested by the statutory provision, some states do not assign such
numbers.'9 Moreover, a few states, including Louisiana, that do
assign organizational identification numbers to domestic
organizations also assign organizational identification numbers to
foreign organizations registering to do business in that state. If a
record is filed in Louisiana pertaining to a foreign organization, the
organizational identification number for the debtor to be included in
the filed record is the number assigned by the foreign organization's
home jurisdiction, not the number assigned by Louisiana. If the
home jurisdiction does not assign the number, the filed record should
state "none." The record should not include the number assigned by
Louisiana to the non-Louisiana organization.
2. PropertyDescription
Subsection 9-516(b)(3)(D) is omitted and reserved in Chapter 9,
because the determination ofthe sufficiency ofproperty descriptions
in Louisiana is not the task offiling officers.199 The responsibility for
the sufficiency of information contained in Louisiana filings is with
the filer, not the filing officer.

195. CompareLa. R.S. 10:9-502(a) (Supp. 2002) (legal sufficiency) with La.
R.S. 10:9-516(b)(5)(C)(iii) (Supp. 2002) (filing rejection).

196. U.C.C. §9-516(b)(5)(C)(iii) (2000).

197. Cf discussion supraPart II.C.3 ("registered organizations").
198. Ironically, the state that is receiving the largest increase in filings under the
new U.C.C. Article 9 filing system, Delaware, does not require organizational

identification numbers for Delaware U.C.C. filings. Delaware omitted U.C.C.
Subsection 9-516(b)(5)(C)(iii) (although Delaware does assign such numbers).
Although the author has not verified the following list, it is being reported at the
time this article is written that the following states do not issue organizational
identification numbers: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma and

South Carolina.
199. See supra notes 187 and 192 and accompanying text.
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C. Fixtures
Chapter 9 is significantly non-uniform in the provisions
pertaining to fixtures. Although the language of the provisions has
been modified in Chapter 9 from the earlier provisions of former
Chapter 9, there is no change in Louisiana law as to fixtures and
fixture filings.
Under U.C.C. Article 9, fixtures are goods that have become so
related to real estate that an interest in the goods arises under
applicable real estate law.2" But fixtures are still goods. The
uniform definition of"goods" includes "fixtures," even though goods
are defined as things that are movable when a security interest
attaches.2"' A security interest under U.C.C. Article 9 (i) may be
created in goods that are fixtures already or (ii) may continue in
goods that become fixtures. There is an exception for goods that are
ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on
land. No security interest in them exists under Chapter 9 or U.C.C.
Article 9.202
In U.C.C. Article 9, a security interest in fixtures may be
perfected either by a regular Article 9 financing statement filing orby
a fixture filing in the real estate records. The importance to a secured
party in making a fixture filing is for priority purposes against a
competing real estate claimant.2 °3 One ofthe available priority rules
under U.C.C. Article 9 is that a purchase-money security interest in
goods can obtain priority over certain real property interests by a
fixture filing made within twenty days after the goods become
fixtures. 2" Unless a fixture filing is made, and other requirements are
met, a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a conflicting real
estate interest.20 5 But the critical distinction between U.C.C. Article
9 and Chapter 9 is that under the former's rules fixtures retain their
personal property nature.
Accordingly, as described in the official comments, U.C.C.
Article 9 recognizes three categories of goods: "(1) those that retain
200. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(41) (2001).
201. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44)(i) (2001).
202. La. R.S. 10:9-334(a) (Supp. 2002).

203. See La. R.S. 10:9-334(c) (Supp. 2002). The competing real estate claimant

may be an "encumbrancer," which is not defined in U.C.C. Article 9 but is defined

in Chapter 9because it is a term unknown to Louisiana law. See La. R.S. 10:9102(a)(32) (Supp. 2002). Thus anordinary (non-fixture filing) financing statement
covering goods suffices for priority over judicial liens. See La. R.S. 10:9-334(e)(3)
(Supp. 2002) (perfected "by any method permitted by this Chapter") and infranote
220.
204. U.C.C. § 9-334(d)(3) (2001). The twenty day grace period is not the law

in Louisiana. See text accompanying infra notes 217-218.
205. See supra note 204.
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their chattel character entirely and are not part ofthe real property; (2)
ordinary building materials that have become an integral part of the
real property and cannot retain their chattel character for purposes of
finance; and (3) an intermediate class that has become real property
for certain purposes, but as to which chattel financing may be
preserved."2 °6
In stark contrast, Chapter 9 carries forward from former Chapter
9 a fundamentally different approach to security interests in fixtures,
consistent with long established Louisiana legal principles relating to
property and chattel mortgages. In Louisiana, a security interest
cannot be created in goods that already have become fixtures. The
definitions of "fixtures" and "fixture filing"2 7 in Chapter 9 are
significantly non-uniform, as is the pertinent portion ofthe definition
of"goods."2 8 Even the scope provision in Chapter 9 is non-uniform,
with Subsection 9-109(a)(1) providing that Chapter 9 applies "as to
fixtures only if the security interest has been perfected by a fixture
filing when the goods become fixtures." These definitions, in
combination with the non-uniform language in the scope provision in
Subsection 9-109(a)(1), the fixtures provisions in Subsection 9334(a), and the non-uniform filing provisions in Chapter 9 Part 5,
establish the four major variations of Chapter 9 as it applies to
fixtures.
First, in order for a security interest in fixtures to exist and
continue, a fixture filing must be made before the goods become
fixtures, i.e., component parts. Second, a security interest may not be
retained under Chapter 9 in consumer goods that become component
parts of immovable property. This is because by definition a
consumer good cannot become a "fixture." Third, fixture filings
under Chapter 9 are not filed in the immovable property records, but
instead are filed in the regular Louisiana Uniform Commercial Code
records. Fourth, the remedies applicable to fixtures are narrower
under Chapter 9.
1. Component Parts
Chapter 9's definition of fixtures utilizes the terminology and
principles pertaining to "component parts" in the Louisiana Civil
Code. 09 In Chapter 9, goods "includes fixtures but only ifthey were
movable when a fixture filing covering them was made."21 0 Thus,
206. See U.C.C. § 9-334 cmt. 3(2001).

207. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(40), 10:9-102(a)(41) (Supp. 2002).
208. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(44)(i) (Supp. 2002).

209. See La. Civ. Code arts. 462-469.

210. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(44) (Supp. 2002); accordLa. R.S. 10: 9-102(a)(44)
(Supp. 2002) ("goods" includes fixtures "but only if they were movable when a
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unlike U.C.C. Article 9, under Chapter 9 the secured party's fixture
filing must be made prior to the goods becoming component parts in
order for the security interest to be preserved. This requirement
reproduces the substance of former Chapter 9.11
This timing requirement continues the substance of former
Chapter 9 as well as Louisiana's former chattel mortgage statutes.
Language from the former chattel mortgage statutes and former
Chapter 9212 that, "[a]s to a secured party with a security interest in
fixtures perfected by a fixture filing, the fixtures shall remain
movables, and no sale or mortgage of the immovable property shall
affect or impair the priority ofthe security interest," has been omitted
as conceptually incorrect on the first point and unnecessary and
implicit on the second. The omission does not change Louisiana law.
2. ConsumerGoods
Chapter 9 reproduces former Chapter 9's exclusion of consumer
goods from classification as fixtures. Except for manufactured
homes, a Chapter 9 security interest may not be retained in consumer
goods that become component parts of immovable property. A
consumer good cannot become a "fixture" under Chapter 9 even
though3 it has become a component part under Louisiana property
law.21
Manufactured homes are not dealt with as fixtures, but instead are
encumbered either as titled motor vehicles under Chapter 9 as
supplemented by the Louisiana Manufactured Home Property Act or
as component parts ofimmovable property following a declaration of
immobilization made under that statute.2 4
3. Filing
Chapter 9 continues the special Louisiana filing rule under former
Chapter 9 with respect to fixture filings. Unlike U.C.C. Article 9,
fixture filings in Louisiana are not filed in the immovable property
mortgage records, but instead are filed in the regular Uniform
Commercial Code records. 215 Accordingly, in Louisiana a "fixture
fixture filing covering them was made") and La. R.S. 10:9-334 (Supp. 2002).
211. La. R.S. 10:9-313 (1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1.
212. See former La. R.S. 10:9-313 (1993) and La. R.S. 9:5357 (repealed 1989).
213. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(40), 10:9-102(a)(41), and 10:9-334(a) (Supp. 2002).
See also La. R.S. 10:9-334(e)(2)(C) (reserved) (Supp. 2002).
214. See discussion infra Part V.D. See also Comments 53 and 54, Revision
Comments - 2001 to La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(53) (Supp. 2002).
215. See La. R.S. 10:9-501, 10:9-502(Supp. 2002). See also supranotes 186188 and accompanying text.
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filing" does not require the filing of a separate financing statement.
One financing statement may be effective1 6 both to cover ordinary
collateral and also to be a "fixture filing1
Consistent with the principles described above, Chapter 9
contains a non-uniform variation regarding purchase-money security
interest fixture filings. U.C.C. Article 9 permits a purchase-money
security interest fixture filing to be effective for priority purposes if
the fixture filing is made within twenty days after the goods become
fixtures. In Chapter 9, a fixture filing by definition is "made before
the goods become fixtures.""1 7 Accordingly, Subsection 9-334(d)(3)
omits the twenty day rule entirely."'
4. Remedies
The remedies available to a secured party having a security
interest in fixtures is also significantly non-uniform." 9 U.C.C.
Section 9-604 significantly changes the former law in other states as
to the remedies available to a secured party. U.C.C. Article 9
overrules cases in other states holding that a secured party's only
remedy after default is the removal of the fixtures from the real
property. U.C.C. Article 9 permits the secured party to sell the
fixtures in place or use self-help to render the fixtures inoperative but
left in place.
In contrast, Chapter 9 omits and reserves these provisions. The
only remedy applicable to fixtures under Chapter 9 is judicial sale by
the secured party. Section 9-604 is modified to eliminate any right,
or implication thereof, of the secured party to self-help action with
respect to fixtures, except in the very narrow circumstances set forth
in Section 9-609. Section 9-604 also carries forward a non-uniform
provision from former Chapter 9 authorizing a secured party to
demand separate appraisal of the fixtures where the immovable
property is sold in foreclosure proceedings by a mortgagee or other
encumbrancer.
Notwithstanding the incorporation of Louisiana property law
principles and terminology into Chapter 9's definitions and provisions
pertaining to fixtures, one U.C.C. Article 9 provision has been
216. Seesupranotes 186-189 and accompanying text. Conversely, in Louisiana

a mortgage filing in the real estate records cannot do double duty as a fixture filing.
See La. R.S. 10:9-502(c) (reserved); 10:9-519(d) (non-uniform); and 10:9-519(e)
(reserved) (Supp. 2002). There is no need in Louisiana for a special place of filing
rule for transmitting utilities. See supranote 186 and accompanying text. See also
text accompanying supranote 190.
217. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(40) (Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S. 10:9102(a)(44)(i) (Supp. 2002) and text accompanying supra notes 211-212.

218. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
219. See discussion infra Part IX.A.
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retained in Chapter 9 in order to avoid creating doubt by its deletion. In
U.C.C. Subsection 9-334(e)(2), there is an exception to the usual first-tofile-or-record rule of Subsection 9-334(e)(1). This exception affords
priority to the holders of security interests in certain types of readily
removable goods: factory and office machines, and equipment that is not
primarily used or leased for use in the operation of the immovable
property. This rule is necessary in U.C.C. Article 9 because of the
confusion in the common law as to whether certain readily removable
machinery, equipment, and appliances become fixtures. It protects a
secured party who, perhaps in the mistaken belief that the readily
removable goods will not become fixtures, makes only a regular
financing statement filing instead ofmaking a fixture filing.22° In many

common law states such readily removable goods ofthe type described
in Subsection 9-334(e)(2) will not be considered to become part of the
real property. In Louisiana, it is unlikely that such readily removable

goods will become component parts under Louisiana law. When such
goods ofthe type described in this subsection are not considered to have
become part ofthe immovable property under Louisiana property law,

a security interest in those goods does not conflict with an immovable

property interest, and resort to Section 9-334's provisions is unnecessary.

Nonetheless, this provision is included in Chapter 9to avoid creating any
unintended negative implication by its deletion.
There is another non-uniform provision in Chapter 9 pertaining to
the relative priority of a secured party's fixture security interest and a
mortgagee's mortgage of the pertinent immovable. Section 9-334(h)
reproduces the variation in former Chapter 9 that omits the requirement
that a mortgage indicate that it is a "construction mortgage" in order to
have priority afforded thereto."'
D. ManufacturedHomes
Chapter 9 varies from U.C.C. Article 9 with respect to
manufactured homes in order to preserve existing Louisiana law.
220. In contrast to priority under Subsections 9-334(d)(3) and (e)(1)(A),
Subsection 9-334(e)(2) does not require a fixture filing for priority but instead only
simple perfection "by any method permitted by this Chapter." See supranote 203
and accompanying text. This exception for readily removable factory and office
machines is carried forward from former U.C.C. Article 9, but the added exception
category of readily removable equipment not primarily used in the real property's
operation is new. For the relevancy of equipment's use and "societal expectations"

with regard thereto in determining whether such equipment is a component part of
other property, see Prytania Park Hotel v. General Star Indem. Co., 179 F.3d 169
(5th Cir. 1999); Showboat Star P'ship v. Slaughter, 789 So. 2d 554 (La. 2001); A.

N. Yiannopoulos, Of Immovables, Component Parts,SocietalExpectations,and
the ForeheadofZeus, 60 La. L. Rev. 1379 (2000).
221. See La. R.S. 10:9-313(1)(c) (1993).
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Under Louisiana law, manufactured homes are encumbered either as
titled motor vehicles under Chapter 9222 as supplemented by the
Louisiana Manufactured Home Property Act223 or as component parts
of immovable property following a declaration of immobilization.
Although Chapter 9 contains the defined term "manufactured home,"
both the definition and its use are non-uniform.
The non-uniform definition of "manufactured home" in Chapter
9 adopts by cross-reference the similar existing definition in the
Louisiana Manufactured Home Property Act.224 This approach is
used in order to avoid a gap that would result between that statute and
Chapter 9 from using different definitions. Because of the entirely
different use in Chapter 9 for this definition, Chapter 9 does not
include the definition "manufactured-home transaction" contained in
U.C.C. Article 9, and that definition is omitted and reserved in
Chapter 9.225
In U.C.C. Article 9, the term "manufactured home" is used only
in the definition of "goods," in the fixtures provision in Section 9344, and in U.C.C. Section 9-515. Under U.C.C. Subsection 9334(e)(4), a security interest noted on the manufactured home's
certificate of title will have priority over the interests of competing
real estate claimants, even if the manufactured home has already
become a fixture and no fixture filing is filed in the real property
records. In addition, the other fixture priority rules also apply to
manufactured homes. Ifthe state statute does not require notation on
the certificate of title for perfection, then U.C.C. Section 9-515
permits an ordinary financing statement in a "manufactured-home
transaction" to be effective for thirty years.
In contrast, under Chapter 9, security interests in manufactured
homes are not perfected by the filing of ordinary financing
statements. Instead, the security interest is noted on the certificate of
title.226 Accordingly, the thirty-year rule in U.C.C. Article 9 is
omitted in Louisiana as unnecessary. A security interest noted on a
certificate of title remains effective until terminated.227
More importantly, in Chapter 9 the term "manufactured homes"
is instead used in the non-uniform provisions pertaining to fixtures.
These non-uniform provisions in Chapter 9 exclude manufactured
homes from being fixtures, pursuant to exclusionary language in the
222. SeeLa. R.S. 10:9-501 (a)(1), 32:702(9), and 32:710 (Supp. 2002). See also
La. R.S. 32:707(A) (Supp. 2002). In addition, La. R.S. 9:5363.1 was expressly

retained in effect. 2001 La. Acts No. 128, §19.
223. La. R.S. 9:1149.1-1149.7 (2000).
224. See id. and La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(53) (Supp. 2002).
225.

La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(54) (reserved) (Supp. 2002).

226. See supranote 222.
227. La. R.S. 10:9-515(h) (Supp. 2002).
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definition and other operative provisions.228 Thus the priority rules
ofthe Louisiana Manufactured Home Property Act are left in effect,
and U.C.C. Subsection 9-334(e)(4) is omitted and reserved in Chapter
9.
E. Titled Motor Vehicles
Chapter 9 has a non-uniform definition of "titled motor
vehicle. 229 This definition is added for convenience and ease of
to the filing of
drafting the provisions in Chapter 9, Part 5 pertaining230
Chapter 9
vehicles.
motor
titled
covering
financing statements
of the
treatment
non-uniform
its
in
law
Louisiana
continues former
23'
vehicles.
motor
titled
in
interests
perfection of security
U.C.C. Section 9-311 exempts from its filing requirements
transactions governed by state certificate-of-title statutes covering
motor vehicles and the like. Chapter 9 continues former Chapter 9 in
omitting this exclusion.2 32 In Louisiana, the method ofperfecting a
security interest in automobiles and other titled motor vehicles is
provided in Chapter 9 itself.233 These filings are made with the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections of the Office of Motor
Vehicles, unless the collateral is held as inventory for sale or lease as
discussed below.234 It should be noted that in Louisiana financing
statements covering titled motor vehicles are required to contain
additional descriptive information, 235 and filing is effective only if
later validated by the secretary.236
228. See La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(40), 10:9-102)(a)(41), 10:9-334(a), and 10:9-

334(e)(4) (reserved) (Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(44)(v) (Supp.
2002).
229. La. R.S. 10:9-102(d)(19) (Supp. 2002).
230. See, e.g., La. R.S. 10:9-501, 10:9-504,10:9-506(c), 10:9-515(h), 10:9516(a), 10:9-519(i), 10:9-525(b), and 10:9-526 (Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S.
32:710 (Supp. 2002).
231. See, e.g., former La. R.S. 10:9-401(1)(a) (1993), as amendedby 2001 La.
Acts No.128, § 1.
232. See formerLa. R.S. 10:9-401(1)(a), 10:9-402(1), 10:9-403(l)(b), and 10:9403(10) (1993).
233. See La. R.S. 10:9-501(a)(1) (Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S. 10:9-303,
10:9-504(3), and 10:9-516(a)(2) (Supp. 2002). Thus, Chapter 9 deletes the
exclusion that makes perfection governed solely by the Louisiana Vehicle
Certificate of Title Law, instead leaving perfection within Chapter 9. La. R.S.
10:9-31 l(a)(2) (Supp. 2002) (non-uniform).
234. La. R.S. 10:9-311(d) (Supp. 2002).
235. The financing statement is required to list "the year of manufacture, make,
model, body style and manufacturer's serial or other identification number." La.
R.S. 10:9-504(3) (Supp. 2002). See former La. R.S. 32:71 0(A)(1) (repealed 1989).

236. See La. R.S. 32:710(A), La. R.S. 10:9-516(a)(2) (Supp. 2002). There is

a change in Louisiana law on this timing matter from former Chapter 9.
Previously, the filing of a financing statement covering a titled motor vehicle
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U.C.C. Subsection 9-31 1(d) provides an exception to Section 931 l's general exclusion of security interests in titles motor vehicles
from the perfection rules of U.C.C. Article 9. Under U.C.C.
Subsection 9-311 (d), perfection ofa security interest in the inventory
of a person in the business of selling goods of that kind is governed
by the normal perfection rules of U.C.C. Article 9, even if the
inventory is subject to a certificate-of-title statute. Compliance with
a certificate-of-title statute is both unnecessary and ineffective under
U.C.C. Article 9 to perfect a security interest in inventory to which
Subsection 9-311 (d) applies. Under U.C.C. Article 9, a secured party
who finances an automobile dealer can perfect a security interest in
the entire inventory of automobiles by filing a financing statement,
but not by compliance with a certificate-of-title statute. However, the
U.C.C. Subsection 9-311 (d) exception does not apply ifthe inventory
is of a kind that the debtor is not in the business of selling and is
subject to certificate-of-title statute. Thus, ifa secured party finances
a company that is in the business of leasing but not selling motor
vehicles, U.C.C. Subsection 9-311(d) does not apply, and the
perfection ofa security interest in the automobiles is governed by the
applicable certificate-of-title statute. The fact that the debtor
eventually sells the goods does not, alone, mean that the debtor "is in
the business of selling goods of that kind" under U.C.C. Article 9.
Chapter 9 contains its own, slightly modified, Subsection 9311 (d) exception. Chapter 9 varies from U.C.C. Subsection 9-311 (d)
by the retention of the words "or leasing." In U.C.C. Article 9, these
words "or leasing" were deleted in the technical corrections effective
January 15, 2000. However, the retention ofthese words in Chapter
9 is intentional and is not an oversight. Thus, under Chapter 9 if a
secured party finances a company that is in the business ofselling or
leasing automobiles, it can perfect a security interest in the entire
inventory of automobiles by filing a financing statement. Like
U.C.C. Article 9, this cannot be done by compliance with a certificate
of title statute.
The provisions of Chapter 9 appear to contain two minor errors
or ambiguities pertaining to the perfection rules applicable to titled
motor vehicles. First, Section 9-309 is uniform in providing that a
purchase-money security interest in consumer goods is perfected
when it attaches, but there is the uniform exception "as otherwise
provided in" Subsection 9-311 (b) with respect to consumer goods that
became effective only when (at the time) the filing was validated by the Secretary
ofthe Office of Motor Vehicles. See former La. R.S. 10:9-403(1)(b) (1993). The
new rule is that the filing is effective when received, so long as such receipt is
subsequently validated by the Secretary. La. R.S. 32:710(A) (Supp. 2002). See

U.C.C. §9-311 cmt. 5(2001). ButseeLa. R.S. 32:706(D) (Supp. 2002). Compare
with La. R.S. 9:1149.5 (uses the prior formulation of the timing rule).
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are subject to a statute described in Subsection 9-311(a). In U.C.C.
Article 9, this provision has the effect of excluding from the
automatic perfection rule purchase-money security interests in titled
motor vehicles, under both the in-state certificate-of-title statute and
the certificate-of-title statutes of other jurisdictions. However, as
noted above, in Chapter 9 the reference to the Louisiana (in-state)
23
certificate-of-title statute is omitted from Subsection 9-311(a).
Consumer titled motor vehicles that are subject to an out-of-state
the
certificate-of-title statute are still excluded under Chapter 9 from
rule. 38
automatic perfection purchase-money security interest
However, read literally, a consumer titled motor vehicle subject to the
Louisiana certificate-of-title statute is arguably not properly excluded
from that automatic perfection purchase-money security interest
rule.239 Nonetheless, it unquestionably is the intent of Louisiana law
that any non-inventory security interest, even a purchase-money
security interest granted by a consumer, covering a titled motor
vehicle be perfected solely by notation on the certificate oftitle under
the Louisiana statute.24 °
The second issue in Chapter 9 pertaining to titled motor vehicles
is in Section 9-513. That section provides that a secured party shall
cause the secured party of record on a financing statement to file a
termination statement if the financing statement covers consumer
goods (generally, notjust titled goods) and the secured obligation has
been fully satisfied. 41 Under Section 9-513, this filing of the
237. See supra note 233.
238. La. R.S. 10:9-309(1), 10:9-311(a)(3), and 10:9-311(b) (Supp. 2002).
239. Section 9-309(1) excludes from automatic attachment only "as otherwise
provided in" Section 9-311 (b) and only "with respect to consumer goods that are
subject to a statute... described in" Section 9-311 (a). But Section 9-31 l(a) is nonuniform and describes only the out-of-state certificate oftitle statutes in paragraph
(3), but does not describe the Louisiana Vehicle Certificate of Title Act in its nonuniform paragraph (2). Compare with former La. R.S. 10:9-302(1)(d) (1993).
240. See 2001 La. Acts No. 128, §12 (amending La. R.S. 32:710(A)). See also
La. R.S. 32:704(A), 32:706(D), 32:708(A), and 32:710(E) (Supp. 2002). Another
method of perfection not allowed under Chapter 9 for titled motor vehicles is
possession by pawn brokers making "automobile title loans," whereby the practice
is for the borrower to deliver the certificate oftitle to be held by the pawn broker
as collateral for the loan. The pawn broker's security interest is not noted on the
certificate of title. Such a purported possessory security interest by means of
possession of the certificate of title is not perfected. See In re Davis, 269 B.R. 914
(Bankr. M.D. Ala 2001). Nor could even possession of the vehicle itself under
such circumstances result in perfection. See La. R.S. 10:9-313(b) (Supp. 2002).
See also U.C.C. § 9-311 cmt. 7, § 9-313 cmt. 7 (2001).
241. This requirement is a special rule for consumer goods, requiring the
secured party itself to file the termination statement. In all other transactions, the
secured party is only required to act upon request, and then has the option to make
the filing itself or simply to send the termination statement to the debtor. See La.
R.S. 10:9-513(c) (Supp. 2002).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 62

termination statement is made in the filing office where the financing
statement was originally filed. This provision is correct as to

ordinary financing statements. However, this requirement is at
variance with the common practice as it applies to titled motor
vehicles. When a Louisiana motor vehicle loan or credit sale is paid
in full, the secured party typically completes the lien release on the

back of the debtor's certificate of title, which the secured party has
been holding, and delivers the original title to the debtor.242 The

debtor then simply retains the vehicle title, and neither the debtor nor

the secured party files anything with the Louisiana Department of

Public Safety to cancel officially the security interest from the public
records. The filing of a termination statement in such circumstances

is of little benefit to the debtor, and in fact may be prejudicial, since
both a filing fee and a fee to issue a new certificate of title may be
incurred.243 It is hoped that Louisiana courts will find that the secured
party's completion of the lien release on the vehicle's certificate of

title and delivery of such original title to the debtor is sufficient to
comply with the requirement of Subsection 9-513.2"
Chapter 9 is uniform in its treatment ofthe conflicts arising when

a debtor obtains a certificate of title for titled goods in a new

jurisdiction and the security interest noted on the original certificate
of title is not noted on the new certificate of title. Under U.C.C.
Section 9-316, the secured party's interest continues to be perfected
242. See La. R.S. 32:708(A) (Supp. 2002). Upon the final discharge of any
security interest, a filing with the office ofmotor vehicles appears optional. See La.
R.S. 32:708(B) (Supp. 2002) (any lien holder "may" present). But see La. R.S.
32:710(F) (Supp. 2002) (requiring compliance with La. R.S. 32:708(B) [not (A)]).
But in any event that latter provision only refers to the filing of a termination
statement in the context of a lost certificate of title previously endorsed with a
satisfaction of security interest. See La. R.S. 32:708(B)(2)(b) (Supp. 2002).
243. See La. R.S. 32:708(B)(1) (present the fee prescribed by law, if not
prepaid), 32:728(1), and 32:728(6) (Supp. 2002). It is true that a Louisiana
financing statement covering a titled motor vehicle does not lapse by the passage
oftime and remains effective until a termination statement is filed. La. R.S. 10:9515(h) (Supp. 2002). Accordformer La. R.S. 9:403(10) (2000). But the filing of
the termination statement with the office of motor vehicles, in addition to the
delivery to the debtor ofthe certificate oftitle endorsed with the release of security
interest, would appear to benefit the debtor only in instances where the title is later
lost. See La. R.S. 32:708(B)(2)(b) (Supp. 2002).
244. Cf Kirkpatrick v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 799 So. 2d 831 (La. App.
2d Cir. 2001). The debtor executed a voluntary surrender in favor of the lender
holding a security interest in the manufactured home. Although the voluntary
surrender expressly reserved deficiency rights, the lender executed and delivered
to the Department of Public Safety (in connection with a private sale of the
manufactured home by the lender) a release of lien form stating that the debtor's
debt had been paid in full. The court nonetheless held that the execution and
delivery of the release did not constitute a remission of the debt.
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following the issuance ofthe new certificate of title for four months
from issuance of the new certificate of title, so long as the security
interest would have remained perfected if the goods had not been
covered by the new certificate of title. However, such security
interest will be ineffective as against certain parties as provided in
Sections 9-316 and 9-337.
F. InterestIn An Estate
Chapter 9 contains a clarifying exclusion in its scope provision
pertaining to security interests in an interest in an estate. Subsection
9-109(c)(5) provides that Chapter 9 does not apply to the extent that
the rights of a successor in an estate are interests in real property.
This exclusion simply makes more express the general applicability
of the exclusion in Subsection 9-109(d)(1 1), stating that Chapter 9
does not apply to the creation or transfer of an interest in real
property. Civil Code Article 872 provides that the estate of a
deceased means the property, rights,, and obligations that a person
leaves after his death.
Paragraph (13) of U.C.C. Section 9-309 provides that a security
interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a
decedent's estate is perfected automatically upon attachment. This
continues the rule under former U.C.C. Section 9-302(1)(c). The
rationale stated in the Official Comments to former U.C.C. Article 9
is that these assignments are not ordinarily thought of as subject to
a filing rule might operate to defeat many
U.C.C. Article
2 45 9, and
assignments.
However, former Chapter 9 varied from former U.C.C. Article 9.
Under former Chapter 9 the filing of a financing statement was not
required to perfect a security interest created by an assignment of a
beneficial interest in a decedent's estate.2 46 Instead, former Chapter
9 had a non-uniform requirement that a security interest in rights of
a succession under administration is perfected only by giving notice
succession representative.247
to the
Chapter
9 changes the law from former Chapter 9 and new U.C.C.
Article 9 with respect to the perfection of a security interest in an
interest in an estate. Under Chapter 9, no special perfection rule or
exception is provided for this collateral.2 48 Therefore, because an
interest in an estate falls within the catch-all definition of general
245. See former U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 9 (1977). But see U.C.C. § 9-309 cmt. 7
(2001); Clark, supranote 109, at §2.07[3].
246. La. R.S. 10:9-302(1)(c) (1993).
247. La. R.S. 10:9-305(3) (1993).
248. This change is another example of the importance of omissions in the
drafting of Chapter 9. See supranote 13.
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intangibles, perfection under Chapter 9 is accomplished by filing.
Even though notice of the security interest to the succession
representative is required to obligate the succession representative
to pay the secured party, such notice is not a useful mechanism for
perfection.249 Perfection by such notice, like U.C.C. Article 9's
approach of automatic perfection, would create a "secret security
interest" not readily determinable by creditors of the debtor, and
might imply an obligation on the part of succession representatives
to respond to inquiries from third parties. Filing is easy and
inexpensive. For those reasons, Chapter 9 rejects the "secret
security interest" obtainable under former Chapter 9's rule of
perfection by notice and U.C.C. Article 9's rule of automatic
perfection.
.Because Chapter 9 changes the law from former Chapter 9 as
to
the method ofperfection of a security interest in a debtor's interest
in an estate, under the transition rules even existing transactions are
affected. Under the transition rules of Chapter 9, a secured party
who has a perfected security interest in such collateral under the
former method of notice has a deadline of one year to perfect its
security interest under the new requirement of filing.25°
This variation in method of perfection will create issues in a
"'
multi-state factual situation.25
The choice of law governing
perfection will be the location ofthe debtor-beneficiary ofthe estate
under Section 9-301, resulting in different rules pertaining to
security interests in the same estate if beneficiaries are residents
versus non-residents of Louisiana.
In numerous provisions, including this section, Chapter 9
follows U.C.C. Article 9 in referring to the "assignment" or the
"transfer" of property interests. But these terms and their
derivatives are not defined. As explained in the official comments
to U.C.C. Article 9, the intent is generally to follow common usage
by using the terms "assignment" and "assign" to refer to transfers
of rights to payment, claims, liens, and security interests.
Generally, the term "transfer" refers to other transfers of interests
in property. Except when used in connection with a letter-of-credit
transaction, "no significance should be placed on the use of one
term or the other. Depending on the context, each term may refer
to the assignment or transfer of an outright ownership interest or to
249. Comment (c), Revision Comments - 2001 to La. R.S. 10:9-309 (Supp.
250. See La. R.S. 10:9-703(b) (Supp. 2002) and infra PartXI. For a discussion
of the transition issue caused by Chapter 9's restriction in the creation of security
interests in estates to existing estates described with some particularity, see supra
notes 157-160 and infra note 387 and accompanying text.
251. Compare with text accompanying supra note 61.
2002). Compare with infra Part V.G.
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the assignment or transfer of a limited interest, such as a security
2 52
interest.
G. Beneficial InterestIn A Trust
Chapter 9 also changes the law from former Chapter 9 as to the
perfection of a security interest in a beneficial interest in a trust.
Under former Chapter 9 filing a financing statement was not required,
in a
and perfection of a security interest in a beneficiary's interest
253 U.C.C.
trustee.
the
to
notice
giving
trust was perfected only by
Article 9 also changes the perfection rule from former U.C.C. Article
in
9. Under former U.C.C. Article 9 perfection of a security interest254
perfected.
automatically
was
a beneficial interest in a trust
However, U.C.C. Article 9 has changed this rule because beneficial
interests in trusts are now often used as collateral in commercial
transactions.255 Under U.C.C. Article 9, filing is required to perfect
a security interest in a beneficial interest in a trust. For the same
to perfect
reasons, Chapter 9 requires filing ofa financing statement
256 It should be
trust.
a
a security interest in a beneficial interest in
noted that notice to the trustee is still required in order to obligate the
trustee with respect to the secured party, but that issue is separate
from perfection.257
Section 9-410 is a new, non-uniform provision in Chapter 9, but
it does not change prior Louisiana law. It adds an express
cross-reference to the controlling provisions of the Louisiana Trust
from
Code, which permit a trust instrument to prohibit a beneficiary
25 If a
alienating or encumbering a beneficial interest in a trust.
security interest is permitted, notice to the trustee is required for the
security interest to be effective as to the trustee, but as noted above,
that issue is separate from perfection.
Like security interests in estates, 259 existing transactions involving
a security interest in a trust are affected by Chapter 9's change in the
law as to the method of perfection for a security interest in a debtor's
beneficial interest in a trust. Under the transition rules of Chapter 9,
252. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 26 (2001).

253. See La. R.S. 10:9-302(l)(c), 10:9-305(3) (1993).
254. See former U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(c) (1985).
255. See U.C.C. § 9-309 cmt. 7 (2001).
256. No express statutory provision so states; the result derives from Section 9310(a) and the absence of an exemption in Sections 9-309, 9-310(b) or elsewhere.
257. See La. R.S. 9:2003 (Supp. 2002) in the Louisiana Trust Code.
258. See La. R.S. 9:2001-2007 (1991 & Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S. 10:9406(d) and 10:9-408(a) (Supp. 2002), which contain non-uniform cross-references
to Section 9-410 as exceptions to the provisions otherwise overriding antiassignment clauses. Thus Subsection 9-401(a) applies to this issue.
259. See text accompanying supranote 250.
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a secured party whose security interest in such collateral was
perfected under the former method of notice has a deadline of one
year to perfect its security interest under the new requirement of
filing. 2"

VI. PERFECTION BY CONTROL

The concept ofperfection by control was introduced into former
U.C.C. Article 9 as part of the 1994 revisions to U.C.C. Article 8.

Under U.C.C. Article 9, perfection of a security interest through
control is expanded and is now allowed not only in investment
property but also in deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, and
letter-of-credit rights. Chapter 9 is uniform in those control
provisions.2 6
However, Chapter 9 does contain two non-uniform provisions
pertaining to collateral in which a security interest may be perfected
by control. First, Section 9-107.2 governs situations where control
of the collateral is subject to some condition. Under this statutory
provision, an agreement by the depository bank, securities
intermediary, letter ofcredit bank or similar pertinent party to comply
with the secured party's instructions suffices for "control" of the
pertinent collateral even if such party's agreement is subject to
specified conditions, e.g., that the secured party's instructions be
accompanied by a certification that the debtor is in default. 62 This
provision makes express a concept that is implicit in U.C.C. Article
9 and in U.C.C. Article 8. It should be noted that if the condition is
the debtor's further consent, the statute explicitly provides that such
agreement would not confer control.
Also, Section 9-107.2 appears to contain a minor error, in
referring only to a default by the debtor instead of a default by the
debtor or the obligor. It is hoped that the courts will interpret the
term "debtor" in this provision to mean "obligor."
Second, as discussed above, Chapter 9 allows for perfection of a
security interest in a life insurance policy by "control." In reality, this
control is somewhat more implicit than the control achieved with
respect to a deposit account or investment property, where control
260. See La. R.S. 10:9-703(b) (Supp. 2002) and infraPart XI. For a discussion
ofthe transition issue created by Chapter 9's restriction in the creation of security
interests in trusts to existing trusts described with some particularity, see supranote
386 and accompanying text.
261. See La. R.S. 10:9-104, 10:9-105, 10:9-106, and 10:9-107 (Supp. 2002).
See also La. R.S. 10:9-310(b)(8), 10:9-314 (Supp. 2002). Chapter 9 is also
uniform in the choice of law rules pertaining to such control. La. R.S. 10:9-304,
10:9-305, and 10:9-306 (Supp. 2002). But see text accompanying supranote 61
and supranote 67 regarding perfection by control ofconsumer deposit accounts.
262. See U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 3, § 8-106 cmt. 7 (2001).
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means that the parties have agreed expressly that the secured party
can direct disposition of the collateral. Under Section 9-107.1,
control ofan insurance policy is achieved simply by the life insurance
company's bare acknowledgment ofthe security interest, without the
further requirement of an express agreement to follow the secured
party's directions pertaining to the life insurance policy.26 3
VII. PRIORITY

Chapter 9 contains several important non-uniform provisions
pertaining to priority in the areas of security interests in crops, the
priority of security interests versus privileges, and purchase-money
security interests.
A. Crops
U.C.C. Article 9 has a new provision which provides that a
perfected security interest in crops 2" has priority over the interest of
an owner or mortgagee if the debtor is the owner, or is in possession,
of the real estate. 26 Under former U.C.C. Article 9, whether a
perfected security interest in crops prevailed over the interest of an
owner or mortgagee of the real estate depended upon how crops are
treated under the applicable state's real estate law. However, in
Chapter 9, Subsection 9-334(i) varies from U.C.C. Article 9 by
limiting its application to security interests in unharvested crops
granted by debtors with interest of record in the land.266 Chapter 9
omits the language "or in possession" of the land as contrary to the
Louisiana public records doctrine.267
Chapter 9 also varies from U.C.C. Article 9 in its provision
pertaining to the relative priority of agricultural liens.268 Under
U.C.C. Subsection 9-322(g), the priority of an agricultural lien is
treated differently than the priority ofother liens under U.C.C. Article
9. The general U.C.C. priority rules apply to an agricultural lien
under U.C.C. Article 9, unless the agricultural lien is given by statute
which provides otherwise. This result arises from the interplay of
263. See discussion infra Part VIII.E. and supraPart III.D.

264. The term "crops" is not deftmed. See text accompanying supra note 32
regarding farm products.

265. U.C.C. § 9-334(i) (2001).
266. Subsection 9-334(i) deals with the rights ofan "encumbrancer" ofthe land
versus a secured party. Encumbrancer is defined in Chapter 9. See La. R.S. 10:9102(a)(32) (Supp. 2002) and supranote 203.
267. La. Civ. Code arts. 474, 491 and 493; La. R.S. 9:2721 (1991); Flower &
King v. Pearce & Son, 45 La. Ann 853, 13 So. 150 (1893). See also infra notes
283 and 312 and accompanying text.
268. See also text accompanying supranotes 39-43.
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U.C.C. Subsections 9-322(a) and (g). In contrast, Chapter 9 omits
Subsection 9-322(g). Instead, Chapter 9 provides in non-uniform
Subsection 9-322(0(5) that the priority among conflicting security
interests and agricultural liens in the same collateral is subject to
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4521 269
Chapter 9 is uniform with respect to the treatment, or lack thereof,
of proceeds of an agricultural lien. 70 U.C.C. Article 9 does not
address proceeds of an agricultural lien, and leaves to other law the
question ofwhether the agricultural lien extends to proceeds, whether
the agricultural lien in proceeds is perfected, and what priority it has
over a competing claimant. Presumably, this "other law" is the state
statute under which the agricultural lien is created. An interesting
situation arises when the proceeds of farm products encumbered by
an agricultural lien are themselves farm products on which an
agricultural lien arises under other law. In such a case the agricultural
lien provisions of U.C.C. Article 9 apply to the agricultural lien on
the proceeds in the same way in which they would apply had the farm
products not been proceeds.
B. PriorityVersus Privileges
One of the most significant variations in Chapter 9 is its nonuniform provision expressly dealing with the relative priority among
conflicting security interests and liens in the same collateral. Under
the common law it is not clear whether a consensual security interest
is or is not a "lien." 27 ' Thus U.C.C. Article 9 refers throughout to
"security interests and other liens." Under Louisiana law, however,
privileges are solely statutory. Privileges attach by reason of status
269. Thus Chapter 9 generally retains existing Louisiana law on the relative
priority ofagricultural liens and security interests affecting unharvested crops. See
Bayou Pierre Farms v. Bat Farms Partners, 693 So. 2d 1158 (La. 1997); Howard
v. Stokes, 607 So. 2d 868 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992). Because Louisiana (like the
vast majority ofstates) did not enact the model provisions ofrevised U.C.C. Article
9 for "production-money security interests" in "production-money crops," Chapter
9 changes Louisiana law to the extent there is no corresponding provision to former
Subsection 9-312(2) relating to growing crops. As to farm products other than
unharvested crops, the general rules of Subsection 9-322(a) apply to set priority
among conflicting security interests and agricultural liens, because no exception in
Section 9-322 exists. Non-uniform Subsection 9-322(h) by its terms does not apply
to agricultural liens. As noted, Chapter 9 omits U.C.C. Subsection 9-322(g).
Subsection 9-322(f)(5) and La. R.S. 9:4521 only apply to unharvested crops, not
all farm products. See also La. R.S. 10:9-31 l(a)(2) (Supp. 2002) (filing in central
registry of security interests and liens affecting farm products).
270. Compare La. R.S. 10:9-315(a)(1) with 10:9-315(a)(2) (Supp. 2002). See
U.C.C. § 9-322 cmt. 12 (2001). Cf text accompanying supra notes 39-43
(discussing agricultural liens).
271. See supra note 21.
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and not by consent of the parties or, as is often the case in the
common law, by jurisprudence. As a result, Chapter 9 varies from
U.C.C. Article 9 by providing a definition of the term "lien."
Chapter 9 defines a "lien" as "a privilege on personal property
created by operation of law that entitles the privileged creditor to be
'
This definition reproduces the
preferred before other creditors."272
substance of former Chapter 9,273 but clarifies the intent. The
definitional phrase "created by operation of law" encompasses all
statutes, whether the Louisiana Civil Code, the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950, or other statutory authority. Because a privilege
under Louisiana law is not a consensual security interest, Chapter 9
makes a consistent change throughout by deleting the reference to
"other" liens in places where reference is made to security interests
and liens.
Chapter 9 adds a non-uniform provision of major importance in
Subsection 9-322(h).27 4 Under Subsection 9-322(h), a security
interest has priority over a conflicting lien, other than an agricultural
lien, in the same collateral except as otherwise provided in Chapter
9 or except to the extent the lien is created by a statute that provides
otherwise. This provision continues prior Louisiana law, although it
states the result in strikingly clear fashion.275 Thus, as a general rule
a security interest has priority over a conflicting lien in the same
collateral, regardless ofperfection.
There are, however, three exceptions to this rule. The first is
when the conflicting lien is an agricultural lien, as discussed above.
The second exception is found in Chapter 9 itself, in Section 9-333.
Section 9-333 deals with possessory liens276 and, although reworded
in Chapter 9, is substantively uniform. The third exception is where
the statute creating the lien expressly provides that the lien has
priority over the security interests. There are multiple examples of
statutes which provide that certain privileges have priority over
272. See La. R.S. 10:9-102(d)(9) (Supp. 2002) and supranote 21. The term is
not defined in U.C.C. Article 9.

273. See La. R.S. 10:9-102(4)(b) (1993).
274. See also La. R.S. 10:9-109(d)(1) and (2) (Supp. 2002) (expanding scope
of Chapter 9).

275. Former Chapter 9 reached the same result, but in an awkward and
confusing fashion. See former La. R.S. 10:9-201 (1993), as amendedby 2001 La.
Acts No. 128, § 1, and former La. R.S. 10:9-104(b) and (c) (1993). Instead,
Chapter 9 contains an express provision placed in the proper place among the
priorityprovisions. See La. R.S. 9:4770 (Supp. 2002) (expressly preserved in 2001
La. Act No. 128, §19); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Beckwith Mach. Co., 650 So.
2d 1148 (La. 1995) (especially discussion contained in footnote 17).
276. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 3217(2). Chapter 9 does not apply to nonagricultural liens except under Sections 9-322(h) and 9-333. La. R.S. 10:9109(d)(2) (Supp. 2002).
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certain security interests.277 In addition, other statutes provide that the
278
statutory privilege has priority over all security interests.
C. Consumer Purchase-MoneySecurity Interests
Section 9-103 reproduces a change made in former Chapter 9
from former U.C.C. Article 9. Chapter 9 applies its rules in Section
9-103 to consumer goods transactions in the same manner as all other
purchase-money security interest transactions. Former Chapter 9
contained a non-uniform addition which preserved purchase-money
security interest status notwithstanding cross-collateralization.279
U.C.C. Article 9 has adopted this Louisiana rule for non consumer
good transactions, rejecting the "transformation" rule in some states'
jurisprudence under which any cross-collateralization destroys the
purchase-money status entirely. Chapter 9 goes further and continues
the rule under former Chapter 9 that the principles in this section
apply to all purchase-money security interest transactions, consumer
and commercial. Chapter 9 rejects the approach of U.C.C. Article 9,
which expressly leaves it to the courts to fashion a rule applicable to
consumer-goods transactions. Under Louisiana civil law, such
decisions are appropriately made by legislation, not by judge-made
common law.280
VIII. THIRD PARTIES
A. Purchasers
The term "purchaser" is defined in U.C.C. Article 1and Louisiana
Chapter 1 as "a person who takes by purchase." To "purchase" is
defined in U.C.C. Article 1 and Louisiana Chapter 1 as "taking by
sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest,
issue or re-issue, gift, or any other voluntary transaction creating an

277. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:4501 (1991) (repairman); La. R.S. 9:4502 (1991)
(maker/repairman); La. R.S. 9:4512 (Supp. 2002) (aircraft); La. R.S. 9:4758 (1991)
(self storage facility); and La. R.S. 9:4870 and 9:4888 (Supp. 2002)
(hydrocarbons). See also La. R.S. 9:4770 (Supp. 2002) and 2001 La. Acts No. 218,

§19.

278. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:5001 (Supp. 2002) (attorneys); 37:218(A) (2000)
(attorneys).
279. La. R.S. 10:9-107 (1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1.
280. See infra note 376 and accompanying text and supranote 22. See also
Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119 (La. 2000); Yiannopoulos, supranote 22,
at 846. Other states such as Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Nebraska, North Dakota and
South Dakota (and Tennessee and Virginia in part) made similar non-uniform
decisions.
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interest in property."2 81 Therefore, "purchaser" under U.C.C. Article
9 and Chapter 9 includes not only a buyer of collateral, but also other
secured parties or lienholders.28
Chapter 9 contains several non-uniform provisions pertaining to
the rights ofpurchasers. First, Chapter 9 varies from U.C.C. Article
9 with respect to the requirements that a buyer, lessee or licensee of
collateral must meet in order to take free of a security interest or
agricultural lien. Section 9-317 deals with the rights of such parties
x ersus unperfected security interests. Subsections 9-317(b), (c) and
(d) omit the requirement contained in U.C.C. Article 9 that such
buyer, lessee, or licensee act without knowledge of the security
interest or agricultural lien in order to take free of the unperfected
security interest. This omission is consistent with the Louisiana
public records doctrine, which is predicated on filings and not
knowledge. The Louisiana rule is that actual knowledge by third
parties of an unrecorded interest is immaterial. Proper filing is alone
dispositive.28 3 This policy promotesjudicial efficiency by facilitating
proof in contested cases.
Second, Section 9-320 of Chapter 9 also omits the requirement
contained in U.C.C. Article 9 that a buyer of consumer goods buy
without knowledge of the security interest in order to take free of a
perfected security interest. Subsection 9-320(b) applies to buyers of
goods that the debtor-seller holds as "consumer goods." The
omission ofthis requirement that the buyer act without knowledge of
the security interest is a change in Louisiana law. 2s4 The reason for
this deletion is both to give greater protection to the consumer buyer
and to align this provision with the public records doctrine. In reality,
this provision deals with purchase-money security interests in nontitled consumer goods, which are perfected automatically without
filing.285 If the secured party does file, all buyers take subject to the
security interest.
Third, Section 9-320 contains another variation from U.C.C.
Article 9, in the omission of Subsection (d). This subsection was
281. La. R.S. 10:1-201(32) and (33) (1993).
282. Lienholder is a defined tenn in Chapter 9. La. R.S. 10:9-102(b)(10) (Supp.
2002). See supra notes 21 and 177. A buyer at ajudicial sale, however, is not a
purchaser, because the transfer is not voluntary as required by the definition.
283. McDuffiev. Walker, 125 La. 152, 167,51 So. 100,105 (La. 1909); Dallas
v. Farrington, 490 So. 2d 265, 269 (La. 1986); F.D.I.C. v. McFarland, 243 F.3d
876 (5th Cir. 2001); La. R.S. 9:2721 (1991); see also Lee Hargrave, Public
Records & PropertyRights, 56 La. L. Rev. 536, 537 (1996); Max Nathan, Jr. &
Anthony Dunbar, The CollateralMortgage:Logic andExperience,49 La. L. Rev.
39, 44 n.22 (1988); Lee Hargrave, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in
LouisianaPropertyLaw, 46 La. L. Rev. 225, 234 (1985).
284. See La. R.S. 10:9-307 (1993), asamendedby 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1.
285. See La. R.S. 10:9-309(1) (Supp. 2002). See alsosupra Part V.E.
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inserted in U.C.C. Article 9 to deal with those states that allow a
mortgage to both cover minerals before extraction and continue such
encumbrance on the minerals after extraction. Neither part of that
rule is the law in Louisiana, and this subsection is unnecessary in
Louisiana. Qualified buyers ofminerals are adequately protected by
Subsection 9-320(a) under Louisiana law.
Finally, Chapter 9 contains a non-uniform addition to Section 9315. This provision carries forward a provision from former Chapter
9286 stating that a purchaser of collateral incurs no personal liability
on account of any unauthorized transfer unless the purchaser has
failed to act in good faith.
B. Consignment
The definitions of"consignee," "consignment," and "consignor"
in U.C.C. Article 9 and Chapter 9 are uniform. The definitions
generally follow prior Louisiana law 287 without using the term "true
consignment. '288 If a transaction is called a consignment but it
creates a security interest that secures an obligation, it is not a
consignment. The new definition of consignment also follows
U.C.C. Article 9 by changing the law to exclude from Chapter 9 the
delivery ofgoods which at the time ofdelivery are valued at less than
one thousand dollars or are consumer goods. The reason for these
exclusions is that filing would be inappropriate or of insufficient
benefit to justify the costs in such transactions. A consignment
excluded from the application of Chapter 9 by one of those
subparagraphs may still be a true consignment; however, it is
governed by non-Chapter 9 law.
The "consignor" is the person who delivers goods to the
"consignee" in a consignment. The consignee is a "debtor. '289 The
consignor's security interest in the consigned goods is a purchasemoney security interest
in inventory. 290 Although a "consignor" is a
"secured party,"2 9 ' a consignor has no duties under Part 6.292 This
Chapter, like U.C.C. Article 9, applies to every "consignment" within
the definition.293
286. See La. R.S. 10:9-306(2) (1993). As to the definition of good faith, see
supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. Compare with La. R.S. 10:9-617(b)
(Supp. 2002) (transferee in good faith).
287. See La. R.S. 10:9-114 (1993), as amended by 2001 La. Acts No. 128, § 1
(non-uniform definition of true consignment).
288. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(19)-(21) (Supp. 2002).
289. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(28)(C) (Supp. 2002).
290. La. R.S. 10:9-103(d) (Supp. 2002).
291. La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(72)(C) (Supp. 2002).
292. La. R.S. 10:9-601(g) (Supp. 2002).
293. See La. R.S. 10:9-109(a)(4) (Supp. 2002) and U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 6
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Subsection 9-319 (a) is identical to U.C.C. Article 9 in providing
that the consignee may pass title to the purchaser to the detriment of
the consignor. However, Section 9-319(b) pertaining to the rights
and title of a consignee with respect to creditors and purchasers is
non-uniform in Chapter 9. Subsection 9-319(b) in Chapter 9 varies
from U.C.C. Article 9 by providing that other laws determine the
rights of purchasers of goods from a consignee if the consignor
perfected its security interest. U.C.C. Section 9-319(b) only applies
to creditors of a consignee.294 The addition ofpurchasers in Chapter
9's Subsection 9-319(b) has relevance with respect to a consignor's
rights as against the rights of a non-ordinary course buyer from the
consignee. Pursuant to Subsection 9-319(b), the respective rights
between a consignor who has filed a financing statement to perfect
the consignor's purchase money security interest 295 and a
non-ordinary course purchaser (even not for value) (example, a
donee/by donation is a purchaser not for value in U.C.C. language)
from the consignee are determined by other law, such as mandate
(agency) and transfer of ownership by agreement in the Civil Code.
If the consignor's security interest is unperfected, then Subsection 9319(a) applies. Ifthe buyer is in the ordinary course ofbusiness, then
Section 9-320 applies.
C. Anti-Assignment Provisions
U.C.C. Sections 9-406 and 9-408 represent one of the most
significant changes contained in new U.C.C. Article 9. U.C.C.
Article 9 continues former law by rendering ineffective a clause
restricting the creation or enforcement of a security interest in an
account or a general intangible.296 U.C.C. Article 9 also renders
ineffective an anti-assignment clause affecting payments under other
chattel paper orpromissory notes. In addition, and more importantly,
U.C.C. Article 9 renders ineffective a provision of law that would
prevent the attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security
interest in accounts or chattel paper. Finally, and of critical
importance, U.C.C. Article 9 renders ineffective a clause in any
general intangible or any provision of law relating to any general
(2001).

294. See U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 6, § 9-109 cmt. 6 (2001). So unlike in Chapter
9, under U.C.C. Article 9 even a perfected consignor cannot derive protection
against a purchaser from this Section, relying instead upon other law. Cf U.C.C.
§ 2-403(3) (2001) (entrustment).
295. See La. R.S. 10:9-103(d) (Supp. 2002).
296. The strong policy in U.C.C. Article 9 is to make such rights assignable as
a matter of public policy and to obligate the account debtor to pay an assignee after
notice. See In re Advanced Systems Inc., 257 B.R. 457 (E.D. La. 2001).
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intangible, even ifnot for money due or to become due, that prevents
a security interest from attaching and becoming perfected, so long as
the rights of the account debtor or other party imposing the antiassignment clause or provision oflaw are not disturbed. The security
interest in such a general intangible may attach and be perfected
notwithstanding the anti-assignment clause or provision of law, but
the secured party may not enforce the security interest without the
consent of the account debtor or other party imposing the antiassignment clause. The key goal is to make the security interest valid
and protected despite the debtor's bankruptcy. For purposes ofthese
provisions, an assignment of a health-care-insurance receivable is
treated as if it were a general intangible, not as an account. As a
result, an assignment ofa health-care insurance receivable is subject
to the limited override rule for general intangibles rather than the
stronger override rule for accounts.29 7
Chapter 9 varies from U.C.C. Article 9 in Sections 9-406 and 9408 in several respects. First, Section 9-406 deletes references to
U.C.C. Article 2, which Louisiana has not enacted.29
Each
subsection adds a specific provision stating that the section prevails
over any inconsistent provisions of Louisiana Civil Code Article
2653, as suggested by the Legislative Enactment Note to U.C.C.
Article 9.299 Each section adds cross-references 3°° to non-uniform
provisions added in Chapter 9, discussed below.
More importantly, Chapter 9 makes two substantive additions.
First, Chapter 9 adds in each section a provision preventing that
section from overriding anti-assignment provisions in statutes
pertaining to government benefits, such as pensions, worker's
compensation, unemployment compensation and public assistance,
as well as statutes providing for crime victim reparation payments or
lottery payments.3° ' Second, each section adds a provision preventing
297. See La. R.S. 10:9-408 (Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S. 10:9-404(e), 10:9405(d), and 10:9-406(i) (Supp. 2002) (each making such section not apply to an
assignment of a health-care-insurance receivable).

298. See La. R.S. 10:9-406(d) and (f) (Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S. 10:9407(a) and (b) (Supp. 2002). See also supranote 16.
299.

La. R.S. 10:9-406(j), 10:9-408(e) (Supp. 2002).

300. See La. R.S. 10:9-406(a) (referring to Section 9-411); 10:9-406(d)

(referring to 9-410); 10:9-408(a) (referring to Subsection (f) and 9-410); 10:9408(b) and 10:9-408(c) (referring to Subsection (f)).

301. See La. R.S. 10:9-406(i), 10:9-408(0 (Supp. 2002). For examples ofsuch

statutes, see La. R.S. 11:570, 11:704, 11:952.3, 11:1526, 11:3389, 23:731,

23:1205,46:111 and 47:9025. Other states such as Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Idaho, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon,

Pennsylvania and Wisconsin have made similar non-uniform changes, either in
their scope provision (U.C.C. Section 9-109) or in U.C.C. Sections 9-406 and 9408.
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that section from overriding anti-assignment provisions in, among
other things, structured settlements.3 °2 These provisions were not part
of the bill recommended by the Louisiana State Law Institute, but
instead are the result of an amendment drafted and proposed by the
Insurance Association in Senate Committee on Judiciary
American
3
A.

30

An aside concerning U.C.C. Article 9 drafting terminology is
relevant here. In numerous provisions, including Sections 9-406 and
9-408, Chapter 9 follows revised U.C.C. Article 9 in referring to the
"assignment" or the "transfer" ofproperty interests. These terms and
their derivatives are not defined. As discussed previously, the official
comments explain that the intent is generally to follow common
usage by using the terms "assignment" and "assign" to refer to
transfers of right to payment, claims, liens, and security interests.
Generally, the term "transfer" is used to refer to other transfers of
interests in property. Except when used in connection with a letterof-credit transaction, "no significance should be placed on the use of
one term or the other. Depending on the context, each term may refer
to the assignment or transfer of an outright ownership interest or to
the assignment or transfer of a limited interest, such as a security
interest." 304
D. Banks
U.C.C. Article 9 provides that unless a secured party has control
over a deposit account, which requires the depositary bank's
agreement, the depositary bank has no obligation to deal with the
secured party with respect to the deposit account. Furthermore, a
depositary bank has no obligation to enter into a control agreement
with a secured party relating to the deposit account, even if the debtor
customer requests. Chapter 9 adds an additional new non-uniform
Section 9-343, to clarify that the joinder by a depositary bank in a
control agreement does not in and of itself constitute a waiver or
302. See La. R.S. 10:9-406(k), 10:9-408(g) (Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S.
9:2715 (Supp. 2002). See also text accompanying infra note 320.
303. See 2001 La. Acts No. 128 and Senate Committee Amendments Nos. 1 &
2, Proposed by Judiciary Committee A for the Louisiana Senate (May 1, 2001).
A majority of the other states have made similar non-uniform changes either in
their scope provision (U.C.C. Section 9-109) or in U.C.C. Sections 9-406 and 9408 [scope: Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota,
Missouri, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee and Vermont; assignment
sections: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Virginia.]
304. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 26 (2001).
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subordination of the bank's security interest in the deposit account,
unless that control agreement specifically so provides. 05
E. Life Insurance Companies
As discussed above, 0 6 Chapter 9 contains a significant variation
from U.C.C. Article 9 by including life insurance policies as eligible
collateral. Although that inclusion carries forward prior Louisiana
law, 3 7 Chapter 9 contains a new Section 9-344 pertaining to the
rights of life insurance companies. Section 9-344 is modeled on
similar provisions pertaining to the rights and duties of persons in
possession of collateral, including the duties of a person who
voluntarily acknowledges that it holds possession for a secured
party's benefit and the rights and duties of a depositary bank and
securities intermediary.30 s A life insurance company is not obligated
by Chapter 9 to enter into a control agreement with a secured party
even ifthe debtor-insured so requests. 31 An insurer who does agree
to allow "control" does not thereby assume any duty to such secured
310
party.
F. Judgment Debtors
Section 9-411 in Chapter 9 is non-uniform and new. As discussed
above, Chapter 9 permits judgments to be original collateral. 311
Under Civil Code Article 3300, a money judgment filed in the
mortgage records creates a judicial mortgage upon the immovable
property ofthe debtor. Subsection 9-411 (a) prevents even a perfected
security interest in such a judgment from affecting third parties in
contravention of the Louisiana public records doctrine.312 Even if a
secured party has a perfected security interest in a recorded judgment,
third parties dealing with the immovable property burdened by a
judicial mortgage may deal with the holder of the judicial mortgage

305. See discussion supraPart III.A.

306. See discussion supraPart III.D.
307. Id.
308. See La. R.S. 10:9-313(0 and (g); 10:9-341 and 10:9-342; 10:9-409(b)
(Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S. 10:8-106(g) (Supp. 2002).
309. La. R.S. 10:9-344(a) (Supp. 2002). But other law may so require, such as
the Louisiana Insurance Code. See supranote 122.
310. La. R.S. 10:9-344(b) (Supp. 2002). But other law may so require. See

supra note 122. See also supraPart VI.

311. See supraPart III.C. A judgment debtor may not assert any rights under
Civil Code Article 2652 against a secured party. La. R.S. 10:9-41 l(c) (Supp.
2002). See text accompanying infranote 317.
312. See text accompanying supranotes 267 and 283.
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as reflected in the mortgage records.3 13 A secured party, therefore, also
may desire to file its assignment in the mortgage records.
Subsection 9-411(b) supplies a cross-reference to longstanding
Louisiana statutes governing a creditor's seizure of a litigant's rights in
a pending lawsuit. It corresponds with Subsection 9-412(d). Each
provision is added in Chapter 9 for purposes of emphasis. Louisiana
Revised Statutes 13:3864 through 13:3868 apply in all instances
applicable by their terms, which include other litigation rights besides
judgments and tort claims dealt with in these sections. The specific
references in Chapter 9 to the application ofthose statutes to judgments
and tort claims is not intended as a restriction upon the applicability of
those statutes to their full extent. These statutes serve to limit the rights
of a secured party to interfere in the progress of the litigation, while
secured party
providing protection regarding payment of monies to the
who properly notifies the other parties to the litigation.314 It should be
noted that filing of a financing statement 15for perfection is not
notification under this section or those statutes.
G. Tortfeasors
Chapter 9 contains several non-uniform provisions pertaining to
security interests in tort claims. First, as discussed above,itsChapter
3169
scope.
within
claims,
tort
consumer
even
claims,
includes all tort
Second, Subsection 9-411 (c) removes the creation and enforcement
of security interests in litigious rights, including tort claims, from the
application of Civil Code Article 2652. The policy underlying Civil
Code Article 2652 is to prevent parties from trading inand attempting to
profit from lawsuits. The rights of a secured party under Chapter 9 in a
tort claim or other litigious right is limited to the secured debt otherwise
of
incurred, and does not involve the negative consequences
31
independently trafficking in tort claims or other lawsuits.
Section 9-412 of Chapter 9 is also non-uniform and new. It is
modeled on Section 9-406. Tort claims are excluded from the definition
318
of"general intangible" and therefore also are not payment intangibles.
Accordingly, the rules in Section 9-406 with respect to account debtors
have no application to persons obligated on a tort claim. Instead, Section
9-412 applies, and if the tort claim is reduced to judgment then Section
9-411 applies.319 If atort claim is settled under circumstances giving rise
313. See La. R.S. 9:5556 (Supp. 2002).
314. See La. R.S. 10:9-406(a) (Supp. 2002) ("subject to" La. R.S. 10:9-411).

See also discussion supraPart III.C. Cf La. R.S. 9:4753 (Supp. 2002).
315. See text accompanying supranotes 104-105.
316. See supra Part II.B.
317. See text accompanying supra note 311.
318. See La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(42) (Supp. 2002).

319. See discussion supra Part III.B-C.
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to a contractual obligation to pay, the right to payment becomes a
payment intangible and ceases to be a claim arising in tort. 320
The notification required by Section 9-412 does not pertain to
perfection ofa security interest in a tort claim, which is done by filing a
financing statement. Filing ofa financing statement does not constitute
notification to the tortfeasor.32 1
Subsection 9-412(d) corresponds to Subsection 9-41 1(b). 322 Each
provision is added in Chapter 9 for purposes of emphasis as explained
above.
IX. REMEDIES

The fourth major variation in Chapter 9 from U.C.C. Article 9 is in
the area of remedies and damages. There are several important nonuniform remedies323 provisions in Chapter 9.324 Some are carried
forward from former Chapter 9, while others were added in response to
new provisions in U.C.C. Article 9. Although not the most significant,
the variation which receives the most attention is the absence in Chapter
9 of a general authorization of self-help repossession of collateral by
secured parties.
A. Self-Help

Louisiana has long had an established public policy against selfhelp action by creditors with respect to corporeal property. 325 That
320. But Sections 9-406 and 9-408 have exclusions that prevent application of
the rules overriding anti-assignment provisions to tortfeasors and their insurers.
See text accompanying supra note 302. See also La. R.S. 9:2715 (Supp. 2002).
321. See La. R.S. 10:9-310(a) (Supp. 2002).
322. See text accompanying supranote 314.
323. The term "rights" in Chapter 9 Part 6 includes "remedies." La. R.S. 10:1201(36) (1993). See also La. R.S. 10:9-601-9-603 (Supp. 2002). Such remedies
are to be liberally administered. La. R.S. 10:1-106 (1993). Cf Terrebonne Fuel
& Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining Co., 681 So. 2d 1292 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied,692 So. 2d 1066 (1996) (no reason to construe security agreement remedy
provisions strictly against the secured party).
324. One non-uniform provision in Louisiana Chapter 1bears upon Chapter 9's
Part 6 enforcement provisions. The term "good faith" is not used in Part 6, and the
uniform definition ofthat term in Chapter 9 has no application to those provisions.
See discussionsupra Part II.C.2. Instead, the non-uniform definition of good faith
in Louisiana Chapter 1is used in the application ofthe non-waivable obligation of
good faith imposed by law on a secured party's enforcement actions under Chapter
9. See La. R.S. 10:1-203, 10:1-201(19), and 10:1-102(3) (1993 & Supp. 2002).
See also Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Reliable Mailing & Printing Servs., Inc., 694 So.
2d 479 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997) (secured party's in globo sale not in bad faith
under La. R.S. 10:1-203).
325. See generallyPrice v. U-Haul Co. ofLouisiana, 745 So. 2d 593 (La. 1999)
(extended discussion). Paul J. Ory, NonjudicialDisposition Under Louisiana
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public policy remains firmly in place in major portions of Louisiana
law. The prohibition on self-help action by landlords except in
instances ofabandonment is unquestionably established in Louisiana
lease law. a26 Unlike most other states, Louisiana mortgage law does
not provide for any non-judicial foreclosure remedies by a mortgagee
ofimmovable property."a 7 There has been no significant movement to
alter the prohibitions on creditor self-help in these areas of Louisiana
law.
There has been, however, a continuing pushby the finance industry
to obtain a broader self-help right of repossession of collateral as part
of Louisiana's former Chapter 9. This concerted effort is driven by
concerns linked to the quintessential American consumer
collateral-the automobile. It is the significant cost, in delay and
expenses, inherent in Louisiana's procedures for judicial seizure and
sale ofautomobiles in defaulted automobile finance loans that fuels the
continued push for self-help repossession.
Bills have been introduced to grant an authorization of self-help
repossession in every Louisiana non-fiscal legislative session for over
a decade. 328 None of these legislative efforts have been successful,
however, largely due to the vehement opposition by Louisiana sheriffs.
A major reason for their opposition, admitted or not, is the significant
loss ofrevenue sheriffs would suffer due to a loss ofor decrease in the
foreclosure business. The political tension between the finance
industry lobby and the Louisiana sheriffs has led to several attempts at
legislative compromise, with enactments of an expedited judicial
seizure and sale process short of self-help repossession. 329 But those
CommercialLaws ChapterNine, 51 La. L. Rev. 1253, 1254-56 (i991). Self-help
repossession in Louisiana has been found to be a violation of the Unfair Trade

Practices Act. See, e.g., Bryant v. Sears Consumer Fin. Corp., 617 So. 2d 1191
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1993); Cook v. Spillers, 574 So. 2d 464 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
The availability of separate tort remedies beyond damages under U.C.C. Section
9-625 (but without double recovery) is suggested but not clearly answered. See
Zinnecker, supra note 170, at 169 n.738; U.C.C. § 9-625 cmt. 3 (2001).
326. George Armstrong, Louisiana Landlord and Tenant Law §11.3 (7th ed.
1995); Vernon Palmer, Leases: The Law in Louisiana §3-25 (1997).
327. For that reason, Subsection 9-607(b) pertaining to non-judicial
enforcement of mortgages is omitted in Chapter 9. See Comment (b), Revision
Comments - 2001 to La. Civ. Code art. 3279. See also Guste v. Hibernia Nat'l
Bank, 655 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
328. See, e.g., 1999 La. Acts No. 626 (by its terms not effective because another
related bill did not become law); H.B. 2257, 1999 Reg. Sess. (La. 1999); S.B. 650,
1999 Reg. Sess. (La. 1999).
329. See former La. R.S. 6:965-967 (1993), as amended by 1993 La. Acts No.
927. This "Additional Default Remedies Act" was immediately challenged as
unconstitutional by the sheriffs in litigation. See Randall Andre, Sheriff of West
Baton Rouge v. Larry Murray, Commissioner of Financial Institutions, No.
424,027, La. 19th J.D.C. (1993). See also 2001 La. Acts No. 943 (amending that
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legislative attempts at compromise solutions have nothad real practical
success to date.
In recognition of this political context, there was an express
policy decision by the U.C.C. Committee ofthe Louisiana State Law
Institute and by the Institute Council not to change significantly the
provisions of former Chapter 9 as they pertain to self-help
repossession. Former Chapter 9 was the source ofthe language used
in Chapter 9 authorizing a very limited right of self-help action by
secured parties. The intent ofthe revised language in Chapter 9 is to
provide for this narrow authorization of self-help repossession in
more precise language.
Section 9-609 of Chapter 9 contains fundamentally different
language from U.C.C. Article 9. There was no intent by use of this
non-uniform language to introduce broad or prevalent self-help
repossession by subterfuge or indirection.33 ° After default, a secured
party in Louisiana may take possession ofthe collateral only (1) after
the debtor's abandonment, or the debtor's surrender to the secured
party of the collateral, or (2) with the debtor's consent given after or
in contemplation of default.
The concepts in the first exception ofabandonment and surrender
are well understood. Both terms come directly from former Chapter
9."' Surrender involves the voluntary yielding ofthe collateral by the
debtor, and is not easily misconstrued. Surrender is a bilateral
contractual act and occurs only through consent and mutual
agreement of both parties.
Abandonment, on the other hand, is a unilateral act whereby the
debtor voluntarily relinquishes all right and possession of the
collateral, with the intention of not reclaiming it. Abandonment
includes both the intention to abandon and an external act by which
Additional Default Remedies Act to provide for expedited judicial repossession
of motor vehicles but deleting the secured party's self-help right).

330. The author is a commercial practitioner and not a trial attorney. Neither
his practice nor his law firm's involves automobile finance transactions or routine
loan enforcement litigation, or material revenue from judicial foreclosure
proceedings. The views expressed in this Part IX.A have no economic impact on
the author and furthermore are not an assertion of the author's belief of what
Louisiana public policy should be in the abstract. This discussion instead reflects
the author's direct personal experience in the details ofthis legislation's drafting
process, and corresponds to express representations on this subject made, with
emphasis, both to the Law Institute Council, and to the House Civil Law
Committee and the Senate Committee on Judiciary A ofthe Louisiana Legislative
during the hearings on 2001 House Bill 679. U.C.C. Subsection 9-609(b)(2) is
omitted fully in Louisiana Chapter 9, not slyly hidden in non-uniform Subsection
9-609(a).
331.

See La. R.S. 10:9-505(3) and (4) (1993), as amendedby 2001 La. Acts No.

128, § 1. Cf Jones v. Petty, 577 So. 2d 821 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (improper
repossession without consent, no abandonment found).
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the intention is carried into effect. Thus, in determining whether a
debtor has abandoned the collateral, the debtor's intention is the
critical inquiry. Abandonment differs from surrender in that the
debtor gives up the collateral with the intention terminating his
ownership, but without vesting it in any other person.
The second exception, contained in Subsection 9-609(a)(2),
provides for self-help repossession with the "debtor's consent given
after or in contemplation of default."332 The language of this
exception was carried over from former Chapter 9, and there was no
intent to significantly broaden the availability of self-help
repossession in Chapter 9. The purpose behind Subsection 9609(a)(2) is to permit a debtor to consent to a secured party's selfhelp repossession only in two narrow circumstances, each of which
is tantamount to a debtor's decision actively to surrender collateral to
the secured party due to such circumstances. The purpose ofallowing
the debtor's consent, in addition to the debtor's surrender, is solely to
permit the creditor to act where the debtor has the full intent to
surrender the collateral, but is not willing to take the active step of
delivery himself.
The phrase "after default" should be understood to require the
debtor's consent while an uncured default exists. For example, in the
case of a debtor who has missed a payment on his automobile loan,
and in responding to a call from the automobile finance company
says, "I have lost myjob, and I can't make any more payments. You
can come get the car, it's in my driveway." Such self-help
authorization by the debtor is limited to the time for which the debtor
remains in default, and is not a blanket general authorization of selfhelp repossession for any future circumstance.333 Upon cure of the
default, the debtor's authorization is automatically revoked and must
be granted again by the debtor in connection with a subsequent,
In addition to consenting to self-help "after
unrelated default.
default," Subsection 9-609(a)(2) permits the debtor to consent to selfhelp repossession "in contemplation of default." This provision
should not be read more broadly than in that context. The debtor's
consent is to be in specific expectation of a probable and proximate
default, and to reasonably prompt self-help action by the secured
party in response thereto. For example, the situation may arise
where a debtor who has not yet missed a payment tells the secured
party in the middle of the week, "I am broke and now unemployed,
332. La. R.S. 10:9-505(3) and (4)(1993) ("after or in contemplation of the

debtor's default"). Cf Fassitt v. United T.V. Rental, Inc., 297 So. 2d 283 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974) (public policy voids contract provision irrevocably authorizing self-

help entry by creditor into debtor's home without consent at time of entry).

333. See La. R.S. 10:9-335(e), 10:9-601, 10:9-604(c), 10:9-607(a), 10:9-610(a),

10:9-612, 10:9-617, 10:9-620, 10:9-624 (Supp. 2002).
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and there is no way I will make my loan payment on Friday. You can
come get the car, it's in front of my apartment." The debtor's
"contemplation of default" is of an anticipated likelihood of
an
imminent and identifiable default. The debtor's specific consent, and
the secured party's self-help action based thereon, are authorized only
in connection with that default, and are simply in substitution for the
debtor's acting to surrender the collateral at that time.
Indefinite consent to a secured party's repossession is not
authorized by Chapter 9. The debtor's consent can be neither
indefinite in duration, nor indefinite as to its justifying cause. The
debtor may not grant consent to self-help in general anticipation of
the possibility that a default will occur. Consent to self-help also may
not be given for a prolonged period. Thus, consent may not be given
at the time the secured interest is created, except in extremely rare
circumstances. Also, consent under Section 9-609 is not authorized
to be given after a default occurs but with respect to another eventual
default which is not then identifiable and probable.
Consent to self-help may be verbal.334 Ifnecessary, of course, the
existence of such consent must be proved in the normal manner.
Whether or not secured parties are willing to rely on verbal consent
alone is a business decision. Also such consent inherently includes
a duty on the secured party to proceed without breach of the peace as
335
a part of the obligation of good faith.
In keeping with the narrow and restricted treatment of self-help
repossession in Section 9-609, other provisions of Chapter 9 have
been similarly modified. U.C.C. Subsection 9-609(b) is omitted and
reserved in Chapter 9. U.C.C. Subsection 9-609(c) provides that a
secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and
make it available at a place designated by the secured party.
Although this provision was contained in former Chapter 9, it was not
enforced or utilized to the author's knowledge in Louisiana and is
omitted and reserved in Chapter 9. U.C.C. Subsection 9-603(b),
which establishes the standard of "breach of peace" for permitted
self-help repossession, is omitted in Chapter 9 because U.C.C.
Subsection 9-609(b) is omitted.
Subsection 9-602(6) is non-uniform in Chapter 9, providing that
the restrictions on self-help repossession may not be varied, waived
or avoided by contractual choice oflaw provisions or other agreement
of the parties.
334.

ContrastLa. R.S. 10:9-609(a)(2) (Supp. 2002) ("consent given") with La.

R.S. 10:9-620(c) (Supp. 2002) (consent "in a record authenticated after default"),
10:9-620(0(2) and 10:9-624 (agreement "entered into and authenticated after
default"). See Jones v. Petty, 577 So. 2d 821 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Cook v.
Spillers, 574 So. 2d 469 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
335. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
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As discussed previously,336 Section 9-604 dealing with remedies
applicable to fixtures is non-uniform in Chapter 9. In other states,
U.C.C. Article 9 expands prior law to permit the secured party to sell
the fixtures in place, or to use self-help to render the fixtures
inoperative but left in place. The intent is to legislatively overrule
cases in other states holding that a secured party's only remedy after
default is the removal of the fixtures from the immovable property.
Chapter 9 omits and reserves Subsection 9-604(b). The only remedy
in Louisiana under Chapter 9 applicable to fixtures is judicial sale by
the secured party.
Subsections 9-604(c) and (d) are modified in Chapter 9 to
eliminate any right, or implication thereof, of a secured party to selfhelp action with respect to fixtures. Instead, a non-uniform
Subsection 9-604(e) is added to Chapter 9, authorizing a secured
party to demand separate appraisal of the fixtures to fix its interest in
the receipts of the judicial foreclosure sale of the immovable
property.
Section 9-335 pertaining to accessions is similarly modified.
Subsections 9-335(e) and (f) contain similar non-uniform
modifications consistent with the limitation on a secured party's selfhelp.
Subsection 9-607(b) is omitted and reserved in Chapter 9 as
inappropriate and unnecessary, because Louisiana does not permit the
non-judicial enforcement of mortgages.
B. JudicialForeclosure
Absent the circumstances ofthe debtor's abandonment, surrender
or consent, the normal remedy for a secured party in Louisiana as to
corporeal movable property is judicial seizure and sale.
Section 9-601 reproduces the substance of former Chapter 9 with
respect to Louisiana's reliance on judicial foreclosure as the normal
remedy applicable to goods. Subsection 9-601(a)(1) includes the
non-uniform addition ofthe words "execute upon" to emphasize this
distinction. 337 For the most part, judicial sales are governed by other
Louisiana law and not by Chapter 9.338
336. See text accompanying supranote 219.
337. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2291; La. R.S. 10:9-601(0, 10:9-607(0 (Supp.
2002). Subsections 9-620(e) and (f) are non-uniform in permitting a secured party
to proceed by judicial sale as an alternative to private or public sale of consumer
goods in such Circumstances where disposition is mandated. See also former La.
R.S. 10:9-501(1) (1993).
338. The exceptions are La. R.S. 10:9-623(d), 10:9-626(c), and 10:9-629 (Supp.
2002). The limitations in Section 9-610 on the rights of a secured party do not
apply in a judicial sale. U.C.C. § 9-601 cmt. 8 (2001). The term "foreclose" is not
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There are a few provisions of Chapter 9 which nonetheless bear
upon judicial foreclosure proceedings. First, Subsection 9-601(e)
uses non-uniform language carried forward from former Chapter 9,
and clarifies that in Louisiana the privilege arising from seizure does
not relate back prior to the seizure.339 Instead, a security interest
continues when a secured party reduces its claim to judgment and
secures the judgment without interruption.
Another important non-uniform provision in Chapter 9 pertinent
to judicial foreclosures is Section 9-629. This section reproduces the
substance ofa similar provision in former Chapter 9, and provides for
various evidentiary matters relevant in judicial foreclosure
proceedings. Subsection 9-629(a) carries forward various provisions
establishing authentic evidence and presumptions for purposes of
executory or ordinary process. The terminology has been modified
to be consistent with Chapter 9, but there is no change in the law.
Section 9-623 adds a non-uniform Subsection (d) pertaining to the
right of redemption in judicial proceedings. If collateral has been
seized in a judicial proceeding, a redemption may occur at any time
before the judicial sale. To redeem collateral in such circumstances,
a person must also tender the cost of the proceeding. As is the case
with the right of redemption generally, a person must tender
fulfillment of all obligations secured, plus certain expenses. If the
entire balance of a secured obligation has been accelerated, it is
necessary to tender the entire balance. A tender of fulfillment
obviously means more than a new promise to perform an existing
obligation. It requires payment in full of all monetary obligations
then due and performance in full of all other obligations then
matured.34 ° The right of redemption may only be waived by an
agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default,
and in a consumer-goods transaction may not ever be waived.34'
defined inU.C.C. Section 9-601 (a), but encompasses bothjudicial and non-judicial
action. La. R.S. 10:9-601(a) and (f) (Supp. 2002). See former La. R.S. 10:9501(5) (1993). But the term "public disposition" used in U.C.C. Article 9,

although also not defined, refers to competitive bidding at a public auction and not
judicial action. See U.C.C. §9-6 10 cmt. 7(2001); William Hawkland, Hawkland's

Handbook on Chapter 9 Louisiana Commercial Law §5:06 (1990). Cf text
accompanying supra note 282 (buyer at judicial sale not a "purchaser").
339. See former La. R.S. 10:9-501(5) (1993). A similar rule exists for
mortgages. La. R.S. 9:5392 (Supp. 2002). See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2292.

340. U.C.C. § 9-623 cmt. 2 (2001).

341. This rule results from the interplay ofmultiple provisions. Subsection 9602(11) provides that the debtor or obligor may not waive or vary the rules dealing
with redemption of collateral contained in Section 9-623, except as otherwise
provided in Section 9-624. In turn, Section 9-624(c) permits waivers of the right
ofredemption only if the transaction is not a consumer-goods transaction, thereby
in conclusion prohibiting such waiver in a consumer-goods transaction.
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As noted above, most of the provisions of Louisiana law
pertaining to judicial foreclosure proceedings are found not in
Chapter 9 but in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and Title 13
of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. One part of the judicial sale
process set forth in other Louisiana statutes has not been modified to
reflect the changes brought by Chapter 9. At the time and place
designated for the judicial sale, the sheriff is required to read aloud a
mortgage certificate and any other certificate required by law.342
Prior to the enactment of former Chapter 9, in a judicial sale of
movables that certificate was a chattel mortgage certificate. For a
long time, chattel mortgages were required to be recorded in the
parish where the chattels were located.3 43 So, when the sheriff
conducted a judicial sale of movable property he would simply
obtain the chattel mortgage certificate from the parish records of his
jurisdiction.
When former Chapter 9 took effect, it superceded the old chattel
mortgage statute. Perfection by filing as to goods under former
Article 9 required only that a financing statement be filed in each
state where the goods were located. There was no requirement that
the financing statement be filed in the actual parish where the goods
were located. However, because a financing statement was required
to be filed at least somewhere in the state and because Louisiana has
a state-wide Uniform Commercial Code index, these changes did not
cause many problems.
The perfection rules have changed dramatically under Chapter 9
and U.C.C. Article 9. Perfection by filing as to goods no longer
requires that a financing statement be filed in each state where the
goods are located. Instead, if the debtor is a registered organization,
344
the filing is made in the jurisdiction ofthat debtor's formation. If
the debtor is an organization but not a registered organization,
perfection by filing as to goods requires only a filing in the state of
the debtor's chief executive office. 345 Accordingly, a gap exists in the
law in instances when a sheriff conducts a judicial sale of movable
property in Louisiana and the debtor is a non-Louisiana resident or a
non-Louisiana entity. As to such debtors, a U.C.C. search certificate
obtained from any parish in Louisiana is not the appropriate
certificate to show proper U.C.C. filings made on and after July 1,
2001. Until the pertinent statutes are modified in the future, it may
342. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2334. Cf La. R.S. 13:844 (1999), 13:4344-4345
(1991), 9:5213 (Supp. 2002) (certificates).

343. La. R.S. 9:5353 (Supp. 1986), as amended by 1986 La. Acts No. 181, § 1,
repealedby 1988 La. Acts No. 528, §§ 2,4. Filing was also made in the parish of
the mortgagor's domicile.
344. La. R.S. 10:9-307(e), 10:9-301(1) (Supp. 2002). See supraPart II.C.3.
345. La. R.S. 10:9-307(b)(3), 10:9-301(1) (Supp. 2002).
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be advisable for the seizing creditor to provide the sheriff with a
U.C.C. search certificate for the debtor from the appropriate
jurisdiction outside Louisiana.34 6 Admittedly, sheriff's sales under
these facts are relatively infrequent.
C. Waiver of Warranties
U.C.C. Section 9-610 provides the transferee of a non-judicial
disposition347 ofcollateral by a secured party with the benefit of any
title, possession, quiet enjoyment and similar warranties that would
have accompanied the disposition by operation ofother law had the
disposition been conducted under other circumstances. U.C.C.
Article 9 expressly provides that these warranties can be disclaimed
either under other applicable law or by communicating a record
containing an express designation, and provides a sample of
wording that will effectively exclude such warranties even if the
exclusion would not be effective under other applicable law. Of
course, U.C.C. Section 9-610 requires that non-judicial dispositions
be made on terms that are commercially reasonable. However,
U.C.C. Article 9 does not specify whether a disclaimer ofwarranties
by a secured party in a non-judicial disposition is commercially
reasonable, therefore leaving that determination to potential afterthe-fact review.
Section 9-610 in Chapter 9 is non-uniform in several respects.
First, it expressly states that a disclaimer of modification of
warranties in a secured party's disposition of collateral is
commercially reasonable.348
Second, Subsection 9-610(d) drops the litany of common law
warranties and instead simply provides that a disposition by the
secured party includes the warranties which by operation of
Louisiana law accompany such voluntary disposition.
Third, Chapter 9 rejects the rule in U.C.C. Article 9 that
provides a sample ofwording for an effective waiver ofwarranties.
Instead, Chapter 9, by omitting Subsections 9-610(e)(2) and (f),
346. Cf.General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Stoma, 241 So. 2d 816 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1970) (sheriff is not required to obtain written statement from motor vehicle
commissioner of any other state).
347. See supranote 338.
348. See La. R.S. 10:9-610(b) (Supp. 2002). In contrast, judicial sales resulting
from a seizure are not subject to the rules of redhibition. La. Civ. Code art. 2537;
La. R.S. 9:3169 (Supp. 2002). As to matters of title, see La. Code Civ. P. arts.
2342, 2371, 2379 and 2381. Chapter 9 therefore avoids the debate that will arise
under U.C.C. Article 9 as to whether or not the warranty disclaimer is one of the
"other terms" under U.C.C. Section 9-610 that must be commercially reasonable.
See Zinnecker, supranote 170, at 57.
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leaves the determination of the validity of waivers of warranties to
other Louisiana law.349
Finally, Section 9-610 adds a non-uniform provision in
Subsection (c)(2) permitting a secured party to purchase collateral at
a private disposition if the secured party, or a person related to the
secured party, is obligated by statute to purchase or repurchase the
collateral from the debtor. Normally the secured party may buy at a
public disposition but not at a private disposition.350 An example of
requirement is in the area of manufacturer-dealer
such a statutory
3
relationships. 11
D. Timeliness of ConsumerNotification
As part of the "consumer compromise" made during the drafting
process of U.C.C. Article 9, U.C.C. Section 9-612 does not provide
a "safe harbor" for consumer transaction notices of disposition..
U.C.C. Section 9-611(b) requires the secured party to send a
reasonable authenticated notification before disposition ofcollateral.
One aspect ofa reasonable notification is its timeliness in advance of
the date of the disposition. U.C.C. Subsection 9-611 (b) creates a
"safe harbor" for non-consumer transactions by providing that a
notification of disposition sent after default and at least ten days
before the earliest time of disposition set forth in the notification is
considered sent within a reasonable time before the disposition. This
ten-day notice period is a safe harbor, and not a minimum
requirement.352
The question ofwhether a notification is sent within a reasonable
time in a consumer transaction is left solely as a question of fact
under U.C.C. Subsection 9-612(a) for each case, with no safe harbor
provided in U.C.C. Article 9. In contrast, Chapter 9 adds a nonuniform Subsection 9-612(c) to establish a "safe harbor" in consumer
transactions oftwenty-one days prior notice before disposition. This
provision applies to consumer transactions, not just consumer-goods
transactions. Again, this notice period is established as a safe harbor
and not as a minimum requirement in all circumstances. One concern
ofthe creditor lobby is that by providing a safe harbor oftwenty-one
days in the statute, the courts will adopt that time period as a
349. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2503 and 2548.
350. Seesupranote 338 for the distinction ofpublic versus private dispositions.
351. See, e.g., La. R.S. 51:481 (Supp. 2002). See also La. R.S. 10:9-618 (Supp.

2002). Cf Clark, supra note 109, at §10.05[5].
352. See U.C.C. § 9-612 cmt. 3 (2001). For discussion of the consumer
compromise, see infra note 376. A twenty-one day safe harbor consumer notice
provision was included in U.C.C. Article 9 during much ofthe drafting process but
was deleted near the end. Zinnecker, supra note 170, at 70.
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requirement rather than as a safe harbor. Such judicial action would
be unfortunate. The courts should recognize that there are significant
costs to forced delays in foreclosure, and that forced delay can harm
the debtor by increasing the size of the deficiency due to increased
sale costs. Notices of shorter duration may be reasonable when
exigent circumstances exist. In all instances, notification also must
be sent in a commercially reasonable manner.353
E. PartialDationBy Consumers
U.C.C. Section 9-620(g) prohibits the secured party in consumer
transactions from accepting collateral in partial satisfaction of the
obligation it secures. This prohibition is a paternalistic exclusion
from the general rules governing "strict foreclosure."354 Chapter 9
varies from U.C.C. Article 9 in permitting a partial dation en
paiement in a consumer transaction. Chapter 9 omits and reserves
Subsection 9-62(g), and adds a non-uniform Subsection (h). Both
former Chapter 9,3 and other Louisiana law pertaining to immovable
property,35 permit a partial dationenpaiement.357 Under Subsection
9-620(c)(1), in a partial dation the debtor's agreement must be
express and cannot be achieved by mere silence following a secured
party's proposal. Chapter 9 does change the law from former Chapter
9 by requiring specific terms pertaining to the proposed partial dation
en paiementand the proposed remaining deficiency be explained to
the consumer debtor. This non-uniform provision in Subsection 9620(h) is modeled upon Section 9-616.358 If the collateral is
consumer goods, the collateral cannot still be in the possession ofthe
debtor when the debtor consents to the dation.35
F. Damages
Chapter 9, like former Chapter 9, is non-uniform in its provisions
pertaining to damages for a secured party's failure to comply with
353. U.C.C. § 9-612 cmt. 3.
354. This term isthe unofficial label given to this procedure. See U.C.C. § 9620 cmt. 2 (2001). For discussion of the "consumer compromise" of which this
exclusion is a part, see infra note 376. For criticism of the exclusion, see
Zinnecker, supra note 170, at 124.
355. See La. R.S. 10:9-505(5) (1993).
356. See La. R.S. 13:4108.2 (1991).
357. See Dunaway v. Spain, 493 So. 2d 577 (La. 1986).
358. Compare with La. R.S. 13:4108.2 (1991).
359. See La. R.S. 10:9-620(B)(3) (Supp. 2002). This limitation is designed to

prevent a consumer debtor from unknowingly consenting by silence to a secured

party's strict foreclosure based on the belief that he may ignore such proposals
because he and not the proposing secured party has physical possession of the
collateral. See Zinnecker, supra note 170, at 127.
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Chapter 9. U.C.C. Article 9 provides that the secured party is
generally liable to the debtor for any loss caused by the secured
party's failure to comply with the enforcement provisions ofU.C.C.
Article 9. 31 Much of the litigation under former U.C.C. Article 9
arose in connection with the enforcement of security interests.
U.C.C. Article 9 has attempted to provide an expanded list of
legislative solutions to many of these disputes that have arisen in the
past. Louisiana Chapter 9 goes even further in that attempt.
Section 9-625 of Chapter 9 contains multiple non-uniform
changes designed to ensure that, as a general rule, only the recovery
of actual damages for failure to comply with the requirements of
Chapter 9 is authorized. 361 Thus, Subsections 9-625(b), (c), (e) and
(f) all refer to "actual damages" under Subsection (b), which
establishes the basic remedy for non-compliance of a damage
recovery as the amount of loss caused by the non-compliance.
Although perhaps unnecessary, the addition ofthe word "actual" was
retained from former Chapter 9.362 Furthermore, consistent with
Louisiana's general prohibition on the recovery ofpunitive damages,
Chapter 9 adds a statement in Subsection 9-625(b) that punitive or
exemplary damages cannot be recovered under Chapter 9.
Section 9-625 contains other non-uniform changes with the intent
that damages thereunder be available to the damaged party
individually, but not in class action lawsuits. 363 Subsection 9-625(c)
provides that the damaged party may recover actual damages
individually but not as a representative in a class action. 3 " The
source of this language is the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act,
which does not permit private class actions.365
Subsection 9-625(e) provides statutory damages that supplement
the recovery, if any, under the general actual damages rule of
Subsection (b), for failure to comply with specified duties. In
Chapter 9, those provisions have been modified for the purpose of
360. See U.C.C. § 9-625 cmt. 3 (2001).
361. See Bryant v. Sears Consumer Fin. Corp., 617 So. 2d 1191 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1993). CompareLa. Code Civ. P. art. 272 1(B); U.C.C. §9-625 cmt. 3 (2001);
U.C.C. § 9-626 cmt. 2 (2001).
362. See former La. R.S. 10:9-507(1) (1993), as amendedby 2001 La. Acts No.
128, § 1; Hawkland, supra note 338, at §5:13. The source provision was the
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. La. R.S. 51:1409(A) (1987).
363. Some states (such as North Dakota and Tennessee) have made similar nonuniform modifications, while other states (such as Maryland, Nebraska and
Virginia) have omitted these provisions entirely.
364. The reference to representative capacity is to class action plaintiffs under
Code of Civil Procedure Article 591, and should not bar a trustee, succession
representative or other representative from being the proper plaintiff to sue to
enforce this Section 9-625.
365. See La. R.S. 51:1409(A) (1987); Morris v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 765 So.
2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000).
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preventing class action lawsuits for such statutory damages.
Subsections 9-625(e)(4) and (5) have been modified in Chapter 9 to
trigger the statutory $500 liability only if the secured party fails to
comply with a statutory duty after the secured party receives a
demand from a debtor. Under U.C.C. Article 9, in certain
circumstances the statutory duty for which non-compliance triggers
the $500 liability does not require prior demand upon the secured
party. Beyond elemental fairness, a specific purpose of these nonuniform changes in Chapter 9 is to require that the aggrieved party
prove the facts behind his particular notice to the secured party, with
the intent that this proofrequirement will prevent the availability of
class action lawsuits under this section.
Chapter 9 is also non-uniform in its omission ofthe provision for
statutory damages in consumer-goods transactions in an amount not
less than 10 percent of the secured obligation. U.C.C. Section 9625(c)(2) continues this minimum statutory damage recovery for a
debtor and secondary obligor in a consumer-goods transaction from
former U.C.C. Article 9. Obviously, its intent is to ensure that every
non-compliance with the requirements of the remedy provisions of
U.C.C. Article 9 in a consumer-goods transaction results in liability,
regardless of any injury that may have resulted. However, former
Chapter 9 omitted this provision.366 Chapter 9 carries forward this
deletion, by omitting and reserving Subsection (c)(2). Because of
that deletion of Subsection 9-625(c)(2), Chapter 9 further varies from
U.C.C. Article 9 by the omission of Subsections 9-628(d) and (e).
These subsections provide limitations on a secured party's liability
under U.C.C. Subsection 9-625(c)(2), but those limitations obviously
are unnecessary in Chapter 9. Thus, under Chapter 9, in both
commercial and consumer transactions, only actual damages may be
recovered, plus any statutory damages under Subsections 9-625(e)
and (f).
G. DeficiencyJudgment
U.C.C. Article 9 has resolved one of the most litigated issues
under former U.C.C. Article 9, but only in commercial transactions.
The jurisprudence under former U.C.C. Article 9 is inconsistent
among the various states in determining what additional sanctions
may be imposed on a secured party who failed to comply with the
enforcement provisions, other than damages for any loss caused by
the non-compliance. The majority of states apply a presumption,
rebuttable by the secured party, that the collateral equaled the amount
of the secured debt. But a significant number of states subscribe to
366. See La. R.S. 10:9-507(1) (1993).
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the view that the failure creates an absolute bar to the secured party
pursuing a deficiency against the debtor. Also, a few states follow
its loss.
the so-called "offset" rule which requires a debtor to prove
67 U.C.C.
statute.1
by
rule
offset
this
adopted
9
Former Chapter
Article 9 adopts the rebuttable presumption rule for commercial
transactions. Therefore, ifa secured party forecloses improperly and
brings a deficiency action against the debtor in a commercial
transaction, under U.C.C. Article 9 the value of the collateral is
presumed to have equaled the entire secured debt and the deficiency
claim is barred, unless the secured party is able to rebut this
presumption. This rule is established in U.C.C. Section 9-626, which
only applies to non-compliance in connection with the "collection,
enforcement, disposition or acceptance" under Part 6.368
But U.C.C. Article 9 is silent as to the effect on a non-complying
secured party's right to deficiency judgment in consumer
transactions. U.C.C. Subsection 9-626(b) affirmatively states that the
limitation of the rebuttable presumption rule to non-consumer is
intended to leave the delineation of the proper rules in consumer
transactions to the courts. It also instructs the court not to draw any
inference from this statutory limitation as to the proper rules for
consumer transactions and leaves the courts free to apply established
approaches to those transactions.
Chapter 9 contains several non-uniform provisions pertaining to
deficiency judgment. First, Chapter 9 applies the rebuttable
presumption rule to consumer transactions, but applies the offset rule
to commercial transactions.
Subsection 9-626(a) is modified to apply to all transactions,
expressly including a consumer transaction, rather than expressly
excluding a consumer transaction. U.C.C. Subsection 9-626(b),
which leaves the consumer rule to be formulated by the courts, is
omitted in Chapter 9.
Subsection 9-626(a) contains two additional non-uniform
provisions which are relevant to the application ofthe burden ofproof
rules. Understanding those changes requires a detailed examination
of the uniform text. U.C.C. Section 926 uses general language
regarding the pleading requirements in formulating the rebuttable
presumption. Under U.C.C. Article 9, the secured party in a
commercial transaction is not required to prove compliance with the
relevant provisions of Part 6 as part of its prima facie case. If,
however, the debtor or a secondary obligor raises the issue in
367. Id.
368. See La. R.S. 10:9-626(a)(1) and (3); 10: 9-625(d) (Supp. 2002). For other
types of non-compliance with Part 6, the general rule of actual damages applies.
U.C.C. § 9-626 cmt. 2 (2001). The non-application of these rules to consumer
transactions is part of the "consumer compromise." See infranote 376.
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accordance with the forum's rules of pleading and practice, then the
secured party bears the burden of proving that the collection,
enforcement, disposition or acceptance complied. In the event the
secured party is unable to meet this burden of proving compliance,
then the debtor or obligor is to be credited with the greater of the
actual proceeds of the disposition or the proceeds that would have
been realized had the secured party complied with the relevant
provisions. The next step creates the rebuttable presumption. That
is, unless the secured party proves that compliance with the relevant
provisions would have yielded a smaller amount, the amount that a
complying collection, enforcement or disposition would have yielded
is deemed to be equal to the amount of the secured obligation,
together with expenses and attorney's fees. Thus, the secured party
may not recover any deficiency unless it meets this burden ofproof.
Chapter 9 contains two non-uniform changes in these provisions.
First, Subsection 9-626(a) requires that the debtor or a secondary
obligor plead the secured party's non-compliance in its petition,
answer, or in connection with a motion for summary judgment. The
purpose of this specificity is to avoid this issue being raised for the
first time at trial.
The second non-uniform change is in Subsection 9-626(a)(4). In
Chapter 9, that part of the rule is limited expressly to consumer
transactions. Thus, under Chapter 9 it is only in a consumer
transaction that the amount that a complying collection, enforcement,
or disposition would have yielded is deemed by operation of law to
be equal to the amount of the secured obligation unless the secured
party proves that compliance with the relevant provisions would have
yielded a smaller amount.
Stated another way, Chapter 9 varies significantly in the
allocation ofthe burdens ofproofin deficiencyjudgment cases. First,
under Chapter 9 the secured party need not prove compliance with the
remedies provisions whether in a commercial or a consumer
transaction unless the debtor or secondary obligor properly pleads
non-compliance. U.C.C. Article 9 applies this rule only to
commercial transactions. Second, if the secured party's noncompliance is pleaded, under Chapter 9 the secured party has the
burden ofestablishing compliance in both commercial and consumer
transactions. Again, this rule under U.C.C. Article 9 is applied only
to commercial transactions. It is a likely expectation, however, that
courts will leave this burden of proof on the secured party in
consumer transactions in other states. Third, there is an additional
burden ofproof if the secured party fails to carry its earlier burden of
proof that its remedies action was in compliance. Under Chapter 9,
if the secured party in a consumer transaction fails that second
burden, then the secured party bears the burden of proving that the
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amount of proceeds that would have been realized had the secured
party complied is less than the sum of the full secured obligation.
In commercial transactions under Chapter 9, there is no such
presumption. Section 9-626 in Chapter 9 continues to provide that if
in a commercial transaction the secured party fails to carry its burden
ofproof ofcompliance, then the deficiency liability is still reduced by
the amount of proceeds that compliance would have yielded. But,
under Chapter 9 the rebuttable presumption burden ofproof, that the
non-complying secured party is barred from recovering a deficiency
unless it overcomes the presumption that compliance would have
to satisfy the debt, applies only to
yielded an amount sufficient
369
consumer transactions.
Former Chapter 9 contained a non-uniform provision adopting the
"offset" rule for both commercial and consumer transactions. The
debtor could offset against a claim for deficiency all damages
recoverable under former Chapter 9 resulting from the secured party's
non-compliance, but the secured party's right to a deficiency was not
7°
otherwise extinguished or forfeited as a result ofnon-compliance.
Under Chapter 9, Louisiana has adopted the rebuttable presumption
rule for consumer transactions, more favorable to Louisiana
consumers than former Chapter 9. For commercial transactions,
Chapter 9 has, in effect, retained the "offset" rule of former Chapter
9 because the core rebuttable presumption is limited in Chapter 9 to
consumer transactions. In Chapter 9 the burden of proving
compliance is on the secured party, as in U.C.C. Article 9. However,
since in commercial transactions there is no rebuttable presumption
that compliance would have yielded an amount sufficient to satisfy
the debt, the burden is on the debtor to prove the extent of offset to
which he is entitled.
Chapter 9 is significantly non-uniform with regard to another
aspect of the deficiency judgment rules in Section 9-626. U.C.C.
Article 9 contains a special rule where a secured party, a person
related to the secured party,371 or a guarantor of the secured debt,
purchases the collateral at a foreclosure sale and the purchase price is
"significantly below the range of proceeds that a complying
disposition to a person [other than one of those persons] would have
369.

The last sentence of uniform Section 9-625(d) eliminates the possibility of

double recovery in connection with a reduction or elimination ofa deficiency based
on non-compliance with such collection and enforcement provisions. U.C.C. § 9625 cmt. 3 (2001). The language is confusing. Zinnicker, supranote 170, at 175.
But in U.C.C. Article 9 this provision applies only in commercial transactions and
the statute is silent as to the rule in consumer transactions, while in Chapter 9 this
provision in Section 9-625(d) applies to consumer transactions.
370. See La. R.S. 10:9-507(1) (1993).
371. See La. R.S. 10:9-102(a)(62) (Supp. 2002). See also U.C.C. §9-615 cmt.
7 (2001).
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brought."3'72 In that circumstance, even though the disposition was
commercially reasonable and in compliance with the remedies rules,
U.C.C. Section 9-615(f) reduces the secured party's deficiency claim
by the amount that the foreclosure sale would have brought had some
other unrelated third party purchased the collateral at the foreclosure
sale. Stated differently, if a secured party, a person related to a
secured party, or a secondary obligor acquires collateral at a
foreclosure sale and the proceeds are significantly below the range of
proceeds that a complying disposition to an unrelated pljrchaser
would have brought, the debtor will receive a credit for the excess
over what was actually paid and what would have been paid by an
unrelated purchaser.
Thus, this rule addresses the problem of procedurally regular
dispositions of collateral to such a person whose alignment with the
second party could be expected to bring a low price. In these
situations there is reason to suspect that the secured party lacks the
incentive to maximize the price. As a consequence, the disposition
may comply with the procedural requirements of U.C.C. Article 9,
being conducted in a commercially reasonable manner following
reasonable notice, but nonetheless bring a low price. The rule adjusts
for this lack of incentive.373 Consequently, instead of calculating a
deficiency based on the actual net proceeds, the deficiency is
calculated based on the proceeds that would have been received in a
disposition to an unrelated person.
Under U.C.C. Article 9, in a non-consumer transaction, the debtor
or obligor has the burden of proving that the proceeds of such a
disposition are so low that the actual proceeds should not serve as the
basis upon which a deficiency or surplus is calculated. The
justification in U.C.C. Article 9 for placing this burden of proof on
debtors or obligors is that if the burden were placed on the secured
party, then debtors might be encouraged to challenge the price
received in every disposition to the secured party, a person related to
the secured party, or a secondary obligor.
Chapter 9 rejects this shifting of the burden of proof as
inappropriate policy. Subsection 9-626(a)(5) is omitted in Chapter 9.
One reason is that the only effect of a foreclosure price when the sale
is to a recourse party (which by definition is a secondary obligor) is
to fix the deficiency owed from the debtor. The price has no effect
on the recourse party's liability to the secured party, which is to pay
372. U.C.C. §§ 9-615(f), 9-626(a)(5) (2001).
373. The rule rejects the view that the secured party's receipt of such a price

necessarily constitutes non-compliance with Part 6. However, such a price may

suggest the need for greater judicial scrutiny. See U.C.C. § 9-615 cmt. 6, § 9-610
cmt. 10 (2001). For factors to be considered in such scrutiny, see Zinnecker, supra
note 170, at 96 n.424.
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the full debt. This purported fear is insufficient justification to shift
the burden to the debtor when sales are to the secured party or a
person related to the secured party. The burden of proof should not
be placed on the debtor in instances where the sale was to any person

who may lack the incentive to maximize the price. Finally, the fact
that Chapter 9 varies from U.C.C. Article 9 by applying Section 9-

626 to all debtors, including consumers, is all the more reason to omit
Subsection(a)(5)'s burden ofproof shifting. The secured party is in
a far better position to bear the burden of proof regarding the
propriety ofthe price, especially in a deficiency judgment battle with
a consumer.
Finally, Chapter 9 contains another non-uniform provision
bearing upon deficiency judgments. Subsection 9-626(c) states that
the provisions of the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act do not
apply to enforcement of a security interest or agricultural lien
governed by Chapter 9. This provision carries forward the substance
of existing Louisiana 74law, but does so in a far more straightforward
and express manner.
X. CONSUMER PROVISIONS

U.C.C. Article 9 contains many provisions with special rules for
consumer transactions.375 In some instances, the "consumer
compromise" reached in the drafting process was to say nothing in
U.C.C. Article 9 on a particular issue as to consumer transactions,
to decide the rules applicable
leaving it to the courts or other state law
37 Chapter 9 has multiple nonon that issue in consumer transactions.
374. See La. R.S. 13:4106(C), 13:4108.2(B)(1), 13:4108.3 (1991). See also
Code Civ. P. art. 2723; Gulfco Fin. Co. v. Boyd, 702 So. 2d 342 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1997); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Melancon, 677 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1996). But see Chrysler Fin. Co., L.L.C. v. Cloutier, 785 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 2001).
375. These consumer protection provisions in Chapter 9 include La. R.S. 10:9108, 10:9-403, 10:9-404, 10:9-612-9-614, 10:9-616, 10:9-620, 10:9-626 (Supp.
2002).
376. The treatment of consumer issues in U.C.C. Article 9 became the most
difficult problem confronted by the Drafting Committee. Late in the drafting
process, a package of proposed revisions was adopted relating to consumer
transactions. This "consumer compromise" grew out of discussions among creditor
and consumer representatives and mediation by the chairman, with the ultimate
compromise being one that enabled the U.C.C. Article 9 enactment process to
proceed without encountering organized political opposition. The compromise
included the deletion of several draft provisions that would have impacted
consumers. It also resulted in the modification of other provisions to make them
not apply to consumer transactions: U.C.C. Sections 9-103(0, (g) and (h)
(purchase-money security interests), 9-612(b) (disposition notice period), 9-620(g)
(partial strict foreclosure), and 9-626(b) (rebuttable presumption rule). in the first
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uniform variations that apply to consumer transactions. All of these
variations have been discussed previously in this article, but are
briefly repeated here in a collected list for the reader's convenience.
Chapter 9 provides by definition that consumer goods cannot
become fixtures and cannot be the subject of a fixture filing.377 This
rule continues the non-uniform variation set forth in former Chapter
9. The effect is to prevent finance companies from obtaining a
security interest encumbering a portion of a home residence. A
lender financing a good that is to become a component part ofa home
residence, such as air conditioning systems, must obtain a mortgage
on the entire immovable in order for its debt to be secured.
Chapter 9 applies the "dual-status" rule for purchase-money
security interest transactions to consumer-goods transactions.37 This
application is a variation from U.C.C. Article 9, which leaves to the
courts the determination of the proper purchase-money security
interest rules to apply in consumer-goods transactions and instructs
the courts not to draw any inference from this statutory limitation as
to the proper rules for consumer-goods transactions. Chapter 9 also
applies to consumer-good transactions the provisions rejecting the
"transformation" rule and permitting cross-collateralization and
refinancing without loss of purchase-money security interest status.
Once again, Chapter 9 carries forward a non-uniform variation from
former Chapter 9 and rejects the "consumer compromise" in U.C.C.
Article 9.
Chapter 9 includes consumer deposit accounts and consumer tort
claims as eligible collateral within the scope of Chapter 9.379 Again,
these non-uniform provisions are carried forward from former
Chapter 9.
Chapter 9 provides a twenty-one days perse reasonable notice
rule for notices ofthe secured party's disposition of the collateral. 380
In contrast, U.C.C. Article 9 has no safe harbor provision for notices
of disposition ofconsumer collateral.
Chapter 9 permits the remedy of retention of collateral in partial
satisfaction of the secured debt in a consumer transaction, and
provides special notice and other procedural rules applicable to such

and last instances, U.C.C. Article 9 goes further and instructs the courts notto draw
any inference from the limitation ofthose rules to non-consumer transactions when
the courts determine the proper rules for consumer transactions. Zinnecker, supra
note 170, at 123 n.548. For a contrast of the approach of Chapter 9 with respect
to these issues, see text accompanying supranotes 280, 352, 354 and 368.
377. See text accompanying supra note 213.
378. See supraPart VII.C.
379. See supraPart III.A. and Part III.B.
380. See supraPart IX.D.
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partial dationsenpaiement.38 1 In contrast, U.C.C. Article 9 prohibits
a secured party from retaining the collateral in partial satisfaction of
the secured debt in a consumer transaction.
Chapter 9 carries forward the non-uniform deletion from former
Chapter 9 of the minimum statutory ten percent damage recovery in
a consumer-goods transaction.3" 2
Chapter 9 applies the rebuttable presumption rule to consumer
transactions when a secured party fails to comply with the remedies
provisions and, essentially, the offset rule to commercial
transactions.383 In contrast, U.C.C. Article 9 limits the application of
the rebuttable presumption rule to commercial transactions, leaving
to the courts the determination of the proper rules in consumer
transactions. Again, U.C.C. Article 9 instructs the court not to draw
any inference from this statutory limitation as to the proper rules for
consumer transactions. Chapter 9 changes the law from former
Chapter 9, which applied the offset rule to both commercial and
consumer transactions in Louisiana.
XI. TRANSITION

The transition provisions ofU.C.C. Article 9 are among the most
difficult to understand and apply. Chapter 9 is largely uniform, and
reference to the national Official Comments to Part 7 of U.C.C.
Article 9 is indispensable. But Chapter 9 does contain a few nonuniform variations in the transition provisions.
Under U.C.C. Section 9-702, except as affected by the express
transition rules in Part 7, transactions that were not governed by
former U.C.C. Article 9 and were validly entered into before July 1,
2001, may be terminated, completed, consummated and enforced by
the law that otherwise would have applied if revised U.C.C. Article
9 had not taken effect. Chapter 9 contains a non-uniform clarification
to this transition provision, by adding a reference to "including law
repealed by this Act." 3 4 In other states which enacted former U.C.C.
Article 9 decades ago, the pre-U.C.C. chattel mortgage statutes and
the like are distant memory. However, in Louisiana former Chapter
9 only became effective in 1990. Louisiana's chattel mortgage
statutes and the Louisiana Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act
were not repealed at that time, but instead were repealed only as a
part ofthe enactment ofChapter 9.385 This reference to "law repealed
by this Act" is therefore appropriate.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

See supraPart IX.E.
See text accompanying supra note 366.
See supraPart IX.G.
La. R.S. 10:9-702(b)(2) (Supp. 2002).
2001 La. Acts No. 128, §18.
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Louisiana attorneys must also remember that they face certain
transition issues which are unique to Louisiana because ofchanges in
non-uniform provisions from former Chapter 9 to Chapter 9. For
instance, the change in Louisiana law under Section 9-108(e)
requiring more specific description oftort claims, consumer securities
accounts, life insurance policies, judgments, interests in a trust or an
estate, or collateral mortgage notes will make security interests
created under general descriptions unenforceable on and after July 1,
2002, absent curative action.3 6 Subsection 9-703(b) also applies in
instances where the method of perfection in a type of collateral has
changed from former law. In such instances the security interest
becomes unperfected on July 1,2002, absent additional action. That
uniform rule has special non-uniform application to certain collateral
under Louisiana Chapter 9. The perfection rules under Chapter 9
applicable to security interests in a deposit account, a life insurance
policy, an interest in an estate, and a beneficial interest in a trust have
all changed from the perfection rules under former Chapter 9.387
Thus, secured parties with existing transactions for which the
applicable new choice of law rules elect Chapter 9 as the law
governing perfection must take action before July 1,2002 to comply
with the new requirements of Chapter 9 with respect to such
collateral.
The major Louisiana-specific transition issues
arise from the
repeal of various global chattel mortgage statutes and the Louisiana
Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act.3 8 As with other repealed
statutes, secured transactions under those statutes (that were not under
former Chapter 9) retain their validity under Subsection 9-702(b)
despite such repeal, except to the extent the transition rules
specifically supersede. The difference is that special non-uniform
Chapter 9 provisions apply to some of these repealed statutes as
discussed below, but not to all these repealed statutes. The general
one year rule of Section 9-703(b) will apply to such transactions in
the absence of special Louisiana non-uniform provisions.
The most significant non-uniform variations in the transition
provisions in Chapter 9 are the additions of Subsection 9-705(g) and
386. La. R.S. 10:9-703(b)(2) (Supp. 2002). See supra note 156 and
accompanying text. See also text accompanying supranote 158 regarding the
unenforceability ofcertain after-acquired collateral clauses.

387. See text accompanying supra notes 73 (deposit account), 114 (life
insurance), 250 (estate), and 260 (trust). See U.C.C. § 9-701 crnt. (2001).
388. 2001 La. Acts No. 128, §18, repealed the two main chattel mortgage
statutes and the Louisiana Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act. But it also
repealed La. R.S. 12:704 and 32:704(B). But Subsection 9-705(g) applies to
transactions under La. R.S. 12:704, making the extended transitional grace period
discussed below available, but does not include La. R.S. 32:704(B).
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Subsection 9-710.389 These non-uniform provisions pertain to the
continued enforceability and perfection of Louisiana chattel
mortgages and assignments of accounts receivable.
Chapter 9 contains anon-uniform definition of"pre-effective-date
financing statement" in Section 9-710. 3 0 Chapter 9 expands this
definition to include filings made in the Louisiana uniform
commercial code records between January 1, 1990 and June 30,2001,
pertaining to former Chapter 9 chattel mortgages and assignments of
accounts receivable. Through this expansion ofthe definition and its
use in Subsection 9-705(c), Chapter 9 allows those filings in the
Louisiana U.C.C. system to continue to be effective for the balance
of their five-year filing period 391 as to Louisiana debtors rather than
having their effectiveness terminated within one year. Financing
statements filed under former Chapter 9 are treated in a like manner.
Because these filings are already in the Louisiana uniform
commercial code records, no benefit to the public would be obtained
by shortening their effective filing period.
However, the impact of the choice of law rules for perfection
contained in U.C.C. Article 9 and Chapter 9 must always be taken
into account. Ifthe debtor in such a chattel mortgage or assignment
of accounts receivable filing is a non-Louisiana resident, a nonLouisiana registered organization, or a non-registered organization
which has its chief executive office outside Louisiana, those choice
of law rules governing perfection, both in Louisiana and elsewhere,
elect a jurisdiction other than Louisiana. 392 Accordingly, in those
situations the benefits ofthe non-uniform provisions ofChapter 9 will
not be available to the secured party if Louisiana law is not applied
to the evaluation of the security interest's perfection. In those
situations, secured parties will be well advised to comply with the
requirements of Chapter 9 and U.C.C. Article 9 before July 1, 2002,
and not rely on the purported protection of this non-uniform
Louisiana transition rule.
389. Indispensable to the effectiveness of that first non-uniform addition is a
matching non-uniform cross-reference thereto in Section 9-705(a). Another critical
cross-reference is the uniform exception in Section 9-703(b) made by reference
therein to 9-705. Finally, use of the non-uniform defined term "pre-effective-date
financing statement" throughout Section 9-705 is critical to the expansion of the
transition provisions to include those pre-U.C.C. Louisiana security devices. See
text accompanying infra notes 390-391.
390. La. R.S. 10:9-710(b) (Supp. 2002). AlthoughU.C.C. Article 9 defines the
term solely for use in U.C.C. Section 9-707, which was added as part of the
January 15, 2000 post-promulgation national corrections, the term actually is used
in U.C.C. Article 9 in other sections as well.

391. See former La. R.S. 9:5356(K) (1991), 9:31-12(C) (1997).

392. La. R.S. 10:9-301, 10:9-307(b) and (e) (Supp. 2002). Cf U.C.C. § 9-707
cmt. 2 (2001) (applicable law governing amendments).
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The non-uniform addition of Subsection 9-705(g) to Chapter 9
has a similar purpose. This provision pertains to mortgages
encumbering chattels entered into before January 1, 1990, when
former Chapter 9 became effective in Louisiana. The two chattel
mortgage statutes repealed as part of the enactment of Chapter 9
provided for two different rules of perfection.393 Chattel mortgages
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5351-5366.2 were perfected by
filing in the chattel mortgage records. However, mortgages of
movables used in commercial or industrial activity under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:5367-5373 were perfected by recordation solely
in the immovable mortgage records if the chattel mortgage was
included in the same act as a mortgage ofthe immovable upon which
the chattels were located. Under the law in effect at the time of their
creation, such mortgage liens under the latter statute still may
continue to be effective in 2001 without any requirement for a filing
to have been made in the Louisiana uniform commercial code
records.394 Furthermore, chattel mortgages under the first statute
entered into before January 1, 1990, recorded in the chattel mortgage
records which secure obligations with a maturity longer than nine
years do not
require reinscription until one year after the described
395
maturity.
Absent a special transition provision, under Chapter 9, all
mortgages within these categories would become unperfected and
unenforceable as to chattels on July 1, 2002, one year after the
effective date.396 The non-uniform addition of Subsection 9-705(g)
provides an extended transition time for these chattel mortgages
under certain circumstances.397 If the debtor is a Louisiana resident,
a Louisiana registered organization, or is otherwise "located" in
Louisiana, then under this special Louisiana rule the perfection of
393. Seesupranote 388 and accompanying test (pertaining to repealed La. R.S.
12:704).
394. See former La. R.S. 9:5369(A) (1991) (repealed) and former La. Civ. Code
art. 3369 (repealed). 1992 La. Acts No. 1132, §7, declares that mortgages created
before January 1, 1993 shall continue to be regulated by the laws in existence
before the restatement of the Civil Code mortgage articles effective January 1,
1993.
395. See former La. R.S. 9:5356(E) (1991) (repealed). In contrast, collateral
chattel mortgages had an inscription duration often years, and therefore either have
all been reinscribed in the Louisiana U.C.C. records or have had their inscriptions
lapse.
396. La. R.S. 10:9-703(b) (Supp. 2002). See U.C.C. § 9-703 cmt. 2 (2001)
("Subsection (b) deals with security interests that are enforceable and perfected
under former Article 9 or other applicable law.'...")

397. Section 9-702(b) allows such a transaction to remain valid except to the
extent one ofthe other sections expressly makes it invalid. Subsection 9-703(b) is
subject to the critical exception "except as otherwise provided in Section 9-705."
Subsection 9-705(a) has a non-uniform cross-reference to Subsection 9-705(g).
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Louisiana chattel mortgages existing on July 1, 2001 remains valid
until the earlier of (i) the time the effect of recordation of the
mortgages ceases or (ii) June 30, 2006. However, if another state's
law governs perfection under the choice of law rules provided in Part
3 of U.C.C. Article 9, and of Chapter 9, this special Louisiana
transition provision may be of no avail.
For the type of such mortgage which under its governing statute
encumbered chattels even though recorded only in the real estate
records, a timely reinscription in the mortgage records after July 1,
2001 will continue the "effect of recordation" of the mortgage and
thus perfection of the security interests and chattels until, but in no
event later than, June 30, 2006.398 This extended time is similar to the
399
extended transition period provided for transmitting utility filings.
However, in contrast, a chattel mortgage (i) filed only in the chattel
mortgage records, and (ii) not previously reinscribed before July 1,
2001, by a continuation filing in the Louisiana uniform commercial
code records, retains its perfection only until arrival of the date on
which its reinscription is required. This different result is because
reinscription of that chattel mortgage to continue its "effect of
recordation," whether in the chattel mortgage records, or the uniform
commercial code records, under the repealed chattel mortgage
statutes is no longer available. Such a chattel mortgage cannot have
the effect of its recordation extended beyond the period fixed as of
July 1, 2001. Thus the secured party must meet the requirements of
Chapter 9 when its current inscription in the chattel mortgage records
expires. 4°°
XII. CONCLUSION

The non-uniform variations in Chapter 9 present a challenge to
the Louisiana practitioner. When participating in a transaction
subject to Chapter 9, a Louisiana attorney must always remember to
compare carefully the applicable provisions of Chapter 9 to their
counterparts in U.C.C. Article 9. Of course, in the large majority of
provisions, Chapter 9 is uniform with U.C.C. Article 9. But, as
discussed above, in many critical areas there are important nonuniform variations in Chapter 9 that mustbe taken into account by
398. La. R.S. 10:9-705(g)(1) (Supp. 2002). See La. Civ. Code arts. 3333, 3334
and supra note 394.
399. La. R.S. 10:9-705(e) (Supp. 2002).
400. The "effect ofrecordation" ofsuch chattel mortgage will cease at the time
its inscription period ends. See former La. R.S. 9:5356(E) and (K) (1991)
(repealed). Cf. La. Civ. Code arts. 3320, 3328-3335 ("effect of recordation").

There isno longer a method available under Louisiana law to extend or continue
their inscriptions and "effect of recordation."
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Louisiana practitioners. Reference to this article, together with a
review of both the Official Comments to U.C.C. Article 9 and the
Louisiana Official Revision Comments to Chapter 9, should provide
assistance in identifying these non-uniform provisions and applying
them to particular transactions.

